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Abstract
Using empirical and theoretical macroeconomic models, we explore external shocks,
business cycle dynamics and optimal monetary policy in oil exporting small open
economies. Paper one employs a sign restricted Bayesian structural vectorautore-
gression (BSVAR) to analyse how three external shocks, namely: global demand,
oil price and the US monetary policy shocks impact on the Nigerian business cycle
variables. Our main objective is to uncover the dominant drivers of the business
cycle. The results show that the global demand shock and oil price shock are the
principal foreign drivers of the Nigerian business cycle. The global demand shock
contributes the most to the evolution of the domestic output growth and inflation
while oil price shock exerts considerable pressure on the domestic interest rate and
the terms of trade. Robustness exercise show that macroeconomic risk arising from
the global demand shock is systematic, owing to its considerable impact on output
and interest rate before and during the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008/2009.
However, the GFC increased inflation volatility. A policy package designed to max-
imise gains from positive global demand shocks, shield the domestic economy from
effects of oil price oscillation and improve domestic economic resilience is advised.
Paper two builds a small open economy (SOE) New Keynesian dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (NKDSGE) model that feature domestic and foreign produc-
tion sectors. There is a representative monopolistically competitive domestic firm
which sets price according to Calvo (1983a) scheme and a representative perfectly
competitive oil firm which produces crude oil exclusive for export and takes oil price
as given. Oil imported from the SOE is combined with a foreign intermediate good
in the rest of the world (ROW) to produce foreign final good which is in turn, im-
ported by the SOE for consumption. The model is closed with Taylor (1993)-type
monetary policy rule. Model calibration matches standard SOE and oil exporting
emerging economy characteristics. Macroeconomic response to a simulated positive
oil price shock indicates evidence of Dutch disease. The exchange rate appreciates
while interest rate falls in response to the non-oil output decline, induced by the
Dutch disease. Domestic inflation targeting policy rule is the most welfare-friendly
in the class of optimized simple rules while the commitment policy dominates both
discretion and optimized simple rules.
14
In paper three, we construct a small open economy New Keynesian DSGE model
to capture important structural features of net oil exporting emerging economies.
We establish a direct connection between crude and refined oil prices and highlight
the seeming structural chasm between domestic oil and non-oil sectors in some net
oil exporting countries. Results of a negative oil price shock simulated on the model
show that, in a zero oil price pass-through environment, the choice of the particular
inflation measure to target in the Taylor rule does not matter. This is because
macroeconomic responses to the shock under all monetary policy specifications are
similar. Such similarity tends to indicate that full oil subsidy which guarantees a zero
oil price pass-through interferes with monetary policy transmission mechanism in
the model economy. In addition, the negative oil price shock precipitates stagflation
which manifests via the income and exchange rate channels. Under the assumption
of perfect labour mobility, the shock triggers movement of workers from the oil sector
to the non-oil sector, thereby boosting non-oil productivity and output. The central
bank responds to inflationary and exchange rate pressures by raising the interest
rate. Tight external borrowing condition adds an extra layer of external vulnerability
to the negative oil price shock. Macroeconomic volatility is least palpable under the
zero oil price pass-through scenario. The optimized simple rules policy exercise
show that either core or oil inflation targeting maximizes welfare given zero oil price
pass-through, while oil inflation targeting is welfare superior under partial or full oil
price pass-through. Targeting core inflation seems the feasible optimal option for
practical monetary policy purposes in net oil exporting small open economies.
Keywords: External Shocks, Sign Restrictions, Structural VAR, Oil Exporting




There is a plethora of theoretical and empirical research on external shocks, busi-
ness cycles and monetary policy. However, an overwhelming proportion is devoted to
exploring issues focusing on industrialized economies; with relatively advanced tech-
nology, high productivity and sound macroeconomic fundamentals. Consequently,
macroeconomic issues in developing and emerging economies have received limited
attention in the literature. Considering the fact that these are small open economies,
many of which rely on commodity export proceeds for foreign exchange earnings,
government revenues and general growth support, it is imperative to understand the
nature of foreign shocks driving their business cycles and the optimal monetary pol-
icy path to take in responding to the shocks. The literature is lean on issues relating
to oil exporting emerging and developing economies, especially those employing re-
cent advances in applied macroeconometric and general equilibrium macroeconomic
modelling frameworks.
Consequently, we attempt to narrow this gap by studying external shocks and
business cycle fluctuations with an empirical model; and by developing two the-
oretical macroeconomic models with structural characteristics of these economies,
particularly in the oil exporting category. In chapter two, using the sign restricted
Bayesian structural vector autoregression (BSVAR), we investigate the dynamic ef-
fects of external shocks on business cycle fluctuations in an oil exporting country
- Nigeria. A small open economy framework is assumed to identify three external
shocks impacting three foreign and four domestic variables. The restrictions im-
posed on the model are informed by theoretical intuitions from Mumtaz & Surico
(2009), Kilian & Lewis (2011), Olayeni (2009a) and Allegret & Benkhodja (2015).
Our sample is partitioned into two, with the full sample covering quarterly dataset
over the period 1982Q1 - 2016Q1 and the second sample covering the period 1982Q2
- 2007Q4. The second sample excludes dataset from the period of the global finan-
cial crisis till 2016Q1 for a robustness exercise to check whether the global financial
crisis impact the results significantly.
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Our results show that global demand and oil price shocks dominate as important
external drivers of the Nigerian business cycle. Whereas, global demand shocks im-
pact domestic output growth and inflation the most, oil price shock is found to exert
considerable influence on the domestic interest rate and the terms of trade. Our ro-
bustness exercise show that, while the global demand shock has similar effects on
domestic output growth and interest rate across the two samples, inflation volatil-
ity exhibits significant moderation when the data is purged of the global financial
crisis. The results suggest that the macroeconomic risk associated with the global
demand shock is a systematic one and thus, may not be diversifiable in small open
economies. The observed oil price pro-cyclicality is preposterous for macroeconomic
stabilization. Periods of financial crisis of a global scale will stretch central banks
capacity to contain inflation among oil exporters. External shocks can be better
managed if oil exporting small open economies utilize gains from positive global
demand shocks to achieve high domestic growth rates, better infrastructures and
improved productivity and competitiveness. On the other hand, managing oil price
shocks require that SOE oil exporters pursue economic diversification to reduce oil
dependency, accumulate fiscal buffers (savings) through the operation of a sovereign
wealth fund and apply sound fiscal rules to dampen the effects of oil price shocks
on business cycle fluctuations.
In chapter three, we present a multi-sector New Keynesian dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) model featuring domestic and foreign production
sectors. The representative domestic firm is assumed to be monopolistically com-
petitive, hence subject to Calvo (1983a) pricing scheme; while a representative oil
firm operate as a perfectly competitive firm. The SOE imports foreign final goods
from the rest of the world (ROE) for consumption while the ROW combines the
SOE’s oil with a foreign intermediate good to produce foreign final good. We close
the model with Taylor (1993)-type monetary policy specification. The model is cal-
ibrated to match standard small open economy characteristics and to reflect the
broad features of an oil exporting emerging economy. A positive oil price shock is
simulated on the model in order to analyse its dynamic effects on macroeconomic
variables under alternative monetary policy specifications. We also conduct optimal
monetary policy exercise given a range of loss functions that reflect central bank’s
preferences.
The results suggest evidence of Dutch disease, as non-oil and aggregate output fell
in response to the shock. However, the significant increase in oil output compensates
for the fall in non-oil output, resulting to higher employment and consumption levels.
The exchange rate appreciates while interest rate falls in response to the Dutch
disease, given there is no immediate inflation threat. Domestic inflation targeting
policy rule is shown to be welfare-superior in the class of optimized simple rules
17
while the commitment policy dominates both discretion and optimized simple rules.
In chapter four, we build a New Keynesian small open economy DSGE model
which embed fundamental features of net oil exporting emerging economies. A
representative oil firm produces crude oil exclusively for export to the rest of the
world (ROW) while the household consumption basket and the non-oil firm’s pro-
duction function include imported refined oil. We assume nominal price rigidity in
the domestic goods sector, a competitive labour market, the operation of the law of
one price gap, a perfectly competitive, non-exogenous enclave oil producing sector,
imperfect international risk-sharing, three alternative oil price pass-through spec-
ifications and a monetary policy setting that feature four alternative policy rules
popular in most emerging and developing economies.
In the model, we capture fundamental features of net oil exporters, establish a di-
rect connection between crude and refined oil prices and highlight seeming structural
chasm between domestic oil and non-oil sectors in some net oil exporting countries.
Given these characterizations, we simulate a negative oil price shock and analyze
the consequent macroeconomic responses under alternative monetary policy speci-
fications and oil price pass-through scenarios. Using optimized simple rules, we test
for the welfare implications of implementing the alternative monetary policy rules
under three oil price pass-through assumptions given the oil price shock.
In the aftermath of the shock, the economy experiences stagflation, which man-
ifests via the income and exchange rate channels. In a zero oil price pass-through
environment, the kind of target variable in the Taylor rule appear not to matter,
as macroeconomic responses to the shock under all monetary policy specifications
exhibit similarity, a development that suggests that oil subsidy interferes with mon-
etary policy transmission mechanism under alternative specifications. Given perfect
labour mobility, the negative oil price shock encourages movement of workers from
the oil sector to the non-oil sector, thereby boosting non-oil productivity and out-
put. The central bank responds to inflation and exchange rate pressures by raising
the interest rate.
Macroeconomic fluctuations under partial and full oil price pass-through follow
similar directional patterns as under the zero pass-through, but response speed and
magnitudes are more pronounced under the former. Although, the monetary policy
rule with oil inflation target is associated with less sharp impact response of oil
consumption, aggregate consumption and aggregate output, it is characterized by
slightly higher volatility over time, compared to other monetary policy rules. Mone-
tary policy response was least aggressive on impact under oil inflation targeting rule
but later turns aggressive as the initial fall in oil inflation reverses. Tight external
borrowing condition adds an extra source of external vulnerability to the negative
oil shock.
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The optimized simple rules policy exercise show that either core or oil inflation
targeting maximizes welfare in a full subsidy or zero pass-through scenario, while
targeting oil inflation is shown to be welfare superior assuming partial or full pass-
through. This modeling outcome presents a challenge in a rule-based interest rate
setting environment, as the policy maker may jeopardize its credibility as it responds
to movement in oil price, an exogenous and highly volatile variable. Our results
suggest that oil subsidy can play a role in moderating adverse oil shock-induced
business cycle fluctuations and can be welfare maximizing, assuming oil subsidy
administration is efficient. Since oil inflation is too volatile to track, core inflation
targeting seems the feasible optimal option for practical monetary policy purposes in
oil exporting small open economies. Inherent external vulnerability can be managed
through stronger domestic resilience to external shocks.
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Chapter 2
External Shocks and Business Cycle
Fluctuations in an Oil Exporting
Small Open Economy
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The role played by external shocks in the evolution of countries business cycles
is recognized in the literature. However, empirical questions still abound in oil
exporting small open economies on the relative contributions of specific external
shocks to the business cycle process. Each foreign shock affect countries in different
ways, depending on the extent of each country’s vulnerability, size of the shock and
the active channels of transmission for the shock. A clear understanding of the
strands of external shocks driving the business cycle is crucial for the formulation
and implementation of appropriate macroeconomic policy responses. The knowledge
of key business cycle-perturbing external shocks is particularly of interest to policy
makers in oil-exporting small open economies, including Nigeria; in view of the
important role oil export play in these economies. This argument is buttressed by the
submission of Cashin & Sosa (2013), that an accurate identification and evaluation
of sources of foreign disturbances and the mechanisms for adjusting to them is
important for understanding business cycles dynamics and for designing appropriate
policies to manage them. The impact an external shock has on the domestic economy
will determine the choice, intensity and sequence of policy responses to such a shock.
Extant literature on Nigeria focuses overwhelmingly on the identification of in-
dividual foreign shocks, with huge concentration on oil price shock. For instance,
Olomola & Adejumo (2006), Omisakin (2008), Umar & Kilishi (2010) and Ekong &
Effiong (2015); amongst many others, zeroed in on oil price shock in their studies.
The emphasis on oil-related shocks tend to obscure other potentially important ex-
ternal shocks to which the Nigerian economy may be susceptible. Thus, resulting
in inaccurate inferences and inappropriate policy prescriptions. In order to address
this, we adopt a unified approach achieved through block identification of three ex-
ternal shocks, namely: global demand, oil price and US monetary policy shocks.
This modelling approach is particularly useful for disentangling the different exter-
nal shock components affecting domestic business cycle movement. Through this
approach, we can uncover the impact of each external shock and the corresponding
relative contribution of each shock, over time, to the Nigerian business cycle.
This chapter aims to investigate the relative contributions of the three external
shocks in the evolution of the Nigerian business cycle using sign restricted Bayesian
structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) modelling technique. To our knowledge,
this is the first attempt to apply this methodology on the Nigerian data to anal-
yse a subject that has received limited attention in the oil exporting small open
economy literature. The paper, therefore, represents an important addition to the
applied macroeconomic literature in Nigeria and the wider oil exporting developing
and emerging economies. The sign restriction identification procedure derives from
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Olayeni (2009a), Adebiyi & Mordi (2012) and Allegret & Benkhodja (2015), in addi-
tion to the global macroeconomic literature in the spirit of Mumtaz & Surico (2009)
and Kilian & Lewis (2011).
The results show that global demand shocks tend to impact domestic output
growth positively for a long time. Similarly, domestic inflation exhibits high sen-
sitivity to the global demand shock, while monetary policy tightens over longer
horizon in response to the global demand shock-induced inflationary pressure. The
sharp but short-lived response of terms of trade to the global demand shock stems
directly from the positive response of oil price to the same shock, given the close
link between the two variables in Nigeria. It is apparent from our results, that any
shock that moves the oil price upward will elicit similar effect in the terms of trade,
as oil export constitute a major component of the terms of trade. There is a delayed
positive domestic inflation response to the US monetary policy shock, suggesting
that monetary tightening in the US can elicit inflationary consequences in SOEs.
This can be attributed to capital reversal in response to increased returns in the US
and flight to safety and quality. The lag in inflation response, however, may reflect
investors cautious attitude or potential temporary constraints to capital mobility.
In addition, the US monetary policy shock exerts a moderate and negative effect
on the domestic output growth in our model; indicating that world monetary policy
does matter for macroeconomic stabilisation in Nigeria. The oil price shock does
not cause inflation on impact; rather, it contributes to inflationary momentum over
time. This result captures how oil boom often result to immediate improvement in
external reserves position and exchange rate appreciation. However, with time, the
boom induces decline in competitiveness, higher demand for imported goods and
excess domestic liquidity which often fuel exchange rate and inflationary pressures,
that may compel the central bank to tighten policy stance. Overall, the global
demand and oil price shocks are revealed to exert significant influence on domestic
output growth and the most discernible effect on inflation compared to the US
monetary policy shock. The result indicates that the global demand shock is the
prime mover of business cycle fluctuations in Nigeria. Our robustness exercise which
covers the pre-crisis period of 1982Q2 - 2007Q4 show that, whereas global demand
shock had similar effects on domestic output growth and interest rate, inflation
volatility moderated significantly. Thus, suggesting that the global financial crisis
contributed to higher inflation volatility in Nigeria.
Section 2 presents a survey of the literature and section 3 explores the method-
ology; while section 4 treats data, model and estimation. Section 5 presents and
discusses the results while section 6 concludes the paper.
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2.2 Some Stylized Facts
The global economy is a network of trading countries, with the United States (US)
as the only one with requisite market power to significantly influence global market
conditions. Other countries are considered as small open economies whose individ-
ual market power is not sufficient to influence world prices, the global term structure
and international income levels. Trade relations among economies account signifi-
cantly for the increasing integration of many economies. Each country’s role in the
complex global economic interactions is to a large extent determined by the size
of their individual markets, factor endowments, financial infrastructure, technology
and development status, among others. Such trade dynamics places the U.S. in
a vantage position to influence global market conditions and other players adjusts
from time to time to the external shocks vulnerabilities imposed on them. Typi-
cally, economies with diversified production base and high levels of self-sufficiency
tend to exhibit less sensitivity to external shocks except when such phenomena are
of a global scale or the channels through which such shocks affect the economy is
prominent. Conversely, developing and emerging economies, especially those relying
on primary product exports as the main source of government revenue and for-
eign exchange are often highly susceptible to volatility in global commodity market
conditions.
Many oil exporting small open economies like Nigeria, have been through eco-
nomic twists and turns occasioned by oil price oscillations, changes in the global
economic conditions and monetary, fiscal, financial and other developments in their
trading partners economies. Oil price increases often result in higher government
revenues and expenditure, economic growth, external reserves growth, exchange
rate stability, higher capital inflows and improvements in the balance of payments.
During oil boom, the exchange rate is often over-valued, encouraging increased im-
portation and leading to decline in non-oil export competitiveness. This scenario
is known as the Dutch disease1. However, a sustained fall in oil price often pre-
cipitate sharp decline in government revenues, high budget deficits, higher public
debts, inflation up-tick, slide in economic growth, threat of recession, increase in
trade arrears, external reserves depletion, exchange rate depreciation, capital rever-
sal, balance of payments crisis, rising unemployment and poverty, industrial crises
and general macroeconomic instability.
Volatility in the price of primary commodities often reflect in the pattern of
resource endowed and commodity exporting countries business cycles. Business cy-
cles in mono-product or primary-led economies often co-vary with movements in
the global market conditions for the products they export. Whereas, primary com-
1See Egert & Leonard (2008) and Benkhodja (2014)
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modity importing countries reap huge benefits from an oil price fall and face higher
input costs when price rises, the experience of commodity exporters is different. For
the latter, periods of decline in price are usually austere while wind-falls come with
upward trending prices. Similarly, economies with ample potential for attracting
foreign capital flows often become vulnerable to events2 in the investors home coun-
tries. Such events may trigger a swift, herd-like exit3 from other markets where they
had interests either due to maturing obligations at home or for safety considerations.
Thus, giving rise to the disruptive phenomenon of sudden stops4 in many developing
and emerging economies with high returns on investments.
Since the 1950s, Nigeria has been a primary-led economy; shifting overtime from
reliance on agriculture to oil for government revenue and foreign exchange earnings.
About 85 percent of Nigeria’s foreign exchange earnings is derived from crude oil
sale receipts while about 70 percent of government revenue is derived from the same
source. The continual over-reliance on oil, the high orientation towards importation
of consumer products and the failure to diversify the economy expose the country to
the consequences of an adverse external shocks. The contagion effects of the global
financial crisis (GFC) of 2008/09, US quantitative easing (QE) and subsequent QE
tapering on many emerging and developing economies underscore the crucial role
external shocks play in their business cycle evolution. The GFC effects reverberated
through the Nigerian financial markets after a short lag. For instance, the Nigerian
All-Share Index (ASI) fell from 65,652.38 points in February 2008 to 19,851.89 points
in March 2009; representing a loss of about 70 percent. Also, external reserves came
under intense pressure, dropping from $62.08 billion in September 2008 to $31.89
billion in June 2011, representing a decline of about 50 percent. These events tended
to mirror the decline in the oil price which stood at $137.74/barrel in July 2008
and $44.95/barrel in January 2009, respectively. The inflow of foreign portfolio
investments (FPI) into Nigeria dipped remarkably during the crisis. The Nigerian
banking sector’s experience was particularly grave, as non-performing loans rose
and toxic assets in banks balance sheets eroded their capital base substantially. In
response, the central bank pursued an accommodating monetary policy by reducing
the policy rate from 10.00 percent to 6.00 percent and implemented quantitative
easing measures to promote credit flow in the economy. Also, to address the concern
about financial system stability, the Bank injected funds into some ailing banks in
form of Tier II capital and set up a crisis resolution vehicle, namely the Asset
2These are dramatic macroeconomic or financial developments that may cause international
investors to repatriate capital or readjust their investments portfolios offshore
3This refers to foreign investors divestment from an economy owing to worsening macroeconomic
outlook in that economy or shocks from their home and other countries
4This is a crisis triggered investor behaviour resulting in phenomenal seizure in the flow of
capital into a country or reversal of capital from a country.
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Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) to buy up banks toxic assets and
repair their balance sheets.
Figure 2.1 shows movement in the quarterly world output growth, domestic
output growth and domestic inflation rates between 2001Q1 and 2016Q1.
Figure 2.1: World Output Growth, Domestic Growth and Inflation Rates
Over the period, world output growth had been positive and fairly stable around
an average of 3.0 percent. The worst performance for global growth was experienced
late 2009 at 0.34 percent. This is due to the impact of the global financial crisis of
2008/09 which resulted from a world-wide credit crunch. It is observed that, the
GFC-induced low global growth did not affect Nigeria’s growth performance imme-
diately. The effect, however, became manifest after a three quarter lag; suggesting
that spill-over effect may be stronger than contagion effect in Nigeria. This may also
justify the possibility of the trade channel being stronger than the financial channel
in Nigeria. Domestic inflation rate is high and mostly in the double-digit range over
the period. Domestic output and inflation are shown to move in nearly opposite
direction. A classic example of this is between 2015Q1 and 2016Q1 when domes-
tic output growth and inflation moved in sharply opposite directions; with output
decelerating into negative territory as inflation sky-rocketed. This is a clear case of
stagflation, a challenge that has remained daunting for policymakers in Nigeria.
Figure 2.2 shows trend in oil price, domestic growth and inflation between 2001Q1
and 2016Q1. The chart suggest that oil price and inflation are more volatile, and
tend to co-move on the average. Domestic output growth assumes a unique and
less volatile trend; and does not share strong co-movement with oil price. However,
both oil price and domestic growth exhibit strong co-movement between 2014Q3 and
2016Q1. This indicates that the co-movement between oil price and domestic growth
is asymmetric; as it is more visible when oil price is on a downward path. This trend,
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Figure 2.2: Oil Price, Domestic Growth and Inflation Rates
when linked with the observed rising inflation during the period, indicates that fall
in oil price is stagflationary in Nigeria.
Figure 2.3: US Federal Funds, Domestic Inflation and Growth Rates
Figure 2.3 shows movement in the US federal funds rate, domestic output growth
and inflation. Overall, this chart does not indicate significant patterns between
federal funds rate and domestic variables. However, there is a slight indication
that Nigeria’s output performance is somewhat improved as foreign interest rate
falls. This observation is buttressed by the recent trend whereby low interest rate
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environment in developed economies encourages capital flows into emerging market
economies with high interest rates. An emerging economy with high inflow of foreign
capital can leverage such for economic growth.
In table 2.1 key external and domestic macroeconomic variables are presented
based on the average for each decade since 1982. It shows some preliminary evi-
dence of possible interactions between global macroeconomic dynamics and domestic




















1982Q1 - 1990Q4 3.06 8.67 23.46 23.88 2.80
1991Q1 - 2000Q4 3.15 4.96 19.20 32.21 2.08
2001Q1 - 2010Q4 4.29 2.35 55.91 13.00 8.74
2011Q1 - 2016Q1 3.43 0.13 95.11 9.83 4.57
Table 2.1: Selected External and Domestic Macroeconomic Indicators
For instance, in the period 2001Q1 - 2010Q4, world output growth and domestic
output growth peaked at 4.29 percent and 8.74 percent, respectively. Whereas, in
the preceding decade, the world recorded the second lowest output growth of 3.15
percent while Nigeria recorded its lowest output growth at 2.08 percent in the same
period. As can be observed from the table, domestic inflation was subdued and real
gross domestic product tend to perform better in a global environment with higher
oil prices. These tend to suggest that developments in the global economy do have
significant influence on the Nigerian economy, working mainly through the exchange
rate channel.
Table 2.2 shows the results of cross correlation analysis implemented on the
dataset. It shows the direction and strength of the association that exist among the
variables under consideration. The degree of association between oil price and terms
of trade is the strongest in the dataset at 46 percent. This is not surprising as oil
export represent the principal component of Nigeria’s total exports.
5Real Gross Domestic Product
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Variables GOG FFR OPG DOG INF TOT DIR
GOG 1.000 -0.061 0.130 0.406 -0.462 0.171 -0.285
FFR -0.061 1.000 0.037 -0.408 0.134 0.007 0.091
OPG 0.130 0.037 1.000 0.175 -0.071 0.457 0.099
DOG 0.406 -0.408 0.175 1.000 -0.425 0.092 0.176
INF -0.462 0.134 -0.071 -0.425 1.000 -0.064 0.411
TOT 0.171 0.007 0.457 0.092 -0.064 1.000 0.087
DIR -0.285 0.091 0.099 0.176 0.411 0.087 1.000
Table 2.2: Correlation Analysis of the Data
Table 2.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the data6. It indicates that the
distribution of four out of the seven variables satisfy the normality assumption while
three did not. Oil price growth and inflation exhibit the highest level of volatility
in the dataset.
GOG FFR OPG DOG INF TOT DIR
Mean 3.509 4.358 1.159 4.605 21.03 0.012 11.97
Median 3.476 4.838 1.081 5.003 13.28 -0.489 11.72
Maximum 6.226 14.51 65.82 15.18 89.56 33.89 27.00
Minimum 0.338 0.073 -50.56 -8.061 -4.976 -31.66 4.630
Std. Dev. 1.281 3.252 14.87 4.480 19.66 8.233 4.306
Skewness 0.052 0.292 0.171 -0.332 1.430 0.393 0.979
Kurtosis 2.761 2.404 5.943 3.482 4.195 7.124 4.103
Jarque-Bera 0.384 3.953 49.75 3.824 54.48 99.91 28.64
Probability 0.825 0.138 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sum 477.2 592.7 157.7 626 2860 1.705 1628
Sum Sq. Dev. 221.5 1428 29877 2709 52206 9151 2503
Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics
6GOG is global output growth, FFR is US federal funds rate, OPG is oil price growth (Bonny
Light Oil price changes), DOG is domestic output growth, INF is domestic inflation, TOT is terms




Mitchell (1927) and Burns & Mitchell (1946) characterize business cycles as “a type
of fluctuation found in the aggregate economic activity of nations that organize their
work mainly in business enterprises: a cycle consists of expansions occurring at about
the same time in many economic activities, followed by similarly general recessions,
contractions and revivals which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle;
this sequence of changes is recurrent but not periodic; in duration business cycles
vary from more than one year to ten or twelve years; they are not divisible into
shorter cycles of similar character with amplitudes approximating their own” (Skare
& Stjepanovic (2016)). From this foundation, business cycles may be regarded as the
regular periods of expansion and contraction in major economic aggregate variables
like employment, industrial production, export, output, consumption, investments,
prices and interest rate. In terms of duration, the U.S. National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) estimates that an average business cycles last from 4 – 6 years in
the U.S.
Both external and domestic shocks are known to play important role in busi-
ness cycle fluctuations. Rebelo (2005) notes that the Great Depression may have
been caused by a strange mix of bad shocks and policy, with shocks like large
drops in world agricultural products, acute drought and financial system instabil-
ity topping the list. Important shocks that have been identified as drivers of the
business cycles in the literature include technology/productivity shocks (Prescott,
1986; Norrbin & Schlagenhauf, 1988; Nelson & Plosser, 1982; King & Rebelo, 1999),
fiscal shocks (Baxter & King, 1999; Braun, 1994; and McGrattan, 1994), changes in
government spending (Ramey & Shapiro, 1998, Burnside, 1996 and Fisher, 2003),
monetary shocks (Bernanke et al., 1996), energy price shocks (Kim & Loungani,
1992a; Rotemberg & Woodford, 1996; and Finn, 2000). In open economies, external
shocks such as oil price shocks, terms of trade shocks, foreign monetary policy shock,
global demand shocks etc tend to play crucial roles in shaping movements in the
business cycles.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Varangis Panos & Nehru (2004)
considers a shock as deviation from a normal, expected trend that is unanticipated
or exogenous. It is an unforeseen event, outside the control of authorities, which has
significant impact on the economy and requiring response or adjustment. Germane
questions arising from this definition include: (a) which shocks can be considered
as purely exogenous and (b) what constitutes significant impact? Varangis Panos
& Nehru (2004), in response note that pronounced shocks occurring suddenly, such
as natural disasters (for example, earthquakes, hurricanes) can be quite different
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compared to those that unfold slowly (such as commodity prices, droughts). The
first is easier to identify, with duration that can be ascertained with some measure
of accuracy and on a scale that can be assessed with some confidence; while the
second type that unfolds slowly, usually starts unnoticed, and with impact that are
hard to assess. They identify another shocks categorization, namely; input shocks
and output shocks. An input shock relates to the source of the disturbance to
an economy. These may include terms of trade shock or a natural disaster. An
output shock touches on the impact of the disturbance measured as trend deviation
in output or export earnings. A consumption shock will measure the impact on
trend deviation in consumption. The process by which input shocks are translated
into output shocks is known as transmission mechanism, which to a large extent
is determined by the structure of the economy, institutional quality and the policy
environment.
Also, shocks have been characterized as temporary changes in the conditional
mean of stochastic processes feeding a particular model. Shocks, as discussed in
the real business cycle (RBC) model a la Kydland & Prescott (1982) analyses the
consequences of changes in the conditional mean of productivity (i.e. productivity
or technology shock). Woodford (2003) and Christiano et al. (2005) analysed shocks
as the effects of temporary changes in the conditional mean of innovations to the
nominal interest rates (i.e. monetary policy shock). Mendoza (1991), Neumeyer &
Perri (2005) investigated shocks associated with temporary changes in the condition
mean of the real interest rate, while Mendoza (1995) probed temporary changes in
the first moment of the terms of trade (i.e. terms of trade shock). In recent times,
macro-economists have shown interest in scenarios where shocks are associated with
temporary changes in the conditional second moments (standard deviation) of the
stochastic process, rather than the first moments (mean). This has been referred to
as stochastic volatility or time-varying standard deviations.
In the macroeconomics literature, supply shocks can be distinguished from de-
mand shocks. Supply shock, generally refers to a sudden and significant deterioration
in the aggregate supply position in a country, which disturbs the structural balance
of the economy, leading to increased prices and unemployment. This type of shock
may be caused by a sudden fall in the supply of raw materials or/and a rise in input
prices, say for example a significant rise in oil prices resulting in a decline in output,
a rise in unemployment and rise in inflation. This is such that create policy dilemma
for the authorities, who may either in line with classical prescriptions wait for the
very ‘long run’ for equilibrium to be restored or intervene through fiscal or monetary
expansion to boost employment, and then live with or manage the possible infla-
tionary consequences. In the old Keynesian sense, however, a demand shock is said
to capture a temporary shift in consumer expectations as an exogenous disturbance
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to the IS equation which does not generate positive co-movement between inflation,
employment and output (Lorenzoni, 2006).
Several studies have indicated the role that external shocks play in influencing
macroeconomic conditions in emerging and developing countries.UNCTAD (2002),
Raddatz (2005) and Berg et al., 2011 underscore the fact that exogenous shocks
often exert significant negative impact on developing economies growth, stability and
welfare. They emphasize that poor countries are particularly vulnerable to natural
disasters and terms-of-trade shocks. Thus, it is believed that world commodity
prices’ levels and volatility constitute important influence on economic growth and
welfare in less-developed countries. Vegh (2013) notes that external shock may
be decomposed into two (2) strands, namely: (a) external nominal shocks, which
represent changes in foreign inflation rate; and (b) external real shocks, which is
regarded as shocks to terms of trade.
The channels through which external shocks are propagated is key to under-
standing the sources, nature and magnitude of impact of shocks in any economy.
Chowla et al. (2014) submits that a good grasp of shocks transmission channels is
important, given that such knowledge can help policymakers to either limit or offset
the impact of shocks. Three main external shocks transmission channels have been
identified in the literature. The first is the external trade channel. It works via
the income effect on demand. A negative foreign demand shock, ceteris paribus,
will lower international demand for exports. The shrinkage in exports lowers ex-
port earnings, dampens domestic employment, causes exchange rate depreciation
and raises the possibility of a recession or depression in many trading countries.
However, in case of a supply shock, say for instance, “an act of God” which cause
huge decline in a major production input, there will be pressures on firms inputs
costs, leading to a cost push inflation across borders. The effects of these shocks
often work through other countries that the world rely on for trade purposes.
The second is the financial channel, which is often reflected through improved
global liquidity flows in good times and tight credit conditions and higher asset price
volatility in periods of financial stress. Whereas, the trade channel work through
exchange of goods and services, the financial channel is underlined by the exchange
of financial assets, across different jurisdictions. The financial channel may be sub-
divided into three, namely: (a) credit channel, (b) funding channel and; (c) non-
banking channel. The credit channel work through domestic financial institutions’
exposure to foreign counterparts or through foreign subsidiaries. Domestic eco-
nomic agents can be adversely affected when the risks associated with domestic
banks’ exposure to foreign banks or when banks’ foreign exposures through offshore
subsidiaries crystallizes. This may be thought of as the risk a local bank faces as
a result of losses originating from her foreign subsidiaries. Losses experienced by
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banks’ foreign subsidiaries through higher non-performing loans due to slow-down in
economic activities in the foreign country where they operate. These trends tend to
impact negatively on affected home banks’ capital base and their capacity to sustain
or expand their balance sheet through new loans, thus, leading to a credit crunch.
The funding channel operates through dependence of home financial institutions
on funding from offshore sources. Many domestic banks which have credit lines with
foreign banks may have such facilities discontinued or reduced when foreign banks
are faced with liquidity squeeze of a significant magnitude. This will affect funding
for international transactions and business operations of domestic banks customers.
Generally, during financial crisis or boom of a global dimension, cross-border lending
activities are usually strongly affected. Chowla et al. (2014), following a study on
the UK, submit that strong evidence exist to indicate that both the funding and
credit channels are crucial for the transmission of global shocks to the UK economy
during the 2008/09 financial crisis.
The non-banking channel addresses the transmission of external shocks through
domestic ownership of foreign assets and liabilities by the non-bank public. Par-
ticipation in foreign direct and foreign portfolio investments in other countries can
have significant impact on investors through ‘wealth effect’ in case of a major shock
in the recipient economy. Offshore losses incurred by households and firms through
their foreign portfolio positions may lead them to cut spending domestically, and
for the foreign countries, it may lead to capital reversals that may snowball into a
‘sudden stop’.
In addition to the trade and financial channels, the uncertainty channel can
also amplify foreign shocks in the local economy. Uncertainty normally arise when
agents are pessimistic or less optimistic about the outlook for domestic or/and global
macroeconomic conditions. Bernanke (1983) and Bloom (2009) also submit that eco-
nomic agents tend to defer their spending decisions in periods when macroeconomic
prospects are shrouded in uncertainty. Firms, in particular, tend to postpone invest-
ment when the macroeconomic outlook is adjudged unfavourable. High uncertainty
may also precipitate higher costs of fund for firms and households as the market
rate of return rises to compensate against future risks.
The literature posits that many cross-border shocks transmission occur through
contagion and spill-overs effects. Kaminsky & Schmukler (2003) provide a distinction
between contagion and spill-over. A contagion is thought of as an episode which
produce significant immediate effects in a number of countries following a shock,
whose consequences are fast and furious and evolve over a matter of hours or days.
In the case of spill over, the initial international response to the shock may be
muted, but it becomes manifest in a gradual and protracted manner, with potential
cumulative economic consequences. They exclude common external shocks, such as
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global interest rates changes or oil prices in their working definition of contagion,
with the exception that an excess co-movement in financial and economic variables
exist across countries in response to a common shock. The extent to which an
external shock operate depend largely on the economy’s degree of openness and level
of integration with major trading partners and the global economy. External shocks
propagation is usually weaker for countries that are less integrated with the rest of
the world. The farther an economy is from being fully open, the less susceptible it
is to contagion and spill over effects.
2.3.2 Empirical Literature
The literature provides evidence on the effects of external shocks on small open
(oil exporting and non-oil exporting) economies. While many studies find external
shocks to be the major diver of business cycle fluctuations, others report that the
role of domestic shocks is stronger on specific business cycle variables. In the case
of Australia, Dungey et al. (2002), based on a SVAR model attributes only 32
percent of the variations in output forecast errors over a twelve-month horizon to
external shocks while domestic demand shocks dominates in moving the business
cycle. Contrary to Dungey et al. (2002), Nimark (2007) based on the results of an
estimated New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
submits that external shocks explains more than half of the variance in output
while domestic demand shocks account for just 8.0 per cent. Also, Dungey & Pagan
(2000), with a simulated data from a SVAR model, find that economic downturns
in Australia would have been mild had there been no shocks from foreign sources,
and total volatility during economic expansion would have been less pronounced.
Similarly, Liu (2010) extracted the cyclical component of Australia’s GDP series
using the Beveridge-Nelson decomposition and set up a SVAR model identified with
sign restrictions obtained from a small open economy DSGE model in the spirits
of Monacelli (2005) and Gali & Monacelli (2005), and showed that foreign shocks
provide more than 50 percent of total explanations for Australia’s output fluctua-
tions, while the impact of domestic demand shocks on the business cycle is found
to be rather muted. Leu (2011) built a SVAR model based on exclusion restrictions
gleaned from an estimated open economy New Keynesian model which capture the
rational and forward looking attributes of economic agents. The findings reveals
that the Reserve Bank of Australia care much about short-run output stabilization
and medium-term target for inflation; while external dynamics are found to impact
significantly on aggregate demand shocks in Australia. Sariola (2015) investigates
the structural shocks driving the Swedish business cycle, using a sign restricted
SVAR, identified four (4) shocks based on guidance from Riksbank’s DSGE model
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(known as Ramses II) by Adolfson & Walentin (2013). The results indicate that
nearly half of the volatility in the Swedish output is accounted for by productivity
and external demand shocks; while the contribution of domestic demand shock to
output volatility is negligible.
The notion that external shocks do impact notably on emerging and developing
economies is further strengthened by Calvo et al. (1993), who apply a SVAR model
and find that foreign shocks account for a significant share of the variance in the
real exchange rate in the period 1988 – 1991 in Latin America. Broda & Tille
(2003) in a study covering seventy five (75) developing countries across Asia, Africa,
Latin America and Eastern Europe, investigated how terms of trade can affect a
country’s real income, price level and exchange rate, using the VAR methodology.
They find that a large proportion of output volatility in developing countries can
be attributed to changes in the terms of trade. Mendoza (1995) employed a three-
sector inter-temporal equilibrium model to investigate the nexus between terms of
trade and macroeconomic fluctuations in small open economies. Results from the
study indicates that about 50 percent of actual GDP variability is due to terms
of trade shocks, but the correlations between net export and terms of trade was
found to be weak. Canova (2005) studied the transmission shocks to eight Latin
American countries from the U.S., by identifying U.S. shocks as exogenous using
the sign restrictions SVAR technique. The paper captures both contemporaneous
and lagged effects through a bilateral specification in which each Latin American
country is paired with the U.S. This approach is said to remove from the analysis
the possibility of feedbacks among Latin American countries or through third party
countries. Findings from the study demonstrate empirically that, while the U.S.
monetary shocks results in significant fluctuations in Latin American business cycles
and that both real supply and demand shocks do not have significant effects on the
region’s business cycle. Also, within the Latin American region, the distinction
between countries which operate the floating exchange rate system and those with
currency boards did not matter much. The financial channel for shocks transmission
is found to be crucial.
In a study which employs a four variable SVAR, Huang & Guo (2006) identify
global foreign shocks as a global supply shock, and utilizing data over the period 1970
- 2002, finds external innovations to be significant, with positive correlation among
the countries in East Asia. Ng (2002), in a study of five emerging countries in South
Eastern Asia spanning the period 1970 - 1995, identified one external shock and two
domestic shocks using a SVAR. Findings from the study indicate that the response
of domestic variables to external shocks across these countries is strong. Thus,
providing some empirical justification for the establishment a monetary union in
the region. In a related study on small Asian economies, Genberg (2005) estimated
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a VAR model to investigate the effects of external shocks on these countries and
finds that foreign shocks from the U.S., rather than China, mainly account for the
inflation dynamics in the six Asian economies of Hong Kong, Thailand, Singapore,
Korea, the Philippines and Taiwan.
In a related study on emerging market countries, with a SVAR model that reflect
block exogeneity over the period 1986M1-2000M12, Mackowiak (2007) used world
commodity prices, the US Federal funds rate, the U.S. aggregate price level, the
U.S. money stock and the U.S. aggregate output as external shocks. Results from
the study suggest that all external shocks apart from the U.S. monetary policy
shock affect domestic variables significantly in these economies. Also, the study
underscores the tendency for external shocks to be persistent, as they are shown
to contribute more to fluctuations in emerging economies’ domestic variables at
longer forecast horizons. Similarly, Sato et al. (2011) examine the contributions
of external shocks to fluctuations in East Asian countries’ business cycles, with a
SVAR model that applied block exogeneity to achieve identification in line with the
small open economy assumptions. Estimation is conducted for three sub-samples:
1978Q1-1987Q4; 1988Q1-1996Q4; and 1999Q1-2007Q4 to detect dynamics inherent
in each episode of external shocks, as well as the business cycle dynamics of East
Asian countries. Findings from the study indicate that external shocks of the U.S.
and those of Japanese origin were prominent in East Asian countries prior to the
financial turbulence of 1997 – 1998. After the crisis, however, while the U.S. shocks
still dominate as the main source of fluctuations in rest of East Asia, China’s main
vulnerability is to Japanese shocks.
Gimet (2011) juxtapose two crises episodes, namely; the Asian crisis (1997M1-
1999M12) and the sub-prime crisis (2007M1-2009M12) to examine the susceptibility
of East Asian economies to world-wide financial turmoil, using a structural Bayesian
vector autoregressive modelling framework. Results from the study reveal that over
time, East Asian economies’ financial vulnerability has reduced, however, responses
to global shocks remain non-symmetric, given that positive and negative shocks do
not result in equal amount of effects. Utlaut & Van Roye (2010) analysed the ef-
fects of external shocks on Asia’s emerging economies through through Bayesian
VAR estimation and show that nearly half of drivers of emerging Asia’s real GDP
growth rate is attributable to external innovations. They simulated a double dip
situation in the global economy, with a subdued growth path in China based on
conditional forecasts, it was discovered that the global economic growth trajectory
dictates significantly emerging Asia’s economic outlook and not the Chinese business
cycle fluctuations. Silva (2012) explores the role domestic and external shocks play
in driving business cycles in Mexico and Brazil. In the paper, non-recursive contem-
poraneous restrictions and block recursive restrictions were imposed and Bayesian
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estimation was implemented. Results from the exercise reveal that for both Brazil
and Mexico, domestic shocks are the prime drivers of domestic output at shorter
horizons while external shocks predominates at longer horizons. Among the external
shocks, U.S. output shocks, compared to the U.S. monetary policy shocks, exerts
greater influence on domestic output volatility. Also, Silva (2012) finds that while
commodity price shocks account for nearly 18 per cent of the output volatility in
a 2-year horizon in Brazil, it accounts for about 20 percent in Mexico in the same
time horizon.
Houssa et al. (2015) for a study on Ghana, a low income country with small
open economy, examine, using a mix of sign and recursive restrictions in a Bayesian
VAR modelling framework, the role international and domestic shocks play in shap-
ing business cycle evolution in Ghana. The same exercise is replicated for South
Africa, an economy with a similar structure but at a higher stage of development,
to provide a benchmark. They pair macroeconomic dynamics in the G-7 countries
with Ghana and South Africa, respectively; and finds that world productivity and
credit shocks dominates more in South Africa than in Ghana, while commodity
shocks is discovered to be a major factor in both countries’ business cycles. Global
credit market shocks exert no notable influence on Ghana while productivity shocks
do, suggesting that Ghana’s integration with the global economy works more via
trade channels and less via financial channels. Their findings underscore the need
to recognize the role of the primary goods sector for policy purposes in commodity
exporting countries.
Rafiq (2011) assumes a small open economy condition to investigate sources
of economic fluctuations in oil-exporting countries and implications for exchange
rate regime choice using a sign restricted SVAR. Shocks were identified based on
“textbook economic theory” and the results indicates that international shocks (i.e.
terms of trade shocks) impact on exchange rate and domestic price movements more
than domestic shocks in oil-exporting emerging market economies. A robustness
exercise in which the terms of trade variable is replaced with oil price yields a
similar result, except that oil price shocks exerts greater influence on exchange rate
fluctuations. In addition, results of the robustness exercise also suggests that most
of the volatility in the terms of trade in emerging market oil exporting economies
are due to oil price changes.
Olomola & Adejumo (2006) examined the effect of oil price shocks on inflation,
output, the real exchange rate and money supply in Nigeria using ordinary VAR, and
finds that the direct impact of oil price shocks on inflation and output is subdued.
Whereas, inflation is influenced by output and the real exchange rate shocks, oil price
shocks impact significantly on the real exchange rate. The results also reveal that oil
price shocks pass-through in Nigeria operate via the real exchange rate and money
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supply, respectively. Philip & Akintoye (2006), Christopher & Benedikt (2006) and
Omisakin (2008) are unanimous in their conclusions that oil price shock has no
significant effect on domestic variables like money supply, government expenditure,
output and inflation . However, Umar & Kilishi (2010) using a VAR methodology
finds that oil price has significant effects on real output, unemployment and money
supply; while the effect is not found to be significant for the consumer price index.
Similarly, Akpan (2009), also using the VAR framework, reports that exchange
rate, inflation and output exhibit significant sensitivity to oil price movement in
Nigeria. Alege (2015) characterize the Nigerian business cycle using the Dynamic
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model in the spirits of Nason & Cogley
(1994) and Schorfheide (2000); extended to incorporate the export sector with a
view to reflecting the transmission mechanism of terms of trade. Results from the
study show that the Nigerian business cycle is driven by both real and nominal
shocks.
The effects of external shocks as observed with small open economies in Asia,
Latin America, Middle East and Africa is not the same with the G-7 countries.
For instance, Kim (2001) 7 finds insignificant spill-overs of U.S. monetary policy
shocks to the G-7 countries. This results provide some degree of corroboration for
the later findings by Mackowiak (2007), which suggests that the emerging mar-
ket economies tend to exhibit greater susceptibility to external shocks compared
to advanced economies. More recently, Huh & Kwon (2015) estimate a Bayesian
SVAR model of the real exchange rate, output and trade balance for the G-7 with
a set of sign restrictions derived from Clarida & Gali (1994)’s stochastic rational
expectations open-economy model with sticky prices. They extend the model by
incorporating trade balance and identifying supply shocks using the implied long-
run restrictions of the output-neutrality condition. Their results show that nominal
shocks tend to induce real exchange rate depreciation and lead to improvements in
the trade balance in the long run across G-7 economies.
7The G-7 is the group of seven leading advanced economies in the world including the U.S.,
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the U.K.
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2.4 Methodology
Generally, VAR models are known to forecast and describe dependencies among
variables well. Since Sims (1980)’s popularization of this class of models, they have
become increasingly useful among macro-economists and researchers in policy insti-
tutions for policy analysis. VAR models have been part of the foremost working tools
in applied macroeconomics (Christiano et al., 1998; Canova, 2005; and Lütkepohl,
2013). They tend to fit macroeconomic data well and are very useful for capturing
the dynamic effects of shocks or responses to shocks in a given system of variables.
Typically, a VAR specification requires that each variable is expressed as being
determined by its own lagged values and the lagged values of other variables in the
system. Important outputs of the VAR models include impulse response functions,
variance error decomposition and historical decomposition. A VAR(p) process is of
the form:
yt = Aiyt−i + et, t = 1, ..., T (2.1)
where yt is (nx1) vector of endogenous variables in the model; Ai are (nxn) matrices
of coefficients, for i = 1, ..., p; and, et represents (nx1) vector of unobservable white
noise processes with E(et) = 0, constant and positive-definite covariance matrix
E(ete
′
t) = cov(et) = Ωe. The errors (et) have zero auto-correlation but may be
correlated across equations. This possibility of cross equations correlation tend to
undermine the plausibility of extracting valid economic intuitions from the reduced
form VAR models.
Despite their popularity, VAR models are purely statistical. Therefore, to make
meaningful economic inferences from the VAR estimates, plausible economic struc-
tures are normally imposed on the unrestricted VAR system. Thus, it is often the
practice to identify a given structure on the reduced form VAR to insert some ele-
ments of economic theory into them for informed policy analysis.
2.4.1 From structural VAR to reduced form VAR
Whereas, in the unrestricted VAR, only predetermined variables are specified on the
RHS8 as in 2.1 above, structural VAR allow for contemporaneous interactions among
variables. Typically, the expression for a (stationary) structural VAR of order 1 can
be of the matrix form:
B0yt = Biyt−i + εt (2.2)
8RHS: right hand side of an equation
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Matrix B0 is the contemporaneous impact matrix, which summarizes the instan-
taneous interactions among the variables; B1 is (nxn) matrix of coefficients of the
model dynamics. The first feature which distinguishes the structural VAR from
the unrestricted VAR is the addition of the impact matrix B0, and the second, is
the replacement of the reduced form errors or residuals, et by an (nx1) vector of
structural shocks or unobservable zero mean white noise processes εt. This property
ensures that εt are serially uncorrelated and independent of each other such that the
variance covariance matrix Ωε is normalized to I. In order to ensure that shocks
εt are truly structural and different from the reduced form residuals et, they must
be orthogonalized. The orthogonalization process ensures that structural shocks are
mutually uncorrelated with each other. The co-variance matrix is assumed to be
an identity matrix, containing zero elements off the diagonal and implying that the
structural shocks are uncorrelated.
Consequently, εt can be accorded an economic interpretation. SVARs are pop-
ularly used to identify or pin down shocks and to examine the effects of structural
innovations on dependent variables in the original model. The SVAR model is used
to relate the observable residuals of the classical VAR to the unobserved innova-
tions in the structural forms. It provides the nexus between data and theory. The
SVAR methodology, with the aid of the impulse response functions, forecast error
variance decomposition and historical variance decomposition, can be employed to
identify shocks and trace out how shocks are propagated. The representation of a
structural model is often based on some relationship anchored on economic theory
or prior beliefs. Following Kilian (2013), who observe that the reduced form errors
(et) are generally a weighted average of the structural shocks (εt) and Bjornland &
Thorsrud, 2015 who consider reduced form errors (et) as a linear combination of
structural shocks (εt), any effort at studying the response of the vector yt to the
reduced form errors et will not provide us with information about the response of yt
to the structural shocks, εt. All the parameters of the reduced form model can be
estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) method, equation by equation and the
co-variance matrix Ωe can be computed as well.
In the case of equation 2.2, the model is not identified. To achieve identification,
the equation can be multiplied by the inverse of the contemporaneous impact matrix
B0 (i.e B−10 ), as follows:












Equation 2.4 is equivalent to the reduced form VAR expression in 2.1, where
Ai = B
−1





























Equation 2.6 can be utilized to derive the unknown parameter elements in B−10 .
In solving Ωe = B−10 B
−1′
0 we are confronted with a number of unknown parameters in
the structural VAR, higher than the number of known parameters from the reduced
form equation. The condition provided for solving for B−10 is that the number of
unknown parameters in B−10 must not exceed the number of equations in the system.
A violation of this rule will give rise to the problem of under-identification, which
can be resolved by imposing extra identifying restrictions; that may be achieved
through exclusion restrictions, proportionality restrictions or other equality restric-
tions (Kilian, 2013).
A popular approach is to get the required restrictions by making some elements
of B−10 equal to zero, otherwise known as exclusion restrictions. Thus, some variables
will not be allowed to impact other variables contemporaneously (Lütkepohl, 2013).
If the number of free parameters in Ωe is given as N(N+1)/2, the minimum number
of restricted parameters in B−10 that would yield a unique identification is N(N+1)/2
(Kilian, 2013). The reduced form parameters depend on properties of the data
therefore, any effort to determine structural parameters from properties of the data
will result to indeterminacy unless an appropriate identifying restrictions can be
found (Bjornland & Thorsrud, 2015).
2.4.2 Zero Short-run Restrictions
Zero Short-run Restrictions is based on the Cholesky decomposition which assumes
a recursive structure. Shocks are identified by assigning one(s) to all elements in
the main diagonal and zero(s) to all elements in the upper triangular matrix. The
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matrix B−10 is orthogonalized and can be matched to the error co-variance matrix
through Ωe. The Cholesky decomposition technique can be used to impose short
run restrictions, which identify the structural shocks by ordering the variables in
the system in a way that ensures the most exogenous variables comes first. This
ordering procedure is often useful for constraining the response of specific variables
in the immediate period sequel to an innovation (shock). In this way, structural
shocks εt can be used to recover the lower triangular matrix which ensures that all
parameters are exactly identified.
Despite its usefulness, the recursive procedure is flawed due to the specific rigid-
ity of Cholesky orthogonalization shock identification scheme (Popescu, 2014). In
addition, Kilian (2013) maintains that the orthogonalization of the reduced-form
residuals through the application Cholesky decomposition procedure is appropriate
only if there are economic justification for a recursive structure, otherwise, the ex-
ercise will produce a mere mechanical solution without theoretical content. Sims
(1980), Bernanke & Blinder (1992) and Christiano et al. (1999) are three examples
of the popular pioneering applications of the recursive identification scheme used for
modelling monetary policy transmission mechanism.
2.4.3 Zero Long-run Restrictions
Alternatively, if long run set of restrictions is imposed on a VAR system, the impulse
responses are constrained to reflect values consistent with economic rationale. In
this case, the accumulated response of a particular variable to a shock are made
to add to zero over the whole period of analysis. For instance, Blanchard & Quah
(1989) in a bi-variate VAR model of output growth and the unemployment rate,
assume that the long-run effect of a demand shock on growth in output is zero.
Although, long run restrictions have been hailed for their close affinity with eco-
nomic theory, they are however, said to, suffer from distortions arising from small
sample biases and measurement errors (Peersman, 2005). In essence, the literature
prove that it would be hard to accurately estimate the impulse response functions
at long (infinite) horizons from a limited data span (Faust & Leeper, 1997). If
a non-recursive identification scheme is followed, the rigidity of the Cholesky de-
composition is avoided and one is able to freely impose restrictions in line with
theoretical underpinnings. Here, there is greater flexibility to infuse a sufficient dose
of economic theory on the model and the opportunity to reflect a more accurate
description of the inter-dependencies among variables. However, this approach too
has been criticized because of differences in identifying restrictions.
42
2.4.4 Sign Restrictions
The idea of the sign restriction procedure as an alternative methodology for iden-
tifying structural VAR is credited to the pioneering works of Faust (1998), Canova
& De Nicolo (2002) and Uhlig (2005). They achieve identification by restricting the
sign (and/or shape) of structural responses. There is no need to impose zero restric-
tions on the contemporaneous impact matrix as is required in SVAR. The system
is set up to identify a set of impulse responses which agrees with theory-based sign
expectations. Unlike the recursive and non-recursive methods of identifying VARs
which are subject to criticisms largely due to the scepticism about the validity of the
identifying restrictions employed in them, the sign restricted SVAR has a strong the-
oretical focus, given that applicable a priori expectations are usually extracted from
the outputs of relevant dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model(s).
Restrictions are set on the sign of the impulse response, to condition its direc-
tion over a given horizon in response to specific alternative innovations (Jaaskela
& Smith, 2011). Fry & Pagan (2011) argue that the sign restriction identification
procedure is especially crucial in circumstances where variables are simultaneously
determined because of bi-directional causality, thus making it difficult to employ
any other alternative identifying restrictions. With sign restrictions, identification
restrictions are validated by theoretical (DSGE) models. In addition, the com-
mon incidence of puzzles9 in the macroeconomic literature raise the suspicion that,
shocks identified in previous studies may not have been truly exogenous, therefore,
addressing the puzzles require the imposition of proper signs on impulse responses10
(Kim, 2013). Identification in models restricted using signs require that each shock
is associated with a unique sign pattern. The use of sign restrictions VAR models
have become commonplace in mainstream empirical macroeconomics. For instance,
Canova (2007), Mountford & Uhlig (2009) and Pappa (2009) applied it to analyse
fiscal shocks, Dedola & Neri (2007) used it to study the effects of technology shocks,
Canova & De Nicolo (2002), Scholl & Uhlig (2008) for open economy shocks and
Kilian & Murphy (2012), Baumeister & Peersman (2013) considered oil markets
applications, while Fujita (2011) modelled labour market dynamics with it.
One main drawback of the sign restricted SVAR is that it does not imply unique
identification as there may be many impulse responses that satisfy the specific sign
restriction imposed. Fry & Pagan (2011) emphasize that it is almost impossible to
find the exact identification when a set of impulse responses are compatible with
a particular restriction, while Kilian (2013) also submit that, in the case of sign
restriction, there is not a unique point estimate of the structural impulse response
functions, and that sign identified VAR models are only set identified. This is as a
9e.g. liquidity puzzle, price puzzle, etc.
10The conditional correlation structure
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result of the nature of sign restrictions, which are essentially regarded as inequality
restrictions. Consequently, the task of identifying a particular impulse response,
from the many, that truly summarizes the needed information in an efficient way is
one that must be resolved.
2.4.5 Procedure for implementing Sign restriction
Given a set of sign restrictions, construction of structural impulse response functions
require that we estimate the NxN matrix B−10 as found in et =B
−1
0 εt from (3).
Suppose we let P be the lower triangular Cholesky decomposition which satisfies the





any orthogonal NxN matrix D. As opposed to P (a lower triangular Cholesky
decomposition), PD is generally non-recursive. If we conduct repeated random
samples or draws from the set D of orthogonal matrices D, a large range of probable
solutions B−10 can be obtained. In line with Fernandez-Villaverde & Rubio-Ramirez
(2010) in Kilian (2013), a set of admissible models can be constructed by taking
draws from the set D and dropping candidate solutions for B−10 that are not in line
with a set of a priori sign restrictions on the implied impulse responses functions.11
Sariola (2015) summarized the steps involved in this procedure as follows: (i) Draw
a NxN matrix L of NID(0, 1)12 random variables. Derive the QR decomposition of
L such that L = Q ·R and QQ′ = IN . (ii) Let D = Q′. Compute impulse responses
using the orthogonalization B−10 = PD. If all implied impulse response functions
satisfy the identifying restrictions, retain D; otherwise, discard. (iii) Repeat the
first two steps for a large number of times, recording each D that satisfies the
restrictions (and the corresponding impulse response functions). (iv) Finally, choose
the model which represents the median impulse responses. The impulse matrix
B−10 that gives the median impulse responses could be interpreted as that which
produces typical responses to the identified structural shocks, given that no unique
B−10 exists. The proportion of the early set of candidate models that are in sync with
the identifying restriction may be viewed, according to Kilian (2013) as an indicator
of how informative the identifying restrictions are about the structural parameters.
11This section draws significantly from Fry & Pagan (2011), Kilian (2013),
12This is a random process, assumed to be normally and independently distributed
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2.5 Model, Data and Estimation
In the spirit of Liu (2010) and Jaaskela & Smith (2011), we assume a small open
economy, a feature that corresponds with the Nigerian economy. Consequently, a
block recursive structure is imposed on the VAR model. The identified external
shocks exert influence on the evolution of both foreign and domestic variables. In
essence, to reflect the small open economy block structure, equation 2.4 above is
























; ft and dt represent the vectors of foreign and domestic
variables, respectively; xt is the vector of exogenous variables and B−10 is the impact
matrix of contemporaneous effects of the mutually uncorrelated foreign and domestic
shocks vectors in the system. The modelling framework for the small open economy
assumption requires that matrix Ai is the lower triangular matrix which does not
allow the lagged values of domestic variables to affect those in the foreign block.
The B−10 matrix also, in line with Karagedikli & Price (2012) would be restricted





















































A small open economy structural VAR model suitable for Nigeria and other
similar SOEs can be summarized as shown in 2.8 above, where all three (3) foreign
and four (4) domestic variables and shocks have been represented assuming a lag
order of 2. Sign restrictions can be imposed on the shock matrix B−10 to identify
the model. The selection of model variables reflect the tradition in the literature14
which often accord important roles to global demand, US monetary policy stance
and commodity prices in shaping macroeconomic trends in the home fronts of small
13Recall that Ai = B−10 Bi, and B
−1
0 = B0.
14Please see Canova (2005); Jaaskela & Smith (2011); Silva (2012)
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open economies. Fluctuations in inflation, output, interest rate and terms of trade








idt 4ydt πdt 4κt
]′
(2.10)
The foreign block (ft) includes the growth rate of world output (4ywt ), the US
federal funds rate (iust ) and changes in the oil price (4o
p
t ), while the domestic block
(dt) includes the domestic interest rate (idt ), the growth rate of domestic output
(4ydt ), the domestic inflation rate (πdt ) and changes in the terms of trade (4κt). In
this set up, ft is block exogenous to dt such that domestic variables and shocks εdt
do not affect foreign variables in ft, while foreign shocks in εft are assumed to affect
variables in both ft and dt; and ft are determined by its own lags and foreign shocks.
With reference to Nigeria, oil price shocks are largely exogenous, given that
factors determining the evolution of crude oil price are predominantly international.
The US monetary policy innovations has effects on developments in the Nigerian
financial market due to the effects of globalization and trade flows. In the same
vein, the state of the global economy may exert considerable influence on Nigeria’s
economy given her status as a net exporter of oil and a net importer of capital and


























In the foreign block of structural innovations (εft ), ε
4yw
t is the global demand
shock, which represents any surprise event that increases world demand; εiust is the
US monetary policy shock, which is an indicator of US contractionary monetary
shock while ε4o
p
t is the oil price shock, which is embedded in those phenomenon
that moves oil price changes in the upward direction. In the domestic shocks block
(εdt ), εi
d
t is the domestic monetary policy shock, conceived as any factor that moves
domestic interest rate upward. The interest rate is the main instrument of monetary
policy used by the central bank to achieve set macroeconomic objectives. ε4y
d
t is the
domestic demand shock, which elicits a positive change in domestic output growth
rate, επdt is the supply shock, which cuts aggregate supply due to cost-push inflation;
while ε4κt represents the country trade shock, which causes an increase to changes
in the terms of trade.
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2.5.1 Identification Scheme
In the literature, the identification of structural vector auto-regressive models with
sign restrictions often follow robust conditional types of restrictions involving the
sign of the responses of certain variables to shocks (Canova, 2005). Sign restrictions
applied to identify shocks are usually by-products of DSGE models and/or intuitions
gleaned from economic theory (Sariola, 2015). For instance, Peersman & Straub
(2004) utilize sign restrictions derived from two DSGE models; a sticky price model
and a real business cycle model, to examine the effects of monetary policy, labour
supply, technology and aggregate spending shocks on hours worked for the economy
of the Euro Zone. In a small open economy application, Liu (2010), following Gali
& Monacelli (2005) estimates a stylized small open economy DSGE model through
simulation to derive a set of restrictions applied to a VAR analysis. In the case of
Sariola (2015), sign restrictions derived from relevant DSGE models were employed
to achieve identification. Specifically, it combined sign restrictions implied by the
Riksbank’s Ramses II (Adolfson & Walentin, 2013 and Peersman & Straub, 2004)
to uniquely identify four shocks for the Swedish economy.
In this study, we assign restrictions to identify specific external shocks based
on direct intuitions established from a suite of relevant small open economy DSGE
models, developed to capture the peculiar structure of two main oil exporting African
economies, namely Nigeria and Algeria. In the case of Nigeria, Olayeni (2009a)
through an estimated small open economy DSGE-BVAR model reported that a
one-time monetary policy shock elicit negative response in both inflation and output
growth; while it led to a rise in interest rate and a less-discernible appreciation in
the exchange rate. The terms of trade shock impacted on these variables in a similar
manner. Adebiyi & Mordi (2012) estimated a new Keynesian DSGE model for the
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), and found that an oil price shock lowered inflation,
widened the output gap, reduced the maximum lending rate, caused depreciation
in the nominal exchange rate and raised government expenditure in the periods
immediate to the innovation. A shock to the nominal exchange rate (meaning a
depreciation) at first increases the output gap and reduces it in subsequent periods;
while the shock caused increases in the maximum lending rate, the general price level
and in fiscal spending. In Allegret & Benkhodja (2015), a DSGE model for the oil
exporting African country of Algeria was estimated using the Bayesian techniques
and increases in output and inflation were observed following an oil price shock.
Based on these results, sign restrictions are applied as shown in table 2.5.1 be-
low. We identified three external shocks, namely: global demand shock (ε4y
w
t ), US
monetary policy shock (iust ) and oil price shock (4o
p
t ). The shocks are propagated
through both foreign and domestic variables. In the table, a positive sign (+) indi-
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cates that the response of a variable to a shock is restricted to be positive, whereas,
a negative sign (-) means that the response of a variable to a shock is set to nega-
tive. The symbol (?) indicate no restrictions are imposed and that we are agnostic
about the particular sign that a variable will assume in response to a given shock.
Our purpose is to uncover how external shocks impact the domestic business cycle
and the relative importance of each foreign shock. Consequently, we do not identify
domestic shocks.
Identification Scheme based on Sign Restrictions
Shocks/Variables15 GOG FFR OPG DIR DOG DINF TOT
External Shocks
GDS (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
USMPS (-) (+) (?) (+) (-) (?) (?)
OPS (-) (-) (+) (+) (+) (?) (+)
Table 2.4: Identification Scheme based on Sign Restrictions
A positive global demand shock is assumed to elicit an increase in all global and
domestic macroeconomic aggregates (Mumtaz & Surico, 2009). Shock to the US
monetary policy is expected to propel a rise in the US federal funds rate and in
the domestic interest rate. An emerging market economy typically responds to a
US monetary policy shock with an increase in the monetary policy rate in favour
of international competitiveness required to sustain or attract capital flows into the
country. We are however agnostic about how oil price, domestic inflation and terms
of trade responds to a U.S. monetary policy shock. Oil price shock is believed to
impact negatively on both global output growth and the Federal funds rate. This is
in line with Carlstrom & Fuerst (2006), Kilian & Lewis (2011) and Inoue & Kilian
(2013) who argue that oil price shock causes increase in the price of oil and induces
global real activity to fall on impact.
Bernanke et al. (1997a) submits that the Fed responds to oil price shocks with
restrictive monetary policy in order to check inflation. Kilian & Lewis (2011), how-
ever, questioned this proposition on three main grounds. First, they argue that the
Fed cares as much about output and employment stabilization as it cares about con-
taining inflation; and that the Fed was overtly concerned with the output objective
during the 1970s. Second, given that the demand side of oil price shock transmis-
sion channel (which may be further complicated by higher precautionary savings)
is stronger than the cost-induced supply side channel, an exogenous oil price shock
will be recessionary or deflationary and thus, there is no basis to pursue a restrictive
monetary policy in response to oil price shock. Third, oil price shocks are considered
as symptoms of a cause, which demands that policy responses target the underlying
15GDS, USMPS and OPS are Global Demand, US Monetary Policy and Oil Price Shocks, re-
spectively. See list of acronyms.
48
demand and supply shocks that drive oil price. The effect an oil price shock would
have on the economy depends on the source of the shock (Kilian, 2008). For in-
stance, if an oil price shock is demand driven, it may not result in decline in output
after all. The argument by Kilian & Lewis (2011) corroborate findings by Hamilton
& Herrera (2004), which show that Bernanke et al. (1997a)’s conclusion about the
Fed’s restrictive monetary policy response to oil price shock was mainly influenced
by the small lag length applied in their model. Therefore, using a larger sample
and higher lag length to capture the dynamics in the monthly data, they found that
monetary policy in the US was actually loose in response to oil price shocks.
Based on Allegret & Benkhodja (2015), domestic output growth responds posi-
tively to oil price shocks. Although, our reference theoretical model suggest a pos-
itive inflation response to oil price innovations, we chose to remain agnostic about
this interaction. Oil price shock and domestic interest rate are observed to be pos-
itively correlated in keeping with the restrictive monetary policy stance targeting
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As shown in 2.13, the sub-block of domestic shocks is inactive, indicating that
domestic shocks are not allowed to impact the system of equations for foreign and
domestic variables. Only foreign shocks are activated and they impact all the equa-
tions or variables in the system.
2.5.2 Data and Estimation Procedure
To estimate the specified SVAR model, we apply the Bayesian technique on a seven-
variable quarterly dataset over the period 1982Q1 - 2016Q1 for the full sample
estimation and the period 1982Q2 - 2007Q4 for the sub sample estimation robustness
exercise performed to see if the recent global financial crisis changes our results
significantly. All data series are in elasticity forms, thus, making it possible to
compare results associated with different variables more credibly. Our external block
variables include: global output growth rate, US federal funds rate and oil price.
These variables are important in our model set up, as they summarize the main
49
characteristics of the international business cycle dynamics which have implications
for the global economy. The domestic block contain domestic indicator variables for
the business cycle fluctuations. They include output growth rate, inflation, interest
rate and terms of trade. Data on global output growth and US federal funds rate
are from World bank and the Fed data bases, respectively; while terms of trade data
is from Alfred (St. Louis Fred). The growth rate of domestic output is sourced from
the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), while oil price series, inflation
and 3-month deposit interest rate are sourced from the Central Bank of Nigeria’s
Statistical Bulletin. Our diagnostic tests on the data show that the series do not
have unit root, the VAR system is stable and the optimal lag length for model
estimation is 2 based on four different information criteria.
The Bayesian technique is often preferred when the sample is short and the
number of variables in the VAR system is relatively large. In a large VAR model
with small sample, the likelihood function does not behave well. Also, there is a
problem of over-fitting arising from over-parameterization, which tend to undermine
the reliability of the estimates. However, in a Bayesian setting, prior information is
used to compress models with huge coefficients on distant lags or explosive dynamics
Silva (2012). In line with the steps laid out in 2.4.5, we employ a prior that assumes
a Normal-Wishart structure for the parameters of the reduced form to generate a
posterior of the same form, based on the identifying restrictions.
50
2.6 Presentation and Discussion of Results
2.6.1 External Shocks and Domestic Business Cycle: Base-
line Model
Each of the shocks elicits a set of impulse responses contained within the dotted
lines which indicates the upper and lower bands of the identified set, while the
solid line is the median impulse response for each set. In the baseline model, we
conducted estimation using full sample data covering the period 1982Q1 - 2016Q1.
The data range include both pre- and post-financial crisis period. GOG is global
output growth, FFR is US federal funds rate, OPG is oil price growth, DOG is
domestic output growth, DINF is domestic inflation, TOT is terms of trade and
DIR is domestic interest rate.
2.6.1.1 Global Demand Shock and Domestic Business Cycle
The effects of external shocks on the movement of key domestic business cycle vari-
ables can be inferred from the dynamic responses of the variables to external in-
novations. The degree of a variable’s sensitivity to a shock is conveyed through
the impulse response functions generated with the estimated model. As shown in
figure 2.4, a unit shock to the global demand resulted in significant increase in the
global output growth and the tightening of the US monetary policy. The stance of
the US monetary policy tended to mirror the global momentum of growth as both
increased slightly from the initial response and eventually returned to steady state
after the twentieth quarter. This results suggest that the Fed considers the state of
the global economy in its monetary policy decisions. Similarly, the global demand
shock elicit a sharp increase in the oil price growth and a milder increase in the
terms of trade. However, these responses were short-lived as oil price growth and
changes in terms of trade waned barely after the second quarter and became fully
dissipated by the seventh quarter. The result reflect the volatile nature of the oil
price and the potential vulnerabilities inherent in relying on export of crude oil as
a major revenue earner. Whereas, domestic inflation response to global demand
shock is remarkably high, volatile and short-lived, domestic interest rate’s response
was initially aggressive, but later became moderate and persistent until the twenty-
fifth quarter. Central banks in emerging economies often deploy monetary policy to
achieve an intermediate objective of ensuring adequate foreign exchange liquidity in
order to ward-off potential speculative attacks on the currency, which can trigger
inflation. They often maintain a relatively high interest rate to attract capital flows
in to the economy.
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Figure 2.4: Impulse Response of Global Demand Shock
2.6.1.2 US Monetary Policy Shock and Domestic Business Cycle
The dampening effect of US monetary policy shock on the global output growth is
fairly significant on impact. As seen in figure 2.5, the decline in the global output
growth is most intense in the fourth quarter before returning to steady state in the
fifteenth quarter. This response underscores the global counter-cyclical implication
of tightening of monetary policy by the US, in order to reign in on the inflationary
pressures associated with increased world-wide economic momentum. Given that
we are agnostic about the response of oil price to a US monetary policy shock, the
response is found to be positive, significant but unsteady as it jumped to negative
territory in the third quarter and rebounded in the sixth quarter before returning
to steady state in the eighth quarter. This oil price developments indicate the un-
certainty surrounding the duration of the effect of the US monetary policy surprises
on oil price growth. On impact, the US monetary policy shock had no effect on
the terms of trade. The subdued impact became manifest and peaked near zero
in the third quarter and then gradually dissipated into steady state by the eighth
quarter. Domestic inflation’s positive response to the US monetary policy shock
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happens after a quarter lag or delay. It peaks moderately in the fifth quarter before
dissipating eventually in the thirteenth quarter.
Figure 2.5: Impulse Response of the U.S. Monetary Policy Shock
A US monetary policy shock is a trigger for capital outflow from Nigeria. Sub-
stantial capital outflow in response to higher interest rate structure in the US can
precipitate inflationary pressure in Nigeria via the exchange rate channel. The delay
period observed in inflation’s response to a US monetary policy shock may be at-
tributable to investors possible cautious attitude or their inability to liquidate their
current holdings immediately, owing to prevailing capital control measures. Domes-
tic interest rate responded quite positively to the tightening of monetary policy in
the US. This is a plausible response by any small open economy that needs to retain
and attract capital inflows to support external reserves.
2.6.1.3 Oil Price Shock and Domestic Business Cycle
A major external shock that affect the world economy and particularly the oil ex-
porting small open economies is oil price shock. Impulse response functions as shown
in figure 2.6 indicate that one unit shock to oil price growth elicit considerable de-
cline in global output growth. On the other hand, the response of the US monetary
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policy to a unit shock to oil price is rather aggressive and persistent. This is because,
while global output growth declined by about 0.1 percent before reverting finally to
steady state in the thirteenth quarter, the US monetary policy was eased by nearly
0.25 percent to accommodate the oil shock and it did not revert to steady state until
around the thirteenth quarter. This results suggest that the US Fed tend to respond
well and for a long time to developments in the global oil price. Oil price response
to its own shock is sharp but short-lived, while terms of trade’s response to oil price
growth shock is positive, considerable and short; in the manner of oil price response
to it’s own shock. It seems evident from this dynamic interactions, that there is no
guarantee that a positive oil price response to an oil shock can be sustained beyond
three quarters as shown in figure 2.6.
Figure 2.6: Impulse Response of Oil Price Shock
Domestic output growth, a major business cycle variable, show a mild but pos-
itive response to oil price growth shock and the response persisted for nearly 10
quarters. Domestic inflation’s sluggish, positive and unsteady response to oil price
shock grew to about 2 percent in the thirteenth quarter before dyeing out finally
just after quarter 20. The initial low and unsteady inflationary response to oil price
shock may be connected to the effect of increased oil revenue and subsequent rise
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in the external reserves which enhances the capacity of most oil exporting SOEs
central banks to support or defend the domestic currency. However, when the cur-
rency comes under severe attack, the central bank is compelled to adjust the value
of the currency either through outright devaluation or a managed float system of
currency adjustment, thus, resulting to an inflation up-tick. Oil price shock also
elicit a 0.7 percent tightening of the domestic monetary policy. It is common that
in periods when oil price shock is prevalent, an oil exporting SOE central bank uses
tight monetary policy to achieve a positive real interest rate environment and to
address the threat of rising inflation in the economy.
2.6.2 External Shocks and and Domestic Business Cycle: A
Robustness Check
Given the severity of the experience of the recent global financial crisis and the
possible effects it may have had on the dynamic interactions among the variables in
our model over the sample period 1982Q2 to 2016Q1, we conduct a simple robustness
exercise by using a sample that excludes data points from the period of the global
financial crisis till date. Policy responses by different governments and central banks
to the crisis such as quantitative easing, the zero lower bound interest rate and the
use of forward guidance may have effected the data, with implications for our earlier
results. Consequently, we carry out the same estimation on data span of 1982Q1 -
2007Q4.
2.6.2.1 Global Demand Shock: Pre Crisis
On impact, global demand shock elicit a marginal response of 0.85 percent in global
output growth. The shock has become more persistent and volatile given that its
eventual return to steady state did not happen until quarter 30. When the effect
of the global financial crisis is discounted, global output growth response to the
global demand shock becomes less pronounced and more volatile, showing high per-
sistence. Both oil price and terms of trade’s response to the global demand shock
became tighter and briefer, barely lasting till second quarter before dyeing out com-
pletely. Both the domestic output growth and domestic interest rate followed a
similar pattern with results in the full sample size. Unlike the pronounced inflation
volatility associated with the full sample estimation results, inflation volatility mod-
erates in the current estimation results; suggesting that the global financial crisis
contributes to high inflation volatility in Nigeria.
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Figure 2.7: Impulse Response of the Global Demand Shock (Pre-GFC)
2.6.2.2 US Monetary Policy Shock: Pre Crisis
The US monetary policy shock reduced the global output growth rate by a fairly
considerable margin. However, when compared to previous estimation reported in
figure 2.6 the effect shown in figure 2.8 is not as strong, though it is more persistent.
It appears, from this result, that the magnitude of the counter-cyclical effect of a
US monetary policy shock will be slightly larger with shorter persistence in a world
with financial crisis of the scale of that of 2008 than in a world without such a crisis.
In this estimation, where we are also agnostic about the US Monetary policy shock
- oil price growth interaction, it is found that oil price growth’s response is positive
but negligible and very short-lived. Similarly, the terms of trade’s response to the
shock is a subdued positive one which dies out by the tenth quarter. The domestic
output growth shrank moderately and returned to steady state by the eighth quarter
in response to a unit shock to the US monetary policy. The results show that on
impact the US monetary policy shock caused a temporary fall in inflation, but by
the third quarter, inflation had risen significantly and the trend remained persistent
till the twenty-fifth quarter. Domestic interest rate’s response to a US monetary
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policy shock is positive and similar in magnitude to that in the earlier estimation
but different in terms of persistence level. The effect of the shock persists in the
current estimation until the twentieth quarter compared to the previous estimation
which dissipated quicker in the tenth quarter.
Figure 2.8: Impulse Response of US Monetary Policy Shock (Pre-GFC)
2.6.2.3 Oil Price Shock: Pre Crisis
Generally, the intensity of oil price shock’s effects is similar in both estimations,
however, varying degrees of persistence exist. Whereas, the impact of the shock is
more persistent on global output growth, federal funds rate, domestic output growth
and inflation in the pre-crisis model, the domestic interest rate response to oil price
shock is more persistent in the model with full sample. Intensity and persistence
of oil price shock are essentially the same in the both estimations for oil price and
terms of trade. As shown in figure 2.9, domestic inflation, following an agnostic
identification, exhibits a temporary negative response on impact before reversing
to positive territory in the 3rd quarter. This initial negative inflation response to
oil price shock is at variance with the small, volatile but positive response inflation
exhibit in the full sample estimation. This result tend to suggest that the central
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bank is more keen on the effect of oil price shock on inflation when the global
economy is exposed to a financial crisis.
Figure 2.9: Oil Price Shock (Pre-GFC)
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2.6.3 Historical Decomposition of External Shocks
2.6.3.1 External shocks Contributions to Foreign Business Cycle Fluc-
tuations
The computed historical decomposition can provide strong insights about individual
external shock’s contributions to the evolution of each business cycle variables on
an historical basis. In figures 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 we show the contributions of the
three identified external shocks to the global output growth, the US federal funds
rate and the oil price growth over the entire sample period (1982Q2 - 2016Q1). The
historical contributions of the decomposed shocks are displayed in the upper panels
of each figure, while a trend chart of the underlining foreign variables that these
shocks drive are plotted in the lower panels of the referenced figures. Figure 2.10
indicates that in our model, oil price and global demand shocks are the dominant
drivers of the global output growth, while the US monetary policy shocks is also
shown to play an important role as a co-driver of the changes in the global output.
Three main episodes have been identified in the sample; two of which represent the
worst dips in global output growth and one, the best episode of growth in the world
economy during the period in focus. The first episode of significant deceleration in
world growth took place in the period 1991 - 1994, during which negative oil price
shock and US monetary policy shock held sway, respectively as key contributing
drivers of the global business cycle fluctuation.
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Figure 2.10: Historical Decomposition of Global Output Growth and it’s trend
On the other hand, during the biggest recessive episode in 2008, negative oil
price shock featured in our model as a dominant contributor to global output growth
ahead of the negative demand shock, with the US monetary policy shock playing
a rather muted role. However, our model does not fully account for the 2008/09
global financial crisis episode, given that the crisis originated from financial fragilities
inherent in major world economies. The crisis was caused and amplified by financial
frictions such as risk shock, equity shock, credit shock, etc. (Christiano et al., 2014);
rather than by shocks featured in this model.
During the main global output growth episode linked to 2004 - 2007, oil price
shock is seen as the principal contributor to world economic growth while the US
monetary policy and global demand shocks ran neck-to-neck as second and third
contributors to global output growth in our model. A positive global demand shock is
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associated with rising momentum in the global economy and negative global demand
shocks with world economic recessive tendencies. Similarly, for the most part of our
model’s sample, positive oil price shocks are associated with higher growth outcomes
while negative oil price shocks are characterized by lower growth outcomes. The
US monetary policy shock is the most counter-cyclical innovation in this historical
context. This means that the US monetary policy stance tends to be loose during
global economic slow downs and restrictive when growth momentum is high.
Figure 2.11: Historical Decomposition of US Federal Funds Rate and it’s trend
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Figure 2.11 indicates that oil price growth and global demand shocks exert sig-
nificant influence on the evolution of the US federal funds rate. Oil price shocks
dominate as the main driver of the US monetary policy stance. Curiously, however,
even when the US monetary policy was at the zero-lower bound, oil price shocks
still predominates as a key contributor to the US monetary policy.
Figure 2.12: Historical Decomposition of Oil Price Growth and it’s trend
In figure 2.12, it is difficult to pin down oil price growth to any particular domi-
nant contributory shock. However, the global demand shock tend to generate more
clusters than the rest of the shocks, thus, suggesting that global demand shock is
an important determinant for oil price dynamics.
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2.6.3.2 External shocks contributions to Domestic Business Cycle Fluc-
tuations
Figures 2.13, 2.14, 2.15 and 2.16 reveal the contributions of the three identified
external shocks to the Nigerian business cycle fluctuations via the domestic output
growth, the domestic inflation, the terms of trade and the domestic interest rate
for the period 1982Q2 - 2016Q1. The historical contributions of the decomposed
shocks are displayed in the upper panels of each figure, while a trend chart of the
underlining domestic variables that these shocks drive are plotted in the lower panels
of the referenced figures.
Figure 2.13: Historical Decomposition of Domestic Output Growth and it’s trend
The decomposition of external shocks in figure 2.13 show that oil price shocks
is the dominant driver of the domestic output growth in Nigeria. Positive oil price
shocks are associated with high domestic output growth while negative oil price
shocks are shown to correspond with moments of low and no output growth. For
instance, oil price shocks induced by the 1990 Gulf war and the 2011 terrorist attack
in the US, respectively, resulted in higher output growth, while the negative oil
price shocks between 2014Q1 - 2016Q1 are associated with deceleration in domestic
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output growth. This evidences Nigeria’s high dependency on oil and exposure to
vulnerability arising from oil price volatility.
An equally important external shock is the global demand shock. The Nigerian
business cycle appear to co-move with the global demand shock, indicating that the
country has its share of the gains of a growing world economy and the pains of a
shrinking world economy, respectively. However, the impact of the US monetary
policy shock on Nigeria’s domestic output growth is marginal.
From figure 2.13, we observe that, for the most parts of the sample, whenever
both oil price and the US interest rate shocks are positive, domestic output growth
tends to gain momentum; while an episode of high global demand and high interest
rate does not seem to provide any significant impetus for domestic economic growth.
Our results also indicate that during the Gulf War of 1990, the simultaneous positive
global demand and oil price shocks, together with a negative US interest rate shock
contributes to higher domestic economic growth.
Figure 2.14: Historical Decomposition of Domestic Inflation and it’s trend
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Figure 2.14 also reveal oil price shock as the key contributor to inflation dynamics
in Nigeria. Between 1982 and 1999 when inflation volatility was most pronounced,
oil price shocks is shown to co-move with domestic inflation. This persisted through
out the remaining parts of the sample, albeit, in a relatively low and stable inflation
environment. A departure from this trend, however, ensued in 2015Q4, where nega-
tive oil price shock seems to drive inflation upward, mainly due to foreign exchange
crisis owing to massive decline in oil earnings.
Figure 2.15: Historical Decomposition of Terms of Trade and it’s trend
In the decomposition of the shocks driving terms of trade as shown in figure 2.15,
oil price and global demand shocks appear to be the lead contributors. The terms
of trade is a mirror image of the oil price, as oil export constitute the lion share of
Nigeria’s trade with the rest of the world. To reduce the oil component in the terms
of trade, the non-oil component of the terms of trade must increase significantly.
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Figure 2.16: Historical Decomposition of Domestic Interest Rate and it’s trend
The result in figure 2.16 reveal that the central bank of Nigeria, in setting the
interest rate, tend to observe oil price movement, as episodes of positive oil price
shocks are associated with tight monetary policy. Higher oil price and earnings
provides impetus for increased government expenditure and raises the concern about
inflation. At such times, the banking system experiences excess money supply which
tends to encourage increased demand for imports and foreign exchange pressure.




We employ a sign restricted structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model to ex-
amine the role of external shocks in Nigeria’s business cycle evolution. Our identifi-
cation structure reflect findings by Mumtaz & Surico (2009), Kilian & Lewis (2011),
Olayeni (2009a) and Allegret & Benkhodja (2015). Three external shocks were iden-
tified in a seven variable SVAR model. Our baseline estimation spans from 1982Q1
- 2016Q1 while the robustness sample period is 1982Q2 - 2007Q4. The robustness
exercise is meant to account for the possible effect of the global financial crisis on
the Nigerian business cycle.
Our results indicate that the global demand and the oil price shocks dominate
as drivers of the Nigerian business cycle. The effect of the global demand shock
is most profound on domestic output and inflation while oil price shock exert the
most influence on domestic interest rate and the terms of trade. Inference from
our robustness exercise suggest that macroeconomic vulnerability associated with a
negative global demand shock is a systematic one, given that the global financial
crisis had no effect on the response of domestic output growth and interest rate to the
shock. However, the financial crisis amplified domestic inflation’s response to global
demand shock, thus resulting to higher inflation volatility. The US monetary policy
shock had a marginal negative effect on domestic output growth while significant
positive inflation response came after a lag. Inflation response can be traced to the
exchange rate effect induced by possible capital outflow in response to the higher
interest rate in the US.
Similar to our results, Adolfson & Walentin (2013) showed that external demand
shock is a significant driver of the Swedish business cycle, while Broda & Tille (2003)
concludes that a significant proportion of output volatility in developing economies
is accounted for by terms of trade shocks. These outcomes are confirmed in our
study if the terms of trade is proxied by the oil price. Contrary to our findings,
Rafiq (2011) reports that the US business cycle does not cause output fluctuations
in emerging market oil-exporting economies. However, our results align with Rafiq
(2011) on the close similarity between responses of oil price and terms of trade to
foreign shocks in oil-exporting emerging countries. Conclusion by Philip & Akintoye
(2006) and Omisakin (2008) that the effect of oil price shock on Nigeria’s business
cycle process is insignificant cannot be validated in our results and those obtained
by Umar & Kilishi (2010) and Akpan (2009); which show that oil price shock is
consequential for the Nigerian business cycle. We have extended the literature by
widening the scope of external shock (oil price shock) mainly studied for Nigeria, to
include global demand and US monetary policy shocks.
Our results have some modest implications for macroeconomic policy. Consid-
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ering the dominant effect of the global demand shock and its persistence through
the period of the global financial crisis, policies should be implemented to max-
imise gains from positive global demand shocks to achieve high growth rates and
savings as a form of insurance against the potential debilitating effect of negative
global demand shocks. Evidence that Nigeria’s output growth tend to mimic oil
price movement suggest vulnerability to oil price shocks. Also, given that oil price
shock constitute the main external driver of inflation, which became more volatile
during the global financial crisis; oil dependent emerging economies require policies
oriented toward domestic resilience to oil shocks.
A path to attaining reduced exposure to oil shocks in oil exporting economies
may be by delinking the overall economic performance from oil activity. Some
advanced and middle income oil producing countries resolved this challenge through
adherence to strict fiscal rules and the operation of sovereign wealth fund for oil
revenues management. Industrialization can help diversify the revenue base of an oil
economy, which in turn reduces the degree of dependence on oil sector performance.
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Chapter 3
Oil Price Shocks and Optimal
Monetary Policy in an Oil-rich
Emerging Economy
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Recurrent episodes of oil price shocks generated considerable interest among pol-
icymakers and researchers in many countries on the appropriate monetary policy
responses to mitigate the effects of such shocks. However, the literature mainly cen-
ters on the evolution of oil price shocks, their distortionary effects and the consequent
role of monetary policy in oil-importing industrial economies1. Moreover, only a lim-
ited number of studies2 employ micro-founded models to analyze this phenomenon;
and even fewer analyze oil exporting emerging economies. Therefore, there is a gap
in the literature on the transmission and dynamic effects of oil price shocks in oil
exporting emerging economies and the optimal monetary policy response to oil price
shocks.
Monetary policy design and implementation in oil exporting small open economies
often runs into troubled waters whenever significant and persistent oil price shock
occur. Particularly, macroeconomic conditions in these economies tend to move in
tandem with the oscillatory patterns of the oil price. This comes with dire con-
sequences for macroeconomic stabilization and welfare. Oil-dependent economies
come under pressure whenever the price of oil plummets and they reap wind-falls
when oil prices rise. Whereas the negative effect of sustained drop in oil prices
is easily seen through worsening macroeconomic performance, the effect of higher
oil prices remain open to debate in these economies. The Dutch disease and re-
source curse syndromes are commonplace in a number of resource-rich economies,
thus making the question about the exact long-run effects of increase in commodity
prices on resource endowed emerging economies a pertinent one. Vulnerabilities in
these economies tend to undermine the potential long term benefits of increases in
oil price.
Gali & Monacelli (2005)’s contribution to the discourse on monetary policy mod-
eling in small open economies highlighted the role of the exchange rate in the trans-
mission process of shocks of foreign origin in a small open economy. They explore
alternative monetary policy rules for achieving macroeconomic stabilization in small
open economies. Ever since, there has been a growing appetite in the literature to
embed commodity dynamics in small open economies (SOE) DSGE models and
to evaluate monetary policy given terms of trade shocks in commodity-dependent
economies.
Within the context of an oil importer, Leduc & Sill (2001b) simulated a dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model and reports that, although
1See Bernanke et al. (1997b); Barsky & Kilian (2001); Lee & Ni (2002); Hamilton (2003); Kilian
(2008); Blanchard et al. (2010); Killian & Lewis (2011), etc)
2Such as Kim & Loungani (1992b), Backus & Crucini (2000), Leduc & Sill (2001a), Devereux
et al. (2006), Romero (2008), Bodenstein et al. (2012)
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policy makers cannot totally insulate their economies from oil-price shocks induced
consequences, their response to the shock is crucial in determining how profoundly
the shock will impact their economies. They show that a response via interest rate
increase may amplify the effect of an oil shock on output, while an accommodatory
monetary policy through money growth may help contain the size of the impact.
Medina & Soto (2005) incorporated oil in dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
(DSGE) model estimated for Chile and finds that oil price shock induced output
contraction and inflationary pressure; and that, the monetary policy rule that re-
sponds to wage rigidity is next to the second best outcome; while indicating that a
full inflation stabilization policy response from the central bank is at a considerable
output cost.
Romero (2008) modeled an oil producing economy in a two-sector DSGE model
featuring a representative oil firm and an oil-utilizing final goods firm and showed
that that oil price shock tends to exacerbate inflation pressures, resulting from the
standard cost-push effect and a marginal cost perturbing wealth effect. In addition,
he finds that the simple policy rule that responds to consumption is welfare-superior.
Ferrero & Seneca (2015) constructed a DSGE model for Norway with a modeling
framework that accommodates linkages and spillovers between the oil producing
sector and the rest of the economy; and a fiscal policy rule that allows for a sovereign
wealth fund for warehousing oil receipts. They suggest that the central bank should
respond to a negative oil price shock by reducing interest rate, while indicating that
domestic inflation stabilization is welfare consistent.
A number of studies on Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries have
shed light on the dynamic interactions between oil price shocks and macroeconomic
dynamics in the region. For instance, in a stylized DSGE model estimated for
Algeria, Allegret & Benkhodja (2015) employ a framework that accommodates a
domestic oil price rule for imported refined oil, with a parameter whose value can be
set to either allow for full subsidy (which mutes exchange rate pass-through) or allow
for a complete pass-through of oil price shocks to the domestic economy (with a zero
subsidy). Their result indicates that in the presence of oil price shock, targeting core
inflation provides the best outcome for economic stabilization and social welfare in
Algeria. Meanwhile, in an earlier study on Algeria, Benkhodja (2014) recommends
inflation targeting under a flexible exchange rate system as the most appropriate way
to insulate an oil exporting economy from the Dutch disease. In addition, Omran
et al. (2015) follows Romero (2008) to model oil as a productive factor in the non-oil
sector, identifies multiple shocks and reports that domestic inflation targeting rule
is welfare superior given a productivity shock, while the exchange rate targeting rule
maximizes welfare the most given oil price shock in Iran.
Hove et al. (2015) evaluates alternative monetary policy setups given terms of
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trade shock in a multi-sector commodity exporting SOE DSGE model calibrated
for South Africa. Their framework explores production in the foreign economy and
reflects the small open economy’s commodity export in the foreign economy’s pro-
duction dynamics. Their findings suggest that, in the event of a shock to the terms
of trade, the CPI targeting monetary policy rule will produce the highest support
for macroeconomic stabilization and welfare, though at a cost of high exchange rate
volatility. More recently, Algozhina (2016) in a SOE DSGE model with monetary
and fiscal instruments, multi-sector production, heterogeneous households and fiscal
savings, allows for foreign exchange reserves in the uncovered interest rate (UIP)
equation and finds that given a negative oil price shock, a pro-cyclical fiscal policy
stance can be combined with a CPI inflation targeting monetary rule in a flexible
exchange rate environment3 to achieve optimum welfare outcomes.
Olomola & Adejumo (2006) using a structural vectorautoregressive (VAR) method
examined the effect of oil price shocks on the Nigerian economy and finds that oil
price shock did not impact output and inflation, but significantly influenced the real
exchange rate. Whereas Aliyu (2009) using the Johansen VAR-based co-integration
technique reports that a unidirectional causality flows from oil price to real GDP
while causality between the real exchange rate and the real gross domestic product
is bidirectional. He also finds that real economic growth is positively influenced by
oil price shock and exchange rate appreciation in Nigeria. Adebiyi et al. (2009), in a
multivariate VAR analysis indicates stock market’s negative ultra sensitivity to the
real oil price shock; as the shock elicit an immediate and significant negative real
stock returns. In the same vein, Iwayemi & Fowowe (2011) based on results from
VAR analysis finds that positive oil price shocks do not have significant effect on key
macroeconomic variables in Nigeria. However, their findings reveal the presence of
asymmetric effects, as negative oil price shocks impact output and the real exchange
rate significantly. Results of these empirical investigations on oil price shock and
macroeconomic behaviour in Nigeria demonstrates the lack of consensus in the lit-
erature, apart from the fact that all of the modeling techniques employed do suffer
from Lucas Jr (1976)’s critique.
Despite Nigeria’s status as a the largest economy in Africa and a top tier player
in oil exporting circles, the Nigeria-focused DSGE literature is rather sparse; with
only a handful providing inconclusive insights on external shocks transmission to the
economy and the optimal path for monetary policy given external shocks. Olekah &
Oyaromade (2007) in their pioneering work on Nigeria, specified a small scale open
economy DSGE model a la Lubik & Schorfheide (2006) and Fukac et al. (2006) but
only performed a pseudo-estimation using the vectorautoregressive (VAR) analysis
and reports that inflation is sensitive mainly to output changes and that interest rate
3Without intervention in the foreign exchange market
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volatility is traceable to exchange rate and inflation shocks in Nigeria. Alege (2008)
incorporates an export sector into Nason & Cogley (1994) and Schorfheide (2000)
to estimate a model to characterize the Nigerian business cycle and finds that tech-
nology, monetary and export shocks have effects on the Nigerian business cycle and
that the link between the macro economy and the external sector is weak. Olayeni
(2009a) using a Bayesian DSGE-VAR estimation approach, analyses monetary pol-
icy shocks under four alternative formulations and finds that the monetary authority
in Nigeria is business cycle-conscious and that the policy maker’s benign response
to exchange rate fluctuations accounts for the observed exchange rate overshooting
and persistence. Thus, the paper recommends that monetary policy should reflect
strong inertia and be more aggressive towards exchange rate. Adebiyi & Mordi
(2012) estimates a DSGE model to examine the pass-through from exchange rate
and oil price to domestic economy and finds evidence in support of a small and
incomplete exchange rate pass-through to domestic inflation; while their findings on
exchange rate response to oil price shock is rather less definitive, as it was negative
on impact and then turned positive in the third quarter with an extended period of
persistence. Iklaga (2017) 4, in a Smets & Wouters (2003)-type model modified for
Nigeria and which features heterogeneous household, capital, government and treats
oil sector as exogenous, finds that exchange rate appreciation, consumption increase,
aggregate output contraction and employment drop results from a positive oil price
shock. Furthermore, in related work, he finds that the optimized monetary policy
rule that targets real wage is superior to other optimized and the sub-optimal rules
in terms of welfare, albeit, at a cost of high interest rate volatility. Rasaki (2017)
employ the Bayesian technique to estimate a small open economy DSGE model for
Nigeria, which embeds a non-separable money in the utility function following An-
drés et al. (2006), to allow monetary aggregate an active role in the economy. Their
results suggests that inflation in Nigeria is a monetary phenomenon, price stick-
iness is observed and monetary policy reacts to exchange rate movements; while
foreign inflation, external debt and exchange rate shocks are shown to drive output
in Nigeria.
Evidently, the literature on the pattern of interactions between oil price shock
and domestic business cycle variables in Nigeria is too limited to allow a consen-
sus of ideas that can guide policy design and implementation in a robust manner.
Additionally, till date there is only one known piece of work5 where attempt has
been made to trace the optimal path for monetary policy in Nigeria given oil price
shock. Policymakers require a robust understanding of the dynamic interactions




between oil price movements and macroeconomic aggregates in order to design ef-
fective monetary policy to achieve optimal macroeconomic stabilization and welfare
during good and bad6 times. Alternative routes to monetary policy optimization
based on micro-founded analysis should not be obscure to policy makers, especially
in economies with inherent external sector vulnerabilities.
Whereas Iklaga (2017) and Rasaki (2017) followed Smets & Wouters (2003) and
Andrés et al. (2006), respectively to estimate SOE DSGE models for Nigeria; we
leverage Gali & Monacelli (2005) and Hove et al. (2015) to construct and simulate a
multi-sector new Keynesian small open economy DSGE model that feature explicit
oil production and analyses oil price shock and optimal monetary policy exercise.
The SOE model of Gali & Monacelli (2005) has become the benchmark model for
studying fundamental features of SOEs and monetary policy options for achieving
welfare maximization. Given key SOE’s model building blocks, we added oil and
foreign production sectors to highlight the interaction between the SOE and the for-
eign economy production sectors, a strategy which ensures SOE’s oil export feature
in foreign production as a key input.
The model is calibrated to capture some broad features of oil producing emerging
economies like Nigeria. The representative household seeks to maximize utility from
consumption and hours of work subject to a budget constraint, price is sticky in
the domestic non-oil production sector while the oil sector is assumed to operate
in a perfectly competitive environment. All domestic oil output are exported and
oil sector is the only export sector. Oil resource is treated as an endowment in the
small open economy, requiring only labor employment to exploit. We analyze the
effects of a positive oil price shock on macroeconomic aggregates and the optimal
monetary policy path given the shock. The central bank sets up monetary policy to
respond to output gap, inflation and exchange rate volatility via a Taylor (1993)-type
monetary policy reaction function. The model is solved and then simulated with a 10
percent positive oil price shock under alternative monetary policy rule specifications.
Given a range of ten alternative policymaker’s preferences for constructing the loss
equation, we analyze optimal monetary policy under the optimized simple rules
(OSR), discretion and commitment policies.
Consequently, we find evidence of Dutch disease in the economy. Both the non-
tradable and total output contracted in response to a positive oil price shock, and this
is most amplified under the CPI targeting monetary rule. The significant increase in
oil output somewhat offsets the decline in non-oil output leading to higher employ-
ment and consumption. The exchange rate is associated with a marked appreciation
6The good times are periods when the economy is hit by a favorable shock, like increases in oil
price or higher global incomes and bad times are those associated with unfavorable events like oil
price slumps, etc
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while the inflation threat was benign on impact, but later became manifest. The
monetary authority lowered the interest rate in response to the Dutch disease. The
domestic inflation targeting (DIT) rule is found to be welfare-superior in the class
of the optimized simple rules (OSR) while the commitment policy dominates both
discretionary policy and the optimized simple rules.
The introductory section is followed by section 2, which discusses the model
in detail. Section 3 explores model calibration, solution and simulation, while in
section 4, we analyze impulse response and volatility results. In section 5, we treat




We model a two-sector small open economy7 endowed with an oil resource. There
is a representative household which consumes both foreign and domestic goods,
two classes of representative firms; one producing non-traded goods and the other
producing oil exclusively for export. There is a central bank that cares about private
agents’ welfare and implements monetary policy to achieve this objective. The
domestic economy interacts with the rest of the world (ROW) via export of oil to
and import of consumption goods from the ROW. The oil producing firm operates in
a perfectly competitive market while the non-tradable goods producing firm operates
as a monopolistic competitor.
The inclusion of an oil sector in the model enriches the original Gali & Monacelli
(2005)-type of small open economy new Keynesian DSGE models and allows for the
exploration of possible interactions between the oil export-oriented sector and the
wider domestic economy. A two-sector model can provide better understanding of
the nature and variety of shocks policy makers should anticipate and the appropriate
response whenever these shocks hits the economy. This is crucial in the light of the
fact that macroeconomic fundamentals in oil exporting economies are largely driven
by price and supply dynamics in the oil market.
The model features price stickiness a la Calvo (1983b) in the domestic (non-
tradable goods) sector; thus allowing for inflation and a role for monetary policy,
accordingly. In the tradable sector, the law of one price holds, thus there is no
separate Philip’s curve for imports; although the general price index still captures
imported component of inflation. Also, a complete assets market is assumed, hence
there are no financial frictions in the model. It also features complete exchange rate
pass-through. The pricing system for the oil firm is such that it is a price taker in a
dollar pricing world. Therefore, dollar oil price is taken as given and typically, the
firm makes a zero profit.
Capital and investment do not feature in the model as is typical of many small
open economy DSGE models for optimal policy analysis. Steinsson (2003) in a closed
economy model for optimal monetary policy with inflation persistence, abstracts
from investment and capital accumulation by assuming a fixed endowment of non-
depreciating capital. For a small open economy, Mccallum & Nelson (1999) argue
that, the stock of capital is inconsequential for the economy’s dynamics since the
contribution of capital changes to the business cycle fluctuations is small. In line
with the Gali & Monacelli (2005) tradition, firm’s production function incorporates
7As shown in figure 3.1
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Figure 3.1: Overview of Model
only labour input; except for the foreign final goods firm that utilizes oil and a
foreign intermediate good as inputs. Households enjoy domestic firm’s ownership
for profits and supply labour to both domestic and oil firms for wages. Labour
is perfectly mobile across all sectors. Monetary policy is modeled using a typical
Taylor rule, augmented with the exchange rate and a smoothing parameter. Our
optimal monetary policy exercise compares outcomes under optimized simple rules,
discretion and commitment policies given an oil price shock.
3.2.2 Household Behaviour
3.2.2.1 Representative Household Problem
We model an economy populated by an infinite number of atomistic, but identical
households. Thus, a representative household approximates preferences of all house-
holds with respect to consumption and hours of work. The representative household
seeks to maximize utility, given an inter-temporal budget constraint. The utility
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where β is the discount factor, Ct is a composite index of consumption goods,
Lt are hours of work; η is the relative risk aversion coefficient, otherwise referred to
as the inverse of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, and % is the elasticity
of the marginal dis-utility of labour. Both η and % take, strictly, positive values.
The household’s composite consumption Ct includes non-tradable (domestic)
good, Cht and imported good, C
f
t . Using the Dixit & Stiglitz (1977) aggregator, the












where the parameter Ψ represents the weight or share of domestically produced,
non-tradable goods in total consumption, which may be interpreted as the “home
bias” coefficient; while 1 − Ψ is the weight of foreign goods in total consumption,
which denotes the import share in total domestic consumption and could be termed
as the degree of openness index for this economy. The parameter υ > 0 is the
elasticity of substitution between the consumption of domestically produced non-
tradable goods Cht and imported goods C
f
t . It is a measure of substitutability
between non-tradables and imports. Consumption of non-tradable and imported

















where Cht (i) and C
f
t (i) denotes consumption of home and foreign goods of variety
(i) by the representative household in the small open economy. The parameter ν > 1
is the elasticity of substitution within each goods category (i.e. domestic goods
category and imported goods category), and it differs from υ which depicts the
consumer’s taste for variety between consumption of domestic and imported goods.
Whereas, ν is the elasticity of substitution between variety of commodities within
each of the two goods categories, υ operates between the two broad categories of
goods. Put differently, υ is the elasticity of demand between the two categories of
consumer goods while ν is the elasticity of demand within each category of goods.
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Given that individual price indices for each category of goods in the consumption













tively; the household optimal allocation can be obtained by minimizing expenditures
relating to each category of goods, subject to their respective CES consumption ag-






























After minimization, the household optimal allocation for each category of goods


































When the total consumption cost is minimized subject to the composite con-
sumption index, the optimal household expenditure allocation, reflecting the weights
of non-tradables and imports in the entire consumption basket, respectively will yield














Going forward, we apply the Uhlig (1995)’s approach to perform log-linearization
on the characterizing equations of the model. This approach involves taking the
log deviation of each expression around their steady-state values. Each lower case
variable capped with tilde should be taken as the log-deviation of the corresponding
upper case variable from its steady state value.

















1−υ + (1−Ψ)(P ft )1−υ]
1
1−υ (3.9)








t = PtCt (3.10)
Performing a log-transformation on 3.9 we obtain a Consumer Price Index (CPI)






Where Ψ and 1−Ψ are the weights associated with non-tradable and imported
goods, respectively, in the overall domestic consumer price index.
When log-linearized, the price index becomes:
p̃t = Ψp̃t
h + (1−Ψ)p̃tf (3.12)
This produces a Consumer Price Index (CPI) that represents a weighted sum of
prices of non-traded and imported goods in the economy.
3.2.2.2 Labour Supply and Consumption Euler Equations
The representative household inter-temporal budget constraint can be expressed as
follows:
PtCt + Et(ξt+1Bt+1 ) + T
l
t ≤ WtLt +Bt + Πt (3.13)
where PtCt is the consumer’s minimum total consumption expenditure,Wt is the
wage rate, Bt is one period asset portfolio, Bt+1 is the nominal pay-off of period t+1
from asset portfolio held at the end of period t. Et(ξt+1) is defined as R−1t and it is the
stochastic discount factor, Rt is the domestic interest rate, T l is lump-sum tax and
Πt is profits transferred to household by the domestic monopolistically competitive
firms. Labour wage is assumed to be the same in all sectors, and it is taken as given
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by the household. The representative household decides on consumption, labour and
assets holding to maximize welfare (utility) subject to the prevailing inter-temporal
budget constraint. A non-trivial solution is assumed, such that Ct > 0, Lt > 0 and
Bt > 0.







U (Ct ,Lt)− λt
[
PtCt + Et(ξt+1Bt+1 )+T
l
t −WtLt − Bt − Πt
]}
(3.14)
Where λt is the Lagrangian multiplier capturing the marginal utility of wealth.
Upon maximizing the Lagrangian multiplier with respect to consumption Ct, labour
supply (hours of work) Lt and household’s portfolio of assets Bt, we obtain the
following first-order conditions (FOCs):
∂L
∂Ct
= C−ηt − λtPt = 0
∂L
∂Lt
= −L%t + λtWt = 0
∂L
∂Bt
= −βλt+1 + λtEtξt+1 = 0
Given the assumption that all households are identical, the optimization con-
ditions (i.e. first order conditions) of the representative household holds for the
aggregate economy and can be expressed as follows:
C−ηt = λtPt (3.15)











This is the labour supply equation, an expression in which the marginal value
of labour is equated to the marginal utility of consumption. It states that the
relative price (real wage) of consumption-leisure should be equal to the marginal
rate of substitution of leisure-consumption. The expression implies that, ceteris
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paribus, higher consumption is only possible if there is an increase in labour hours.
To consume more, the household has to forfeit some leisure to work more. This
underscores the trade-off between leisure and consumption. However, this also imply
that consumption can increase if there is a rise in the real wage while the consumer
enjoys the same level of leisure.
Equation 3.19 below is the Consumption Euler equation, which reflects the trade-
off associated with the inter-temporal allocation of the household consumption and it










In equation 3.19, 1
Rt
is the price of a one-period domestic currency denominated
bond. Rt represents the gross interest rate on the bond. The consumption Euler
equation underscores how interest rate influences the household decision either to
consume more or less between periods. The consumer compares the utility deriv-
able from consuming an additional amount now (t) with the utility expected from
consuming more in future (t+1). In an environment where interest rate is expected
to rise in future, consuming more today will be costly, hence, the willingness to wait
and consume more in future.
The log-linearized versions of equations 3.18 and 3.19, are as follows:
ηc̃t + %l̃t = w̃t − p̃t (3.20)
c̃t = Etc̃t+1 −
1
η
(r̃t − π̃t+1) (3.21)
3.2.3 Domestic Firms Production
The economy is populated by two types of firms engaged in production activity.
The first representative firm produces8 oil entirely for export to the rest of the world
(ROW) and the second firm is engaged in the production of non-tradable final goods.
In essence, one firm operate in the export (tradable) sector while the other operate
in the non-tradable sector. Activity relating to the firm in the non-tradable sector
is denoted with the superscript (h) while that relating to the firm in the tradable
sector is denoted with the superscript (o). A third class of non-producing firms exist
in the economy, dealing in the importation of goods from the foreign economy for
domestic consumption.
8Production here refers to mining of oil minerals from under the ground and beneath the sea
for exports.
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3.2.3.1 Firms in the tradable (oil) sector
The representative oil firm is assumed to operate in an international oil market
deemed to be perfectly competitive. The firm employs only labour and it’s produc-
tion function evolves linearly as follows:





where Y ot , Zot and Lot is oil output, oil sector productivity variable and labour
employed in the oil sector, respectively. Zot , the productivity variable in the oil
sector, is an exogenous autoregressive process of the form:






t ∼ N(0, σ2z) (3.23)
The oil firm minimizes cost subject to total output constraint, thus leading to the







The equation for the oil sector’s real marginal cost (RMCot ) in (24) represents
the firm’s cost minimizing decision and can be expressed log-linearly as follows:
˜rmcot = w̃t − z̃ot − p̃ot (3.25)
Given the perfect competition in the oil sector, we can derive the representative
oil firm’s price as:






We can also, from 3.26 obtain Wt = Zot P o; where NMCot and RMCot in 3.24
and 3.26 refer to the nominal and real marginal costs in the oil sector, respectively;






3.2.3.2 Firms in the non-tradable sector
In the non-oil sector, imperfectly competitive firms produce differentiated commodi-
ties entirely for domestic consumption. Hence, these goods are non-tradables. The
non-tradable goods firms are subject to monopolistic competition and they utilize a
linear production function as follows:






where Y ht is the non-tradable goods output, Zht is non-tradable sector productiv-
ity variable and Lht is the employment in the non-tradable sector. The productivity
variable Zht , being an exogenous autoregressive process is expressed as follows:





Zh ∼ N(0, σ2z) (3.29)
The firm’s optimality condition resulting from cost minimization process in the







Where RMCht is the non-tradable sector’s real marginal cost and P ht is the non-
tradable good’s price. The log-linear version of the RMCht is as follows:
˜rmcht = w̃t − z̃ht − p̃ht (3.31)






















Assuming wage equalization in the tradable and non-tradable production sectors,
equations 3.33 and 3.34 are used to derive the relative price of non-tradable goods







The log-linear version is:
p̃t
h = z̃ot − z̃ht − ˜rmcht + p̃ot (3.36)
Equation 3.35 indicates that the relative productivity in the two sectors, oil price
and non-tradable real marginal cost are the determinants of non-tradable goods
price. From this expression, it would seem, ceteris paribus, that higher oil price and
improvement oil sector productivity can lead to increase in the price of non-tradable
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commodities. We can also infer ceteris paribus, that improvement in non-tradable
sector productivity may induce lower price for non-tradable goods.
3.2.3.3 Importers
We assume the existence of a retailer importing foreign homogeneous good Y ft from
the rest of the world at the foreign currency price P f∗t . The imported good is
packaged into a consumption good Cft at no extra cost and with a zero mark-up.
The law of one price (LOOP) operates, such that the domestic price of imported
goods is equivalent to the corresponding foreign price denominated by the nominal





Where P ft is the domestic price of import and St is the nominal exchange rate.
Equation 3.37 when log-linearized yields:
p̃t
f = p̃t
f∗ − s̃t (3.38)
The implication of the LOOP assumption is that there is complete pass-through,
which ensures fluctuations in domestic price of imported goods fully reflect changes
in foreign price of imports and the exchange rate dynamics.
3.2.4 Production in the Foreign Economy
The model features a perfectly competitive multi-sector foreign production block,
comprising the foreign final goods sector, the foreign intermediate goods sector and
the foreign non-tradable goods sector in the spirit of Cashin et al. (2004) and Hove
et al. (2015). Foreign final goods firm uses oil from the SOE an input. It is common-
place in the SOE DSGE literature to assume key foreign economy linkages as a set of
exogenous processes, rather than explore the micro-founded equilibrium dynamics.
Similar to the domestic economy, perfect mobility of labour across the three foreign
production sectors and the consequent cross sectors wage equalization is assumed.
3.2.4.1 Production in the foreign intermediate and non-tradable goods
sectors
Firms in the foreign intermediate and non-tradable goods production sectors employ
linear production technologies. Production function in the foreign non-tradable
goods sector is given as:
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Where Y h∗t , Zh∗t and Lh∗t represents foreign non-tradable output, foreign non-
tradable sector productivity variable and employment in the foreign non-tradable
sector, respectively. Zh∗t follows an AR(1) exogenous process, which when expressed
in logarithms yield the following:






t ∼ N(0, σ2zh∗) (3.40)
In the same vein, the foreign intermediate goods production function is modeled
linearly as follows:





Where Y I∗t , ZI∗t and LI∗t are the foreign intermediate sector’s output, productivity
and employment, respectively. ZI∗t is also characterized by an AR(1) exogenous
process as follows:






t ∼ N(0, σ2zI∗) (3.42)



















This expresses the price of foreign non-tradables as a product of the relative
productivity and foreign intermediate goods price.
3.2.4.2 Production in the foreign tradable goods sector
The foreign tradable goods production sector applies a Cobb-Douglas technology to
combine oil imported from the SOE and other oil exporters and foreign produced
intermediate good as inputs for the production of tradable goods. The production
function is as follows:





Where Zf∗t is the foreign tradable goods production sector total factor produc-
tivity, Y I∗t is the foreign intermediate goods inputs and Y o∗t is the foreign oil input,
a fraction of which is imported from the SOE. The parameters ζ and 1− ζ represent
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the shares of oil imports and foreign intermediate goods in foreign final goods pro-
duction, respectively. The cost minimization exercise in the foreign tradable goods
sector will result in a cost per unit of output in the following form:





Foreign final goods are assumed to be tradable, allowing its import by the small
open economy. Consumption by foreign households is assumed to be symmetric
with that of consumers in the domestic economy, thus resulting in an implied foreign
consumer price index of the form:





Where Ψ∗ and 1−Ψ∗ are the weights associated with non-tradable and imported
goods, respectively, in the foreign economy’s overall consumer price index.
3.2.5 Domestic Firms Price Setting
The non-tradable goods producing firm sets the price of its goods following Calvo
(1983b)’s staggered pricing rule, which allows price adjustment with some probabil-
ity. Consequently, at period (t), a firm type with the probability 1−θh can optimally
re-set price while another firm type with the probability θh can not re-set price ev-
ery period and thus, constrained to maintain previous period price. It applies that
θh ∈ (0, 1) and θh is the measure of the degree of stickiness or nominal rigidity in the
system. The bigger the stickiness parameter θh the less flexible prices are. Taking










Where (P ht )reset is the price of the firm that can re-optimize. The maximization
























Where (θh)kEtξt+k andNMCht+k represent the effective stochastic discount factor
and the nominal marginal cost, respectively. By this expression, the fraction of firms
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that can reset prices try to maximize the discounted present value of profit flows
subject to the total demand for domestic non-tradable goods. Substituting Yt+k in















A few steps of mathematical procedure is applied to derive a log-linear expres-
sion which depicts the domestic (non-tradable) goods inflation as a function of the
one period ahead expected non-tradable inflation and the real marginal cost of the
non-tradable firm. This is the non-tradable sector’s New Keynesian Phillips curve












, being the coefficient of the real marginal cost in the
New Keynesian Phillips curve equation.
3.2.6 Real Exchange Rate, Oil Price and Imported Inflation
3.2.6.1 The Real Exchange Rate
We follow Cashin et al. (2004) to define the real exchange rate (Qt) as the foreign
price of domestic consumption basket (StPt) relative to the foreign price of foreign
consumption basket (P ∗t ). Put differently, the real exchange rate is expressed as the
foreign worth of domestic basket of goods relative to the foreign worth of foreign





Where St is the nominal exchange rate, Pt is the domestic price index and P ∗t is
the foreign price index.
We assume that the law of one price prevails at both ends (i.e. imports and








Where P f∗t and P o∗t are the foreign prices of the small open economy’s imports
and exports (oil), respectively; while P ot is the domestic price of oil.
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is the terms of trade between the small open economy’s foreign oil





productivity differential between the domestic oil sector and foreign intermediate




is the productivity differential between foreign and domestic
non-tradable sectors. The relative productivities in 3.53 reflect the Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson effect, a theoretical hypothesis credited to the combined contributions
of Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) on the real exchange rate,
relative productivities, relative prices and wages in the non-tradable sector. The
Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis posits that, assuming the law of one price
hold in the tradable sectors, a shock to productivity in the tradable sector will
cause wages to rise, resulting in non-tradable goods price increase and an eventual
appreciation of the real exchange rate.
The foremost justification for the above real exchange rate derivation in equa-
tion 3.53 has its root in the literature9 which establishes that the equilibrium real
exchange rate is largely driven by the long-run evolution of some macroeconomic
fundamentals like productivity differentials, terms of trade and real interest rate dif-
ferentials. In line with this tradition, Cashin et al. (2004) show empirically that real
commodity prices constitute the fundamental determinant of the real exchange rate
in commodity-exporting countries. Hove et al. (2015) modifies Cashin et al. (2004)’s
real exchange rate specification by incorporating the non-tradable goods firm’s real
marginal cost in a new Keynesian small open economy model that identifies com-
modity terms of trade shock. Following this tradition, we study how a positive shock
to the dollar price of oil will affect the oil exporting SOE’s business cycle variables
within the Gali & Monacelli (2005) small open economy New Keynesian framework
and then proceed to explore optimal monetary policy.
The log-linear representation of equation 3.53 is as follows:
q̃t = Ψ
(




The domestic price of oil is given as P ot =
P o∗t
St
. In log-linear form, it becomes:
9See De Gregorio et al. (1994), Rogoff (1996), Chinn & Johnston (1996), Montiel (1997),




t − s̃t (3.55)
Both foreign oil price and oil price inflation are treated as AR(1) exogenous
processes as shown in 3.89 and 3.90, respectively.
3.2.6.3 Imported Inflation
Imported inflation is associated with foreign tradable goods, and can be derived
with the first difference of equation 3.45 as follows:




t − P o∗t−1)ζ
∗





ζ∗ (πI∗t )1−ζ∗ (3.56)
The equation when expressed in log-linear version becomes:
π̃t
f∗ = ζ∗π̃t
o∗ + (1− ζ∗)π̃tI∗ (3.57)
In the domestic economy, the log-linearized consumer price index (CPI) inflation
equation is obtained from 3.12 as follows:
π̃t = Ψπ̃t
h + (1−Ψ)π̃tf (3.58)
From equation 3.52, the imported component of the domestic CPI inflation equa-




When we substitute π̃tf∗ from equation 3.56 into equation 3.59, we derive:
π̃t
f = ζ∗π̃t
o∗ + (1− ζ∗)π̃tI∗ −4s̃t (3.60)
Equation 3.60 is the modified imported inflation, which expresses imported infla-
tion in the domestic economy as a function of foreign intermediate goods inflation,
oil inflation in the foreign oil market and changes in the nominal exchange rate.
3.2.7 International Risk Sharing and the Uncovered Interest
Rate Parity
We assume complete international financial markets, which guarantees domestic eco-
nomic agents access to the international financial markets. In the same vein, foreign
agents too can access the domestic financial markets. Trading in state-contingent
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international financial assets is facilitated. Consequently, domestic agents are able
to smooth consumption through subscription to domestic and foreign securities.
Assuming both domestic and foreign households exhibit the same preferences and
stochastic discount factors, consequent upon which the expected nominal return
from domestic risk-free bonds is equal to the expected nominal return from for-
eign risk-free bonds expressed in terms of the domestic currency; we can derive the
condition for international risk sharing. Under this condition, consumption risk is
perfectly allocated (shared) between domestic and foreign households by equating




























where Γ is a constant representing the initial assets position, Qt is the real








With the assumption of complete international markets, the condition for the








where ξt+1 is the stochastic discount factor, Rt is the domestic interest rate and
R∗t is the foreign interest rate. The log-linear version is as follows:
r̃t − r̃∗t = Et∆s̃t+1 (3.65)
The UIP condition depicts the relationship between expected variation in nom-
inal exchange rates and differential in interest rates in the domestic and foreign
economy. The expression indicates that movements in the nominal exchange rate
is linked to the gap (wedge) between domestic and foreign nominal interest rates.
When we combine the log-linearized UIP condition in 3.65 with the real exchange




t+1)− (r̃t + Etπ̃t+1) (3.66)
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This shows that movements in the nominal exchange rate is accounted for by the
wedge between domestic and foreign nominal interest rate and inflation.
3.2.8 Monetary Policy
To close the model, monetary policy is captured as central bank’s policy reaction
function; a Taylor (1993)-type interest rate feedback rule. The Taylor rule is a pre-
scription for how a central bank should set monetary policy rate to promote healthy
macroeconomic conditions. In keeping with this tradition, we employ an interest
rate rule with which the central bank is assumed to act or respond to stabilize out-
put, inflation and the exchange rate. The rule is notable in the literature for the
merits it hold for monetary policy modeling. Clarida et al. (2000) and Lubik &
Schorfheide (2007) believe the rule summarizes well monetary policy patterns and
behaviour in many policy environments. Also, Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford
(2003) attest to the general robustness and consistency of the rules with the funda-
mental principles of optimal monetary policy. It would appear that at the moment,
there is a general consensus both in the literature and in policy environments that
stabilizing inflation around a particular target and output around its trend should
constitute the fundamental goals of monetary policy. Such a policy framework is
popularly known as flexible inflation targeting and it fits the Taylor rule setup.
The flexibility of the Taylor rule makes it possible to nest a rich set of alternative
monetary policy frameworks, especially in many developing and emerging market
economies where different monetary policy regimes may be in vogue at different
times (Senbeta, 2011). From a modeling stand point, Clarida et al. (1999) submits
that Taylor rules are known to provide equilibrium determinacy, a requirement for
achieving a unique stationary equilibrium solution in rational expectations models.
It must be added that, Taylor’s prescription that the asymptotic response of the
policy rate to inflation must be higher than unity is required for achieving model
stability.
3.2.8.1 Generalized Taylor Rule
We adopt a generalized Taylor rule in which the central bank manipulates the nom-
inal interest rate in response to deviations of output, inflation and exchange rate
from their steady-state values10 This is in the spirit of Senbeta (2011) and Hove















10As shown in the log-linear version in 3.68.
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The log-linear expression for the above generalized monetary policy rule is as
follows:







Where $1, $2, $3 and $4 are weights attached by the monetary authority to
output, CPI inflation, non-tradable inflation and movement in the exchange rate,
respectively. Each weight indicate the importance of their respective coefficient vari-
ables in the central bank policy reaction function. The term ρr is the smoothing
parameter, which captures history dependency of policy in the model (Woodford,
2003). Empirical results have shown that monetary policy innovations rarely radi-
cally depart from recent history, rather interest rate changes often reflect a sequence
of small adjustments in the same direction (Clarida et al., 2000). In addition, Sack
& Wieland (2000) maintains that concerns about model parameter uncertainty and
financial system stability concerns makes interest rate smoothing appealing to cen-
tral banks. It ensures that monetary policy innovations do not become disruptive,
surprise the markets unnecessarily and elicit unintended macroeconomic volatility.
εrt is the monetary policy shock, which accommodates the triggers for monetary
policy action.
3.2.8.2 Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
From the generalized Taylor rule in 3.68, we assume the following three alternative
policy regimes or strategies which inform the set of policy objectives being targeted
by the central bank:
r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 + (1− ρr) ($1ỹt +$2π̃t) + εrt (3.69)







r̃t = ρrr̃t−1 + (1− ρr) ($1ỹt +$4∆s̃t) + εrt (3.71)
Equations 3.69, 3.70 and 3.71 are the CPI inflation targeting regime, non-
tradable inflation targeting regime and the nominal exchange rate targeting regime,
respectively. Under all the three frameworks, the monetary authority is assumed
to be interested in employment level, as such it observes the behaviour of aggre-
gate output under all of the alternative monetary policy rules. The significance of
output in the Taylor rule is well recognized by Galí (2015) who argues that even
“inflation targeters” do not claim to be seeking to stabilize inflation all the time
without due consideration for how that would impact real variables like output and
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employment. The inclusion of the exchange rate in the central bank feedback rule
does not necessarily mean that the central bank explicitly pegs the exchange rate,
rather it indicates that significant volatility in the exchange rate could elicit a policy
response from the monetary authority.
3.2.9 Equilibrium Conditions and Aggregate Resource Con-
straints
In equilibrium, the demand and supply for tradable goods, non-tradable goods and
labour must attain parity. For the goods market, the clearing conditions is such
that sum of demand for non-tradable output and oil output (export) must be equal


























are the steady state ratios for non-tradable and tradable
output, respectively. These ratios are calibrated based on data and related literature.
3.2.9.1 Demand Side in the goods market
Given that Y ht = Cht , we can substitute 3.11 into Cht in 3.7 to derive:







The log-linear version of 3.74, given below, is the equation depicting the equilib-
rium condition for the non-tradable goods sector.
ỹht = −υ(1−Ψ)
(





Similarly, given that Y ot = Y o∗t = Cot in the oil sector and using the equation for
















∗ (p̃o∗t − p̃I∗t ) (3.77)
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Equation 3.77 is the equilibrium condition in the oil sector, with the parameter
ζ∗ being the share of exported oil in the foreign economy’s production.
Having derived the two equilibrium conditions that matter in the goods market,
we can combine 3.75 and 3.77 with the steady state ratios of the non-tradable and oil
sectors to total income to obtain the equilibrium expression that reflect the domestic






















∗ (p̃o∗t − p̃I∗t )]
(3.78)
3.2.9.2 Supply Side in the Goods market
The supply side of the equilibrium dynamics can be obtained using the derived
marginal costs in the oil and non-tradable sectors. The marginal cost in the oil
sector is given as:
˜rmcot = w̃t − z̃ot − p̃ot (3.79)
Substituting w̃t from 3.20, p̃t from 3.12, p̃ft from 3.37 and p̃ot from 3.55; we obtain
the equilibrium real marginal cost in the oil sector as follows:




+ Ψp̃ht − p̃o∗t + s̃t − z̃ot (3.80)
Similarly, the real marginal cost in the non-tradable sector is given as:
˜rmcht = w̃t − z̃ht − p̃ht (3.81)
Substituting w̃t from 3.20, p̃t from 3.12 and p̃ft from 3.37; we obtain the equilib-
rium real marginal cost in the non-tradable sector as follows:




+ Ψp̃ht − p̃ht − z̃ht (3.82)
3.2.9.3 Labour Market
The clearing condition for the labour market is such that the sum of employment
in the oil and non-tradable sectors must be equal to the total labour supply in the






We derive the equilibrium dynamics in the labour market by log-linearizing 3.83,
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and substituting out the log-linear versions of 3.22 and 3.28 in same; together with


















are the steady state share of employment in the oil and non-
traded sectors, respectively.
3.2.10 Equilibrium Conditions in the Foreign Economy
The log-linear equilibrium conditions for foreign consumption, foreign non-tradable
consumption and foreign tradable consumption:
ỹ∗t = Ψ
∗ỹh∗t + (1−Ψ∗) ỹ
f∗
t (3.85)
ỹh∗t = −υ∗p̃h∗t + υ∗
(






∗ỹot + (1− ζ∗) ỹI∗t (3.87)
Other equations characterizing the foreign economy include the exogenous pro-
cess of foreign interest rate, foreign oil price and inflation, as well as foreign inter-


























Ultimately, the model’s competitive equilibrium system is the aggregation of
the optimal solutions to (a) household’s problem c̃t (i), l̃t (i); (b) firm’s problem
ỹt (i), ỹht (i), ỹot (i); and (c) pricing decisions and price indices p̃t (i), p̃ht (i), p̃
f
t (i),
π̃t (i), π̃ht (i), π̃
f
t (i), all market clearing conditions, monetary policy rules, interest
rate parity condition and the exogenous shock processes. The remaining model’s
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equilibrium characterizing sequences which yield the solution for the oil exporting
small open and the foreign economies are: s̃t, q̃t, ˜rmcot , ˜rmc
h
t , r̃t, z̃ot , z̃ht , r̃∗t , ỹ∗t , ỹh∗t ,




t , z̃h∗t and z̃I∗t .
3.3 Parameter Calibration, Model Solution and Sim-
ulation
To analyze the impact of a positive oil price shock, the model’s structural parameters
are calibrated to match the general features of small open economies exporting
primary products and to reflect specific characteristics of the Nigerian economy. In
doing this, we rely heavily on the wider small open economy literature, the limited
literature on Nigeria and comparable emerging and developing economies business
cycle characteristics and data driven estimates from time series analysis. The key
ratios are obtained using data sourced from the IMF, the World Bank and the
Central Bank of Nigeria. The subjective discount factor β is set at 0.99 implying
that steady state real interest is in the neighbourhood of 4% annually. The inverse
of the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, being the risk aversion parameter
η is calibrated as 1, in line with the estimate obtained by Steinbach et al. (2009)
for South Africa, a commodity exporter. The elasticity of the marginal dis-utility
of labour % is set at 6 following estimate from Alpanda et al. (2010). The share
of non-traded goods in total domestic consumption, Ψ and the share of imports in
total domestic consumption, otherwise known as the degree of openness, 1−Ψ are
estimated at 0.8 and 0.2, respectively. The estimate is based on the average import
to GDP ratio for Nigeria between 1981 and 2015. For the foreign economy, in line
with the earlier assumption of consumption symmetry between domestic and foreign
households, the share of non-tradable goods in total consumption is given as 0.8.
We follow Santacreu (2005) and Alpanda et al. (2010) in setting the persistence
of the productivity variables in the oil ρzo and non-oil ρzh sectors to 0.85 and 0.74,
respectively; and the foreign intermediate and non-traded goods sectors both have
productivity variables (ρzI∗ and ρzh∗) persistence of 0.8. The persistence parameters
for foreign interest rate ρr∗, foreign oil price ρpo∗ , foreign oil inflation ρπo∗ , foreign
intermediate goods price ρpI∗ , and the foreign intermediate goods inflation ρπI∗ are
set at 0.8, 0.8, 0.5, and 0.5, respectively; while the share of oil in foreign production
ζ∗ is calibrated at 0.26 in the spirit of Hove et al. (2015).
The probability that firms are unable to re-optimize every period, otherwise
referred to as the stickiness or nominal price rigidity parameter is given as 0.75 in
line with Christiano et al. (2005) and Gali & Monacelli (2005); suggesting that price
adjustment is achieved averagely once in every four (4) quarters. The smoothing
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parameter ρr for the Taylor rule, following Ortiz & Sturzenegger (2007), is set at
0.73. The role of the parameter is to offer some assurance to economic agents
on the trajectory of monetary policy stance and to anchor expectations about the
evolution of interest rate in the economy. The monetary policy parameters in the
Taylor rule $1, $2, $3 and $4 are fixed at 0.5, 1.5, 1.5 and 0.25; respectively. The
type of Taylor rules that incorporate exchange rate element is in the category of the
modified Taylor rules common with small open, emerging markets and developing
economies. The modification of the traditional Taylor rule to account explicitly
for the exchange rate in setting monetary policy instrument is consistent with an
inflation targeting monetary policy framework (Mishkin, 2007). Generally, in many
inflation targeting regimes, especially the class being modeled here, stabilization of
output and exchange rate in addition to inflation are accommodated in the monetary
policy reaction function. Weights assigned to CPI and domestic inflation satisfies
the Taylor principle, which recommends an aggressive stance to inflation; while
values assigned to output and exchange rate are consistent with those employed by




) in the new Keynesian Philips curve equation is obtained
as 0.0825; while the elasticity of substitution within each goods category (i.e. non-
tradable and imports) and between the two goods categories are set at 10 and 1,
respectively, corresponding to values in Romero (2008) and Hove et al. (2015). Using
the macroeconomic fundamentals of Nigeria and data sourced from the IMF IFS and
the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), we




(exports) to total income Ȳt
o
Ȳt
, non-tradable sector employment to total employment
L̄h
L̄
and oil sector employment to total employment L̄o
L̄
as 0.75, 0.25, 0.65 and 0.35;
respectively.
We solve the model in Dynare after deriving the first order conditions of all
optimizing agents, the equilibrium conditions and specifying the shock processes.
The Dynare software in Matlab environment utilizes the Blanchard & Khan (1980)
procedure to derive model solutions. We proceed to simulate the model to examine




We apply a ten percent positive standard deviation shock to the international price
of oil and observe the impulse responses of selected macroeconomic variables under
the three alternative monetary policy frameworks. Our objective is to unravel the
transmission mechanism of oil price shocks in the oil exporting small open economy
given (i) CPI inflation targeting policy rule (CITR); (ii) domestic inflation target-
ing policy rule (DITR); and (iii) exchange rate targeting policy rule (ERTR). The
response of each macroeconomic variable to a positive oil price shock and the paths
through which the shock permeates the economy under each monetary policy en-
vironment will provide useful insights on model dynamics. In addition, through
the analysis, we can identify the monetary policy rule associated with pronounced
volatility in selected macroeconomic variables given oil price shock. Therefore, each
monetary policy rule’s merit will derive from the level of macroeconomic fluctuations
elicited by oil price shock under it.
Figure 3.2 below shows the impulse responses of shock to oil price under the
three alternative policy rules.
Figure 3.2: Responses to a positive oil price shock under alternative Monetary Policy
Regimes
3.4.1 Oil Price Shocks and Macroeconomic Responses
An oil price shock is shown to increase the value of oil exports on impact. Ex-
ogenous increase in oil price decreases oil sector real marginal cost and raises oil
supply, resulting in higher oil exports and output. The oil sector exhibits signifi-
cant sensitivity to oil price movements. The monetary policy rule that targets the
100
consumer price index (CITR) elicits the largest oil sector response to the positive
oil price shock. Although, the domestic inflation targeting regime (DITR) and the
exchange rate targeting regime (ERTR) provide nearly the same magnitude of oil
output response to the positive shock to oil price, the CITR clearly outperforms
them. In addition, oil price shock effects on oil output under DITR and ERTR is
more volatile given that the initial increase in oil output turned into a decline by the
sixth quarter before becoming fully dissipated with that of the CITR in the thirtieth
quarter.
Conversely, the non-tradable (domestic) output sector nose-dived in response to a
positive oil price shock. Non-oil output declined on impact in response to the positive
innovation to oil price under all of the three alternative monetary policy rules.
The non-tradable output fall under the CITR is worse than those under the DITR
and ERTR. The phenomenon11 in which boom in the resource sector results in the
depression of the domestic non-resource sector as in this case is known as the Dutch
disease, a problem to which many developing resource-rich economies are susceptible.
In this respect, we find evidence of the operation of the two principal mechanisms
of the Dutch disease; viz: the resource movement effect and the wealth/spending
effect.
The resource movement effect is associated with the migration of productive
(labour) resources from the non-tradable goods sector to the oil sector, where the
marginal productivity of labour has risen due to oil boom. The exodus of workers
from the non-tradable sector to the oil sector is a causal factor in the decline expe-
rienced in the non-tradable sector. Additionally, given the size of the non-tradable
sector, it’s decline resulted in the overall output slump. However, while the shock
elicits decline in both non-tradable and total output, the percentage increase in the
oil output is by far higher than the percentage fall in both non-tradable and overall
output. This development has important implications for employment and consump-
tion. The booming oil sector, characterized by improved wages attracts workers from
the non-traded goods sector and creates new employment opportunities for labour
force participants. This results in a rise in total employment. Employment is found
to be more responsive to an oil price shock under the CITR compared to both DITR
and ERTR that often trail each other.
In the same vein, consumption exhibit a positive response to oil price shock.
Given that more people are now in work as a result of the oil windfall, higher
marginal productivity of labour in the oil sector will propel higher wages and conse-
quently, higher consumption; allowing the spending effect to manifest through higher
demand for consumer goods in the economy. Comparatively, consumption is shown
11See Corden (1984), Egert & Leonard (2008), Kalcheva & Oomes (2007), Benkhodja (2014) and
Hove et al. (2015)
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to be more sensitive to oil price shock under ERTR and DITR than the CITR. This
implies that consumption growth in response to oil price shock is more contained
and less volatile under a monetary policy rule that targets the composite measure of
inflation. Furthermore, we can infer that the consequent increase in consumption is
oriented towards imported goods, given that exchange rate appreciation will make
imported goods more attractive to domestic consumers and the effects of the Dutch
disease can not allow the domestic non-tradable sector to respond immediately to
higher demand. Consumption stabilization is better attained under the CITR com-
pared with under both ERTR and DITR, under which consumption response to an
oil price shock is more amplified. Given the circumstances of the Dutch disease
and real exchange rate appreciation, higher consumption in response to oil price
shocks under ERTR and DITR may build external account vulnerabilities which
could undermine the economy’s current account and balance of payments position.
A situation where output falls, yet consumption rises as exchange rate appreciation
encourages higher imports bills which may precipitate a range of external sector
problems such as loss of domestic competitiveness, unsustainable import bills, high
imported inflation, external reserves pressure and a potential currency crisis if oil
market conditions reverses.
Oil price shock results in the appreciation of the real exchange rate. This is at-
tributable to the consequent rise in oil sales receipts or foreign exchange. Combined
with the wealth effect, real exchange rate appreciation provide domestic consumers
with an additional incentive to consume more imported goods. Whenever, the real
exchange rate appreciates, the relative price of imports fall and domestic consumers
consume more. In any case, the non-tradable sector is already on the decline and
can not adjust to the improved domestic demand propelled by the oil boom. Oil
price shock produced the same high magnitude of exchange rate appreciation un-
der the three (3) policy rules; suggesting that oil earnings play a very critical role
in the real exchange rate determination process in developing oil exporting small
open economies. It does not matter, what inflation targeting regime is in vogue,
an oil price shock would elicit a similar response in the real exchange rate of a
less-developed economy that exports oil.
The effect of oil price shock on inflation is not manifest on impact, however,
it shows that a positive inflation expectation exist and that actual inflation may
rise in the medium-to-long term. Therefore, the concern about inflation is palpable
amongst domestic economic agents and the principal source of the inflation expec-
tations is the price index of imported goods. Whereas, inflation tend to be more
responsive and volatile under the CITR, it is more persistent under the DITR and
ERTR.
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3.4.2 Oil Price Shock, Dutch Disease and Monetary Policy
Response
Given that there is no immediate threat of inflation the central bank has no incentive
to tighten the stance of policy. Conversely, the effect of the Dutch disease on the
non-tradable output sector compels the central bank to lower the interest rate. The
significant decline in non-tradable output which accounts for the marginal decline
in the economy’s overall output leads to an interest rate cut, given that the central
bank’s reaction function envisages output performance as an objective in the Taylor
rule. Mishkin (2007) notes that central banks focus on output stabilization enjoys
two main merits. The first is in connection with conclusions from the canonical ag-
gregate supply models of Svensson (1997) and Clarida et al. (1999) which indicates
that variation in inflation is influenced by output gap; and the second is that the
general public also care about the trade-off between output and inflation fluctua-
tions. Output volatility is important for the setting of monetary policy because it
affects the forecast of future inflation and has implications for welfare.
The central bank, therefore, is compelled to act through an accommodatory mon-
etary policy to arrest the negative deviation of output from steady state. Moreover,
the real exchange rate appreciation occasioned by the oil price shock may provide
an additional impetus for the central bank to ease monetary policy with the intent
to re-inflate the non-tradable sector and boost overall output. Interest rate cut is
sharper under the CITR, the normalization of monetary policy through rate hike
is also sharper under the CITR, with interest rate response dissipating faster than
under the alternative policy rules. Under both DITR and ERTR however, the cut
in interest rate was benign, policy normalization was slower and policy response
took a longer time to dissipate. On the whole, the point where policy normalization
(interest rate response climbed to positive territory) began are shown to co-incide
with the points where both imported and CPI inflation inflation pressures became
manifest and at these points, output decline had dissipated, especially under the
DITR and ERTR. These interactions tend to indicate the central bank’s readiness
to contain inflation aggressively whenever the threat emerges.
3.4.3 Volatility under alternative Monetary Policy Rules
The standard deviations or volatility associated with each of the selected macroe-
conomic variables under the three alternative monetary policy rules in focus are
presented in table 3.1 below. In the table, the real exchange rate is shown to ex-
hibit the highest volatility and is the same under the three policy regimes. This
confirms the results of the impulse response function which shows real exchange
rate as the variable with the most significant response to oil price shock under all
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the policy rules. The real exchange rate is revealed as the conveyor of external
shocks, especially with a high sensitivity to terms of trade fluctuations. The real
exchange rate volatility is evident under all three monetary policy specifications. In
line with Friedman (1953) and Mundell (1961), the exchange rate is believed to act
as a shock absorber and a cushion for the economy in the face of external shocks,
such as oil price shocks. External shocks often hit the real exchange rate in small
open economies first, before they are transmitted to the domestic economy. The
real exchange rate comes under intense pressure to either appreciate or depreciate
depending on the nature of the shock. Hence, its high levels of volatility across
the alternative monetary policy setups. However, the conveyor role of the exchange
rate works in flexible exchange rate environments and would not matter in a peg,
except in the informal sector where multiple exchange rates may result. In the event
of an external shock, flexible exchange rate system allows for swift changes in rel-
ative prices, which minimizes the impact of the shock on output and employment
(Maliszewska & Maliszewski, 2003).
Exported oil output exhibits the second largest volatility across all three policy
frameworks; with CITR having the largest volatility, followed by DITR and ERTR,
respectively. The high oil output volatility tend to reflect the inverse relationship
between oil price and the marginal cost in the oil sector. Higher oil price lowers oil
sector marginal cost and thus elicits considerable responses that increases exported
oil output. As is the case in many commodity exporters, the commodity sector out-
put often mimic the evolution of the international price of the commodity, and by
the same token, oil price volatility tend to drive oil export volatility. Comparatively,
the least volatility under the ERTR suggest that targeting exchange rate can mod-
erate volatility in the oil sector, given that the exchange rate is the prime channel
for external shocks transmission in a commodity exporting small open economy.
Variables/Policy Rules CITR DITR ERTR
Output 0.1108 0.0686 0.0647
Non-tradable Output 0.6649 0.4115 0.3883
Exported (Oil) Output 1.5515 0.9602 0.9060
Consumption 0.2197 0.5845 0.6132
Employment 0.1108 0.0686 0.0647
Real Exchange Rate 13.3333 13.3333 13.3333
Imported Inflation 0.1636 0.2031 0.2197
Inflation 0.0327 0.0406 0.0439
Interest Rate 0.0300 0.0225 0.0241
Table 3.1: Standard Deviation under the alternative policy rules
Output and non-tradable output are shown to be most volatile under the CITR,
in line with results from the impulse response functions and reflecting effects of
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volatility from the imported and non-tradable components of the composite infla-
tion index. Clearly, the CITR provides the best monetary policy environment to
minimize consumption volatility, as its value under the rule is less than half of the
volatility under both DITR and ERTR. This tend to align with results from De-
vereux et al. (2006), where it is established that targeting the CPI inflation leads
to minimum consumption volatility. To obtain the least volatility in the imported
inflation and aggregate inflation, the CITR provides the best guarantee as volatility
of consumption is least under the CITR.
The lowest volatility is associated with the interest rate. Two reasons may have
accounted for this. First is the possible manifestation of monetary policy inertia,
which is a deliberate effort to achieve interest rate smoothing by the central bank
Woodford (1999). It would seem that interest rate smoothing may be re-inforced
where there is no immediate threat to price stability in the economy. Second, from
the results of impulse response functions, a positive shock to oil price did not elicit
an immediate inflationary uptick, therefore, the expected aggressive interest rate
response to inflation could not materialize as inflation expectations were constrained
to medium term horizon and no current inflation threat resulted from the oil price
shock. As discussed earlier, central bank’s response was however intended to address
the effect of Dutch disease in the non-tradable sector. Interest rate volatility is
most significant under CITR, showing that the rule aggressively employs interest
rate to keep the economy on a particular business cycle path. This shows that
the monetary authority would react most aggressively to oil price shocks under a
composite inflation index.
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3.5 Optimal Monetary Policy and Welfare Evalua-
tion
The literature presents two alternative routes through which a welfare loss function
can be derived; either through the fundamentals obtained from the representative
household utility function as in Rotemberg & Woodford (1999), Woodford (2003),
and Galí (2008, 2015) or through a somewhat ad-hoc approach which in the spirit of
Clarida et al. (1999) and Alpanda et al. (2010) assumes a central bank’s loss function
seeking to minimize the deviations of inflation and output from their target levels.
In the first instance, Woodford (2003) demonstrates the possibility of motivating
a quadratic loss function as a second order Taylor approximation of the expected
utility of a representative household, which equates the expected discounted sum
of period losses for specific coefficients. In this way, a linear approximation to the
policy function is shown to be sufficient to approximate welfare up to a second order,
provided such a second order approximation to the welfare function has quadratic
terms. The resulting welfare loss will be proportional to the expected discounted
sum of squared deviations of variables. In the second instance, following from the
effects of the welfare-reducing distortions embedded in the new Keynesian model,
it is assumed that the central bank dislikes inflation and output gap. Thus, the
central bank welfare is characterized as a present discounted value of a quadratic
loss function in inflation and output gap.
3.5.1 Utility-based Welfare Loss function
In Woodford (2003) and Galí (2008), the expected welfare loss function was derived














where Ut is the utility at time t, U is the steady state utility and C is the steady






where λπ and λy are constants defined essentially by model parameters. In this
first approach that features optimizing agents, whose utility depends on consumption
and hours of work, and sticky prices, expected welfare is believed to decline with
the squared deviation of inflation from optimal rate (a zero inflation level) and the
squared deviation of output from the natural output level.
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If prices are sticky, fluctuation in output gap implies that the average mark-up
over marginal cost will be unstable. This may result in labour utilization inefficiency
in the production process, thus leading to a sub-optimal employment level. This
provides a justification for stabilizing the output gap to promote the stability of the
average mark-up. Similarly, as argued by Woodford (2003), the situation of price
stickiness exploited by firms that can re-optimize will yield a non-zero inflation rate.
The resulting relative price distortions will produce dead weight losses because of a
sub-optimal production setup. For instance, a positive inflation will compel firms
that are stuck with the old price (because they unable to re-optimize for reasons
discussed in the New Keynesian literature for price stickiness) to sell at a price below
their competitors and produce in excess of the quantity that makes for an efficient
allocation. It is believed that if prices were to be perfectly stable, there would be no
incentives for firms with the leverage to raise prices and the situation will be similar
to that of perfect price flexibility. Galí (2015) notes that following assumptions of
the Real Business Cycle literature, the attainment of price stability implies efficiency
in output and vice versa, in line with the principle of divine co-incidence. Divine co-
incidence implies that the monetary authority need not worry about what constitute
the efficient output level per period, given that it can be achieved automatically as
a by-product of the policy that ensures price stabilization.
The inclusion of the interest rate in the loss function has a micro-founded motiva-
tion as well. Woodford (2003) provides a derivation in which the squared deviation
of interest rate from its steady state value features in the period loss when trans-
actions frictions are taken into cognizance and real money balances appear in the
utility function. Levin et al. (1999) and Williams (2003) imposes a constraint on
interest rate variability on the grounds that: (i) a highly volatile short term interest
rate could result in higher long-term interest rate due to higher term premium; (ii)
leaving out interest rate in the loss function could make optimal monetary policy to
be extremely aggressive to a point where the nominal interest rates hits the zero-
lower bound. Levin & Williams (2003), Orphanides & Williams (2008) and Ilbas
(2012) reason that, since policymakers are more concerned about the inter-temporal
variation in interest rate, it would be appropriate to replace it with 4it in the loss
function.
In relation to the open economy framework where the exchange rate and/or the
terms of trade may have implications for welfare, Galí (2015) maintains that the
central bank has an incentive to influence or respond to the terms of trade in the
interest of domestic households. Clarida et al. (2001) submits that the open economy
loss function is not different from the one for the closed economy if there is complete
pass-through of real exchange rate fluctuations to the domestic economy and the
domestic inflation. On the other hand, Corsetti et al. (2010) provides allowance for
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incomplete pass-through and argues that the law of one price gap should be included
in the loss function.
The standard new Keynesian model for the closed economy can be distinguished
from the open economy version, generally, by the introduction of additional layers
of frictions emanating from rigidities such as those associated with nominal import
price, imperfect risk-sharing, financial frictions and exogenous shocks of foreign ori-
gins. Consequently, the central bank in an open economy is conditioned to respond
to extra distortions that may undermine key objects of monetary policy.
3.5.2 Ad-hoc (central bank) Welfare Loss Function
In this approach, the central bank is assumed to dislike inflation and also believed
to be concerned about the deviation of output from the optimal equilibrium level.
Therefore, the welfare of the central bank is assumed to approximate the discounted
quadratic loss function in inflation and output gap. In an ad-hoc approach, the













where ỹt is the output gap and ω is the relative weight attached to output gap
by the central bank. The central bank chooses inflation and output gap, given its
choice of the nominal interest rate (i) which in turn determines the real interest
rate (r) subject to the given path of Etπt+1, the term for expected inflation in the
Philip’s curve. Therefore, the central bank’s loss function will be minimized subject
to the Philip’s curve constraint. Where markup shocks are real, the central bank
wanting to achieve inflation and output stabilization will be constrained by Philip’s
curve (Davig, 2007).
We employ a loss function of the ad-hoc type with some extensions to accom-
modate small open economy considerations. This approach follows the literature on
monetary policy and aligns with Clarida et al. (1999) and Laxton & Pesenti (2003)
and follows from the assumption that the central bank has a fundamental objective
of minimizing the variance of output and inflation from their target values. We
consider a loss function which nest the realization of central bank’s objective on
policy targets into an aggregate measure of welfare in the economy. The intent of
the monetary authority therefore is to reduce or eliminate welfare losses arising from
deviations of inflation, output, interest rates and exchange rates from their steady
state values.
The ad-hoc loss function, in contrast to those derived from micro-founded fun-
damentals, are popular in the literature for a number of reasons. First, they allow
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for the incorporation of a smoothing parameter for interest rate in the model. The
interest rate smoothing parameter reflects monetary policy inertia for which evi-
dence is found in the data. Second, there are concerns that models used in the
utility-based loss function may not be sufficiently micro-founded or too complicated
to produce a true welfare function (Ilbas et al., 2013). Third, Clarida et al. (1999)
notes that commonly employed models do not envisage all the costs associated with
fluctuations in the economy, thus, making the use of extra-model judgments incum-
bent when making decisions on policy objectives. Fourth, based on Adolfson et al.
(2011), observable macroeconomic variables may be used to set up the loss function
in order to provide a better guide for welfare analysis, especially in economies char-
acterized by significant business cycle fluctuations. Fifth, central bank loss functions
are believed to capture uncertainty induced by inflation variability; and this is con-
sidered as the main cost of inflation in the economy (Clarida et al., 1999). Sixth,
the optimization framework provided by the loss function is deemed reasonable and
simplifies the estimation of welfare. Seventh, the ad-hoc loss function recognizes the
fact that parts of the central bank’s objectives do have the force of the law, and
therefore not within the bank’s control. The loss function allow us to characterize
central bank’s preferences in simple fashion that aligns with the practical imple-


















The loss function in 3.96 shows that central bank intends to minimize losses
arising from fluctuations in πt, the measure of inflation which could either be the
CPI or domestic inflation measure; yt, output; st, exchange rate; and rt, interest
rate. The exchange rate is incorporated in the loss function to reflect it’s impor-
tance to the optimizing policymaker in a small open economy. This process is in line
with Gali & Monacelli (2005) and Kirsanova et al. (2006) who demonstrates that
relaxing parameter restrictions of the utility-based loss function results in a more
complex welfare criterion that includes the terms of trade, which can be proxied by
the exchange rate. In addition, De Paoli (2009) utilizes a terms of trade externality
to elicit the motivation for the inclusion of the real exchange rate in the objective
function. As noted earlier, the interest rate smoothing parameter in the loss func-
tion indicates the central bank’s distaste for huge, sudden and extreme volatility
in interest rates. Woodford (2003) also observes that the interest rate element in
the loss function helps the central banks to prevent a possibility of hitting the zero
lower bound on interest rates. The parameters of the policy rule(s) are selected in
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an optimal way to minimize the quadratic loss function12
As noted by Levin & Williams (2003) and Cateau (2007) weather the policy
function is derived from household utility fundamentals or on ad-hoc basis, there is
no consensus in the literature on the appropriate size of relevant weights in the loss
function. In practice, policymakers rarely select weights based on the theoretical
findings of a single model, rather, it takes outputs of a suite of models and expert
opinions to assign values to the weight of the loss function.
When the unconditional expectations is applied on 3.96 in line with Rudebusch
& Svensson (1999), the loss function becomes:
E(Lt) = λπV ar(πt) + λyV ar(yt) + λrV ar(rt) + λsV ar(st) (3.97)
The resulting loss function in 3.97 represent the weighted average of the uncon-
ditional variances of inflation, output, exchange rate and interest rate. The weights
(λπ, λy, λs and λr) are selected optimally to minimize the quadratic loss function.
The smaller the value of the loss function the less the welfare losses. Therefore,
the monetary policy rule that results in a minimum value for the loss function is
the optimal monetary policy. However, this loss function may be minimized under
the optimized simple rules, discretion and commitment policies. Accordingly, the
ad-hoc loss function of the modeled central bank minimizes losses arising from the
deviations of inflation, output, interest and exchange rates from respective steady
state values. Weights assigned to variables in the the loss function is crucial in the
loss minimization process. Like Alpanda et al. (2010), Ferrero & Seneca (2015) and
Hove et al. (2015), we construct a set of alternative values of the relative loss func-
tion weights ranging from 0.5 to 2; leading to ten (10) alternative plausible weight
combinations, with the weight of inflation variance normalized to unity for simplicity
and in line with the literature. Each weighted loss function is minimized under each
of the alternative simple policy rules to compute the values of central bank losses.
3.5.3 Optimized Simple Rules given 10 percent positive oil
price shock
An optimized simple rule is a rule within a category for which relevant parameters
are chosen to minimize a loss function. In our case, these are three (3) Taylor-
type policy rules in equations 3.69 - 3.71, which features the pair of interest rate
smoothing parameter13 and output deviation from steady state; with the deviations
of aggregate inflation, domestic inflation and changes in the nominal exchange rate
12Dynare tools for optimal policy are utilized for the computation of the optimal parameters.
13Other terms used by Galí (2008) to qualify this term include inertia and history dependence.
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from their steady states, respectively. The objective14 is to optimize the coefficients
of the policy rules15 in order to minimize the variances of the expected loss function in
equation 3.97. The first rule responds to output and aggregate inflation, the second
to output and domestic inflation and the third to output and exchange rate given
a ten (10) percent oil price shock. Additional justification for the inclusion of the
exchange rate in the simple monetary policy feedback rule for a small open economy
is Ball (1999), who finds that exchange rate’s presence enhances the performance of
the simple rule significantly and Taylor (2001) and Batini et al. (2003) who uncover
an effect, albeit minimal.
Table 3.2 below reports the results obtained from optimizing the coefficients
of the different monetary policy rules to derive values for the policy maker’s loss
function. We show ten (10) loss values resulting from the policy maker’s range of
weights combination for the loss function. Each weights combination reflects relative
preference of the central bank for minimizing the variance of the variables in the
loss function. The range of the weights is between 0.5 and 2, and the size of the
weight attached to individual variables in the loss function is determined by how
strongly the policymaker would care about stabilizing the variables. A policymaker
that cares strongly about stabilizing a variable, say output, inflation etc; in the loss
function will assign a value above 1 or 2 to the variable; otherwise, it would weight
such a variable less by assigning 0.5 or 1 to the variable.
Loss values under alternative rules Preferences (weights)
CITR DITR ERTR λπ λy λr λs
0.00095 0.00090 0.00094 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.00120 0.00120 0.00120 1 1 0.5 0.5
0.00130 0.00130 0.00130 1 1.5 0.5 0.5
0.00140 0.00140 0.00140 1 2 0.5 0.5
0.00096 0.00091 0.00095 1 0.5 1 0.5
0.00097 0.00092 0.00095 1 0.5 1.5 0.5
0.00098 0.00093 0.00096 1 0.5 2 0.5
0.00140 0.00120 0.00140 1 0.5 0.5 1
0.00170 0.00150 0.00170 1 0.5 0.5 1.5
0.00190 0.00170 0.00190 1 0.5 0.5 2
Table 3.2: Welfare losses under alternative policy rules given a 10% oil price shock
The optimized simple rules (OSR) policy exercise shows that the policy maker’s
preference with weight values of 1 and 0.5 for inflation and other variables, re-
14The Dynare’s toolbox which implements the optimized simple rules (OSR) algorithm is used.
It numerically searches the parameter space of the policy function to obtain those parameters
which minimize the weighted variances of the relevant variables and reports the loss value.
15Alternative Taylor Rules. CITR denotes CPI inflation targeting regime, DITR denotes domes-
tic inflation targeting regime; while ERTR denotes exchange rate targeting regime. Each regime
feature interest rate inertia and output gap.
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spectively; produces the lowest loss values under all three policy rules. Thus, the
preference that makes the central bank less tolerant of inflation volatility compared
to interest rate, output gap and the exchange rate volatilities is deemed optimal
under the CPI targeting, domestic inflation targeting and exchange rate targeting
rules. At that central bank’s preference of weights selection of inflation (1), output
(0.5), interest rate (0.5) and exchange rate (0.5) however, the domestic inflation
targeting policy rule (DITR) delivers the least loss value. Seven (7) out of the ten
(10) formulated policy preferences (weights combinations) indicates that the DITR
will deliver the best outcome for welfare, while the remainder deliver the same re-
sults across all three policy reaction functions. It is observed that in the preferences
that produced same loss values, the policy tends to be more interested in output
stabilization as output weights of 1 - 2 are associated with them. The remaining
seven (7) preferences have an output weight of just 0.5. Consequently, the DITR is
shown to be the superior, welfare-enhancing monetary policy rule in the class of the
optimized simple rules in this model.
Under the alternative preferences, the DITR also delivers the second and third
best results in comparison with other rules. These outcomes are associated with the
weight combinations that indicates the central bank strongly care about interest rate
volatility. Next to the DITR, the ERTR provides the second best welfare outcome;
while the CITR yields the least welfare maximizing results. Therefore, the monetary
policy rule that targets domestic (non-tradable) inflation is the one with the best
welfare-maximizing outcome. This result finds strong support in the literature. For
example, Aoki (2001) observes that optimal monetary policy is the one that targets
inflation with sticky prices given that it ensures equilibrium in the goods market
with the most sticky prices. Kollmann (2002), under a local currency pricing condi-
tion and absence of the law of one price, argues that it is optimal to pursue domestic
inflation stabilization via a Taylor-type policy rule notwithstanding the associated
significant exchange rate volatility cost. Gali & Monacelli (2005), with a model that
features complete exchange rate pass-through for a small open economy, finds that
the stabilization of domestic prices is the best welfare-maximizing policy route for a
central bank. In addition, Devereux et al. (2006), in an open economy setting with
complete pass-through and financial constraints, finds that the domestic inflation
targeting (DITR) yields the best outcome for welfare; followed by the CPI inflation
targeting rule (CITR) and the exchange rate targeting rule (ERTR), respectively.
Furthermore, using a welfare loss function derived from the household utility repre-
sentation in a two country model set-up, Divino (2009) finds that domestic inflation
targeting is the optimal policy.
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3.5.4 Optimal Policy under discretion and commitment given
10 percent oil price shock
To derive the optimal policy, all information in the endogenous and exogenous vari-
ables are utilized to minimize a stated loss function. Optimal policy problems entails
finding solution to an optimization problem whose objective function is the loss equa-
tion and the constraints are the structural equations in the model. The literature
distinguishes between two classes of optimal policy16; namely, discretion and com-
mitment. In the discretionary policy, the policy maker solves the one period problem
every period. He sets interest rate each period by solving a new optimization prob-
lem without dealing with constraints arising from previous period commitment. The
policy maker knows he will re-optimize next period, and he is aware that the pri-
vate sector knows as well. Thus, he takes private sector’s expectations about future
variables as given. Kydland & Prescott (1977) and Woodford (2003) demonstrates
that, when the policy maker cannot commit, the promise of a specific path for
the instrument will become time inconsistent. Therefore, reneging on the plan and
re-optimizing the next period becomes optimal and the private sector would have
absorbed this information. Under discretion, the interest rate reacts only to current
period variables, there is no sticking to a policy rule and monetary policy may not
be time consistent (Woodford, 2003; Divino, 2009).
Conversely, with optimal policy under commitment to follow a rule, the pol-
icy maker minimizes the welfare loss function subject to the rational expectations
equilibrium conditions in the model, once and for all, and commits to the resulting
optimal policy rule, with no incentive to change course. The solution does not only
take current period into account, but also reflects the present discounted value of the
flow objective functions. Private agents, believed to be forward looking do consider
the commitment by the central bank to a definite policy course in the formation of
expectation about the future. Consequently, gains result from commitment given
that private agents’ expectations is properly anchored. The gain of commitment
is in the lowering of future expected changes in current variables in case of exoge-
nous shocks. The policy maker’s binding commitment to a future monetary policy
reaction function ensures credibility and anchors expectation in the economy.
Table 3.3 presents loss values obtained from discretionary and commitment op-
timal policy under the alternative central bank’s preferences. The commitment17
policy clearly outperforms discretion under all ten (10) weights combinations. The-
16Dynare’s toolbox which implements discretionary and commitment policies is used for the
numerical solution given simulated oil price shock.
17Better long-run outcomes are achieved under commitment. Monetary policy can respond better
to shocks if the central bank is duty-bound to honor past promises concerning its future behavior.
Commitment allows the policy maker to gain credibility, an asset needed for success in achieving
policy objective Clarida et al. (1999), Plosser (2007) and Dotsey & Plosser (2008).
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Loss values Preferences (weights)
Discretion Commitment λπ λy λr λs
0.01030 0.00076 1 0.5 0.5 0.5
0.01330 0.00041 1 1 0.5 0.5
0.01650 0.00028 1 1.5 0.5 0.5
0.01960 0.00022 1 2 0.5 0.5
0.01020 0.00078 1 0.5 1 0.5
0.01000 0.00079 1 0.5 1.5 0.5
0.00970 0.00081 1 0.5 2 0.5
0.00900 0.00130 1 0.5 0.5 1
0.00850 0.00170 1 0.5 0.5 1.5
0.00830 0.00200 1 0.5 0.5 2
Table 3.3: Welfare losses under discretion and commitment policy given 10% oil
price shock
oretically, the superior results obtained under commitment over discretion stems
from (i) the possible positive inflation bias which results when the central bank tries
to steer output above it’s potential by exploiting inflation-output trade-off in the
short-run (Kydland & Prescott, 1977; Barro & Gordon, 1983); and (ii) the reaction
of a discretionary policy maker to shocks is generally, inefficient, leading to higher
welfare losses than would obtain in a commitment policy. As evident in the liter-
ature, the equilibrium and responses to shocks achievable by a committed policy
maker are superior to those achievable by a policy maker who re-optimizes per pe-
riod. In this exercise, the best outcome under commitment is achieved when the
policy maker attaches high weight to output volatility, while the worst outcomes
results from the preference that attaches high importance to exchange rate stabi-
lization. The justification for an output-oriented optimal commitment policy can
be extracted from the evidence of Dutch disease shown in the impulse response
functions and the compelling need for the central bank to act accordingly, to boost
domestic output. Whereas, the case of the least optimal policy under commitment
imply that caring too much about a highly volatile variable (see table 3.3) like the
exchange rate in the loss function is not welfare maximizing and may undermine the
spirit of commitment. Under discretionary policy, however, the best policy outcome
is associated with the policy maker’s preference that accords greater importance to
the exchange rate in the welfare loss function. Conversely, the worst policy outcome
under the discretionary policy is one which gives greater weight to output in the
loss function. The same central bank’s preference that produced the best outcome
(the least loss value) under commitment yields the worst possible outcome (highest
loss value) under discretion; and vice versa.
This finding is somewhat instructive for oil exporting small open economies,
where the exchange rate is highly volatile and critical for welfare. Unless these
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economies are able to achieve domestic economic resilience against external shocks,
so they are able to accommodate a considerable degree of exchange rate flexibility,
it will be hard for them to pursue a credible commitment optimal policy in reality.
Given the Dutch disease situation, the small open economy would need to think of
the right balance between output and exchange rate stabilization. In practice18, full
commitment is utopia, as many central banks may be pro-active in their preferences
of the loss function weights. However, committing to a medium term inflation and
exchange rate paths may pass for a degree of commitment.
3.5.5 Comparing Optimized Simple Rules, Discretion and
Commitment policies
Taylor & Williams (2010) argue that when simple rules are optimized the advantage
optimal policy has over simple rules becomes insignificant in most models. Their po-
sition aligns with findings from an earlier work by Williams (2003), which show that
an optimized three parameter interest rate rule which incorporates inertia is com-
parable in performance to the fully optimal policy counterpart. In addition, Levin
et al. (2005) submits that the results of optimal policy exercise for one model may be
worse than that of the optimized simple rule in another model. From the foregoing,
results from the optimized simple rules are believed to closely approximate those
from the commitment optimal policy. Therefore, for the purpose of comparison, we
present in table 3.4 below the loss values obtained from the optimized simple rules,
discretionary and commitment policies given ten (10) policy preferences assuming a
10 percent oil price shock.
Central Bank Optimized Simple Rules Optimal Policy
λπ λy λr λs CITR DITR ERTR Discretion Commitment
1 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.00095 0.00090 0.00094 0.01030 0.00076
1 1 0.5 0.5 0.00120 0.00120 0.00120 0.01330 0.00041
1 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.00130 0.00130 0.00130 0.01650 0.00028
1 2 0.5 0.5 0.00140 0.00140 0.00140 0.01960 0.00022
1 0.5 1 0.5 0.00096 0.00091 0.00095 0.01020 0.00078
1 0.5 1.5 0.5 0.00097 0.00092 0.00095 0.01000 0.00079
1 0.5 2 0.5 0.00098 0.00093 0.00096 0.00970 0.00081
1 0.5 0.5 1 0.00140 0.00120 0.00140 0.00900 0.00130
1 0.5 0.5 1.5 0.00170 0.00150 0.00170 0.00850 0.00170
1 0.5 0.5 2 0.00190 0.00170 0.00190 0.00830 0.00200
Table 3.4: Welfare losses under optimized simple rules, discretion and commitment
policy given 10% oil price shock
The overall results of the policy exercises indicates that commitment policy com-
18More so for a small open economy
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pletely outperforms discretionary policy across all preferences; and largely dominates
the optimized simple rules. Under three (3) weight combinations that reflects pol-
icy maker’s preference to value exchange rate more in the loss function, the DITR
produces a better result; while under one (1) weight combination with the highest
exchange rate weight of 2 both CITR and ERTR also perform better compared to
both commitment and discretion. There is a tie between CITR, ERTR and the com-
mitment policy under one policy preference with high exchange rate weight of 1.5.
As shown earlier, a higher weight on exchange rate in the loss function will produce
sub-optimal outcomes under commitment and a less sub-optimal outcome under
discretion. Our results show that the optimized simple rules of CITR, DITR and
ERTR under any policy preferences overwhelmingly outperform the discretionary
policy. In terms of general ranking based on welfare loss values, commitment policy
leads the pack, followed by the optimized simple rules, especially the one targeting
domestic inflation (DITR) and then, the discretion policy.
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3.6 Conclusion
In a two-sector small open economy model featuring price stickiness in the non-
traded sector and calibrated to highlight some stylized facts about oil exporting
emerging and developing small open economies, we study the dynamic responses of
selected macroeconomic variables to a positive oil price shock and the alternative
optimal paths for monetary policy given the shock. The study indicates evidence of
the Dutch disease in the model economy, consequent on the positive oil price shock
and finds a monetary policy response that is accommodatory in pursuit of domestic
output stabilization.
The incidence of Dutch disease in the economy is found to be more amplified un-
der the CPI targeting rule, as both non-tradable output and total output declined in
response to the positive oil price shock. In addition, given that the magnitude of the
rise in oil output induced by the oil boom exceeds the size of the decline in domestic
output, the net effect resulted to an increase in employment and consumption lev-
els. The income effect from the higher hours of work and the wealth effect resulting
from the boom can explain the rise in consumption. Exchange rate appreciation is
significant and similar under the three policy regimes; while the threat of inflation is
largely subdued, although a positive inflation expectation abounds in the economy.
The real exchange rate is revealed as the most volatile variable in the model and this
is robust across all monetary policy regimes. The high volatility of the exchange rate
may further justify the propriety of incorporating the exchange rate in the monetary
policy reaction function of the central bank, in line with Olayeni (2009b) who posits
that the exchange rate is not self-correcting.
Evidence from the optimized simple rules policy exercises show that the DITR
delivers the superior welfare-maximizing outcome. Next to the DITR, the ERTR
rule provides the second best welfare outcome; while the CITR yields the least
welfare maximizing results. Although the best optimized simple rule is associated
with a policy maker’s preference that normalizes inflation’s weight to unity and dis-
tributes a lesser weight (of 0.5) equally for the remainder variables, the next ranked
optimal outcomes under optimized simple rules tend to exhibit sensitivity to higher
weight on interest rate in the loss function. Preferences (other than the one referred
to earlier which produces the best) with the least weight of 0.5 on interest rate in
the loss function are associated with higher welfare losses. Curiously, under three
(3) out of the ten (10) preferences, the DITR OSR marginally outperforms the com-
mitment policy; a situation that lends some credence to Levin & Williams (2003),
who advocate that the OSR can sometimes produce results that are comparable to
the fully optimal policy.
The commitment policy ranks best and wholly outperforms discretion under all
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preferences. The optimal commitment policy is shown to be sensitive to the policy
maker’s weight on output stabilization. Divino (2009) echoes a similar result in the
context of an open economy. He posits that the openness of the economy has a
direct implication for social welfare objective and that the relative weight on output
gap stabilization is higher for an open economy than for the closed economy. On the
other hand, the performance of the discretion policy is improved with higher weights
on the exchange rate. It can be seen from the results that the policy maker’s prefer-
ence that produces the best possible outcome for optimal policy under commitment
also leads to the worst possible welfare outcome under the discretion policy. Op-
timal policy under commitment demands that a higher weight should be attached
to domestic output stabilization while the discretion policy’s best result is obtained
with a higher weight on the exchange rate in our model. This sets up a trade-off
between stabilizing the exchange rate (which can be conceived as stabilizing infla-
tion) and stabilizing the output gap. In this model, however, owing to the combined
effects of the consequent exchange rate appreciation and the debilitating effect of
the Dutch disease on domestic output, the central bank can pursue optimal policy
by leaning towards output stabilization. This recommendation is based on the re-
sults obtained from the optimal policy exercise under commitment. The domestic
inflation targeting regime under optimized simple rules will suit a policymaker with
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External sector vulnerability has been at the core of most emerging and developing
economies business cycle fluctuations for many decades. The state of the domestic
economy determines to a large extent, the size of the impact and amplification of
foreign shocks in these economies. Inherent structural weaknesses, inefficiencies and
macroeconomic imbalances in the domestic economy tend to exacerbate the impact
of adverse external shocks, thereby undermining domestic resilience to such shocks.
The situation in which many oil-dependent small open economies rely predomi-
nantly on crude oil export for foreign exchange and government revenue is a pointer
to the delicate economic structures in these countries. A large proportion of the
expected positive inter-sectoral spillovers, forward and backward linkages from oil
production do not materialize. This is because, the oil sectors in most oil producing
economies operate as enclave sectors; attracting vast amount of production inputs
from abroad and producing almost entirely for export. In addition, unanticipated
and prolonged adverse oil price shocks tend to create external vulnerabilities which
often snowball into sharp output declines, high inflation, fiscal insolvency, currency
crises; thereby leading to welfare losses. Consequently, tough fiscal choices and ap-
propriate monetary policy responses are required to ameliorate the welfare effects
of oil-induced vulnerabilities among oil exporting small open economies.
The literature on micro-founded models with oil price shocks, macroeconomic
dynamics and monetary policy in net oil exporting small open economies is rather
sparse. Medina & Soto (2005), in an estimated New Keynesian small open economy
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for Chile, incorporated oil in
the household consumption bundle and in domestic firms production function and
found that a positive oil price shock resulted to higher inflation and lower output. An
oil-induced output decline is linked to the endogenous tightening of monetary policy.
They also reported that a wage stabilizing monetary policy rule is welfare superior
to those targeting core and headline inflation measures, albeit at significant output
cost. Poghosyan & Beidas-Strom (2011) estimated a DSGE model for Jordan which
feature price and wage rigidities; imported oil as consumption good and production
input; and found that oil price shock caused a huge negative income effect, exchange
rate rate depreciation and current account improvements. They found also that
a pegged exchange rate regime delivers a comparatively low risk premium, with
consequential amplifications in consumption, output and inflation volatilities. More
recently, Hollander et al. (2019) estimated a New Keynesian DSGE model for South
Africa, with oil as a consumption good and a production factor; and reports that
real oil price shock’s effect on output and consumption is significant and persistent.
Thus, they concluded that oil price shock is a fundamental driver of inflation, output
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and interest rates; given that it generated a trade-off between inflation and output
stabilization. Their results also suggest that endogenous monetary tightening in
response to oil price shock undermined economic recovery in South Africa1.
This chapter, however, sets up a New Keynesian small open economy DSGE
model which embeds some fundamental features of a net oil exporting developing
economy. The small open economy produces crude oil exclusively for export. House-
holds and non-oil firms consumption basket and production function, respectively,
include imported refined oil. We assume nominal price rigidity in the domestic goods
sector (Gali & Monacelli (2005)), a competitive labour market (Hove et al. (2015)),
the operation of the law of one price gap (Monacelli (2005), Burstein & Gopinath
(2014)), a perfectly competitive, non-exogenous2 enclave oil producing sector, im-
perfect international risk-sharing, induced endogenously by a debt-sensitive external
risk premium and an exogenous oil price shock; oil subsidy (Bouakez et al. (2008),
Allegret & Benkhodja (2015)) and a monetary policy setting that feature four al-
ternative policy rules popular in most emerging markets and developing economies.
We contribute to the literature in three (3) ways. First, we capture fundamen-
tal features of commodity exporters that re-import the commodity they export in
another form after foreign value addition; thereby leading to job export, low com-
petitiveness, tax burden of foreign origin, in addition to external vulnerabilities
associated with oil earnings volatility3, imported oil and non-oil inflation and for-
eign exchange pressures. Second, we established a direct connection between crude
and refined oil prices in the model. This is not the case with models by Medina &
Soto (2005), Poghosyan & Beidas-Strom (2011) and Hollander et al. (2019) which
were oriented toward oil importing small open economies that exports non-oil com-
modity endowments. Consequently, they did not explore the interaction 4 between
the two price dynamics. In addition, given that the economies of Chile, Jordan and
South Africa modeled, respectively, in the aforementioned papers are fundamentally
oil importing, their model features can not approximate the structural realities in
SOEs that both export and import oil. Third, we highlight the seeming structural
chasm between domestic oil and non-oil sectors in some net oil exporting countries;
by assuming that crude oil is exported wholly to the rest of the world and that oil
sector attracts capital from the rest of the world in form of foreign direct investments
(FDI). Our characterization show the near-zero direct interaction between oil and
non-oil sectors among many developing oil exporters and captures the low levels of
1All three models see the world from the angle of an oil importer.
2Crude oil output is modeled explicitly, as opposed to the popular trend of simply assuming it
to be an exogenous process.
3Due to commodity price fluctuations.
4The interaction between exported crude and imported petroleum prices is key to underlining
external vulnerability in our model
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industrialization in these economies.
Models developed for advanced oil exporting countries such as Dib (2008) for
Canada; and Ferrero & Seneca (2015) and Bergholt et al. (2017) for Norway cannot
be situated in the context of net oil exporting developing and emerging market
economies. These models are enriched with strong domestic inter-sectoral industrial
interactions which often generate significant positive spillovers between the oil sector
and the mainland economy. They generally tend to embed fiscal rules designed to
promote national savings and de-link the domestic economy from the direct effects of
oil price volatility. This is achieved through the operation of a sovereign wealth fund,
where oil profits are warehoused and managed. These features have not yet taken
roots in many oil exporting developing countries. The closest strand of literature
to our model include Allegret & Benkhodja (2015) for Algeria, Algozhina (2016)
for Kazakhstan and Iklaga (2017) for Nigeria; but they do not account for our
observations and resultant contributions. For instance in the case of Nigeria, Iklaga
(2017) assumed domestic oil sector variables to be wholly exogenous, such that
both oil output and price evolve exogenously. Whereas in our model, crude oil
production is endogenously modeled, allowing the oil firm to utilize domestic labour
and imported capital in its production function. Only oil price is deemed to be
exogenous. Furthermore, to our knowledge, no attempt had been made in the New
Keynesian DSGE literature for net oil exporting developing and emerging market
economies to highlight the relationship between crude and refined oil prices.
Given our model characterization, we simulate a negative oil price shock and
analyze the consequent macroeconomic responses under alternative monetary pol-
icy specifications and oil subsidy regimes. Using optimized simple rules, we test for
the welfare implications of implementing the alternative policy rules under three
oil subsidy scenarios given the oil price shock. Optimized simple rules allow for
the possibility of generating robust rules among competing alternative models for
setting interest rate (Taylor & Williams, 2010). In the aftermath of the shock, the
economy experiences stagflation. Stagflation manifests via the income and exchange
rate channels, while increased household external borrowing to smooth consumption
and cushion the effects of fallen income, higher lump-sum tax, rising unemployment,
volatile wages and higher inflation led to an increase in the external risk premium.
In a full subsidy environment, the kind of target variable in the Taylor rule appears
not to matter, as macroeconomic responses to the shock under all monetary policy
specifications exhibit extreme similarity, a development which suggests that oil sub-
sidy may have undermined monetary policy transmission mechanism in the model.
Given free labour mobility, the adverse shock to the oil sector encouraged movement
of workers from the sector to the non-oil sector, thereby boosting non-oil sector pro-
ductivity and output. The central bank responds to inflation and exchange rate
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pressures by raising the interest rate.
Macroeconomic fluctuations under partial and zero subsidy regimes follow sim-
ilar directional patterns as under the full subsidy regime, but response speed and
magnitudes are more pronounced under the former. Although, the monetary policy
rule with oil inflation target is associated with less sharp impact response of oil
consumption, aggregate consumption and aggregate output, it is characterized by
slightly higher volatility over time, compared to other monetary policy rules. Mone-
tary policy response was least aggressive on impact under oil inflation targeting rule
but later became aggressive as the initial fall in oil inflation reversed. Tight external
borrowing condition added an extra source of external vulnerability to the negative
oil shock. The optimized simple rules policy exercises show that either core or oil
inflation targeting maximizes welfare in a full subsidy scenario, while targeting oil
inflation is shown to be welfare superior assuming a partial or zero subsidy scenarios.
This outcome presents a challenge in a rule-based interest rate setting environment,
as the policy maker may jeopardize its credibility as it responds to movement in oil
price, an exogenous and highly volatile variable. Our results suggest that oil subsidy
can play a role in moderating adverse oil shock-induced business cycle fluctuations
and can be welfare maximizing, although, our model assumes efficiency in oil subsidy
administration.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Following the introduction is sec-
tion 2, which describes model environment and equations underpinning behaviour
of agents and the resulting equilibrium conditions. Section 3 presents model cali-
bration, solution and simulation, while in section 4, we analyze simulation results.





We model an oil-endowed small open economy5 with structural characteristics of
emerging or developing economies. There is a representative household whose con-
sumption bundle includes imported refined oil, core domestic and foreign goods.
The household can access international capital market for consumption smoothing
purposes. However, an endogenous external debt-sensitive risk premium term intro-
duces a financial friction which does not allow for perfect international risk sharing.
On the firms side, two categories of representative firms exist; the first is a
monopolistically competitive firm that combines labour and refined oil to produce
core goods for domestic consumption and export; and the second operates as a
perfectly competitive firm, utilizing a production function that includes labour and
foreign oil capital to produce crude oil exclusively for export. There is an importer
with a pricing mechanism based on Calvo (1983b) just like the monopolistically
competitive domestic firm. However, import price is subject to the law of one
price gap in the spirit of Monacelli (2005), reflecting exchange rate incomplete pass-
through.
The labour market is assumed to be competitive, allowing perfect cross-sectors
mobility of workers. The domestic assets market functions to ensure a zero net
supply of domestic bonds. The government levy lump-sum tax on households and
oil tax on oil producing firm’s net revenue. The post-tax balance of oil firm’s net
revenue constitute returns on foreign capital and it is paid to foreign direct investors.
In addition, the government consumes domestic and foreign goods. It also provides
sovereign guarantees for households external debt obligations.
5As shown in figure 4.1
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Figure 4.1: Overview of Model
The central bank cares about agents welfare and sets the interest rate according
to the Taylor rule specification(s) that shows the objective to minimize output and
inflation or exchange rate volatility. The policy maker must choose the particular
inflation measure to target as an instrument variable in the Taylor rule. For the
model economy, the variants we consider include headline inflation, core inflation
and oil inflation. Either of the three is to be combined with either output or the real
exchange rate to anchor inflation expectations, promote macroeconomic stability and
maximize welfare in the economy. Our optimal monetary policy exercise compares
outcomes of optimized simple rules given a negative oil price shock under alternative
monetary policy specifications and oil subsidy regimes. The rest of the world is
assumed to evolve exogenously.
4.2.2 Households
The economy is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely lived households indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1]. Following the One-Agent New Keynesian (OANK) modeling approach
referenced in Gali (2018), we model a typical Ricardian representative household,
who has access to both domestic and foreign capital markets. However, risk sharing
is imperfect owing to an external risk premium.
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4.2.2.1 Household Intra-temporal Consumption
Household total consumption bundle (Ct) is a composite of core (non-oil) goods and


















Where Cct is core consumption, Crot is (refined) oil consumption, Ψro and 1−Ψro
are shares of refined oil and core goods, respectively in the composite consumption
basket; while ν represents the elasticity of substitution between core and oil con-
sumption. Core consumption, following a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)



















Where Cht and C
f
t are the bundles of domestically produced and imported core
goods, respectively. The parameter 1 − Ψf is the home bias term in household
consumption, Ψf is the share of imported core goods in domestic consumption and
$ represents the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution associated with each group
of domestically produced goods and imported foreign produced goods in the core
consumption bundle. The resulting aggregate consumer price index (CPI) is:
Pt =
[
(1− Ψro)(P ct )1−ν + Ψro(P rot )1−ν
] 1
1−ν (4.3)
Where P ct and P rot are the price of core goods and imported refined oil, respec-
tively. The price index associated with core consumption bundles is as follows:
P ct =
[






Where P ht and P
f
t represents the price of domestically produced and imported
goods, respectively in the core goods consumption basket. The total household ex-
penditure [P ct Cct + P rot Crot = PtCt] can be minimized subject to the CES consump-
tion aggregator in 4.1 to determine household optimal allocation for the aggregate
consumption. Thus, the demand for core goods and refined oil in the aggregate
consumption are as follows:













The demand functions for domestically produced and imported goods, resulting















to the CES core consumption aggregator in 4.2 are given as follows:



















P ct = (P
h
t )
1−Ψf (P ft )
Ψf (4.10)
Going forward, the Uhlig (1995)’s linearization method is used to perform log-
linearization on the characterizing equations of the model. It involves taking the
log deviation of each expression around their steady-state values. Each lower case
variable capped with tilde should be taken as the log-deviation of the corresponding
upper case variable from its steady state value.
The corresponding log-linearized price indices in 4.9 and 4.10 are:
p̃t = (1− Ψro)p̃ct + Ψrop̃rot
p̃ct = (1− Ψf )p̃ht + Ψf p̃
f
t
Substituting Pt in 4.5 and 4.6; and P ct in 4.7 and 4.8, respectively; we obtain the
following new corresponding sets of demand functions:

























We can further substitute 4.11 into 4.13 and 4.14 to derive the following functions:







Cft = Ψf (Υt)











, as defined by Gali & Monacelli (2005).
Log linearizing6 4.12, 4.15 and 4.16, we obtain the following expressions:
c̃t
h = ($Ψf )Υ̃t + (−νΨro)(p̃ct − p̃rot ) + c̃t (4.17)
c̃t
f = −$(1− Ψf )Υ̃t + (−νΨro)(p̃ct − p̃rot ) + c̃t (4.18)
c̃t
ro = −ν(1− Ψro)(p̃rot − p̃ct) + c̃t (4.19)
4.2.2.2 Household Inter-temporal preferences















Where the expectation operator is E0, the discount factor is βt, a composite
consumption goods index is represented as Ct and household hours of work are
given as Lt. The relative risk aversion coefficient, otherwise known as inverse of the
elasticity of inter-temporal substitution is represented as η and it is a measure of
the utility function curvature. The elasticity of the marginal dis-utility of labour is





























−1Bt+1 +WtLt + Π
h
t (4.21)
6Log-linearized variables are expressed in lowercase with tilde and steady state variables are
those with with bars and no time subscripts.
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Summarizing all the consumption types in the composite consumption bundle of



















t +WtLt + Π
h
t (4.22)




t , being the household total consumption
expenditure, which include expenditure on imported refined oil P rot Crot , domesti-




t . The household has
access to one period unit of domestic bond, Bt and one period unit of foreign bond
B∗t at the nominal gross returns7 of Rt and R∗t , respectively. A unit of domestic
bond Bt is purchased while a unit of foreign currency denominated bond StB∗t is



















open economy’s endogenous risk premium associated with private foreign bonds and
it is influenced by the ratio of the country’s net foreign asset/debt to gross domestic
product (GDP) and a stochastic risk premium shock (εzt ) in the spirit of Garcia
& Gonzalez (2013). A net debtor small open economy issuing foreign debt must
pay an extra cost (a risk premium) in addition to a foreign risk-free interest rate.
Conversely, if the small open economy is a net creditor, it receives returns less than
the foreign risk-free interest rate as foreign bond holders factor in the country risk
premium.
In addition, the inclusion of the risk premium reflects the empirical evidence in
support of the existence of an international financial friction or imperfect interna-
tional capital mobility as in Benigno (2001) in which domestic agents must pay a
premium above the foreign risk-free interest rate in order to access foreign funding.
In addition, risk premium on foreign bonds has been shown by Schmitt-Grohe &
Uribe (2003) to be an important requirement for inducing stationarity in the small
open economy’s total net foreign assets/debts. In a world characterized by perfect
international financial market, there will be complete international risk sharing and
the the risk premium zt will be equal to unity. St is the nominal exchange rate,
WtLt is wages received from hours of work, Πht is the profits received from ownership
of firms producing domestic goods and τt is the lump-sum tax.
The optimizing household chooses the combination of consumption Ct, labour
supply Lt, domestic savings Bt and foreign borrowings B∗t , respectively, which max-
imizes its inter-temporal utility in 4.20 subject to the consequent budget constraint
7Rt = 1+ i and R∗t = 1+ i∗ being the gross returns on domestic and foreign bonds, respectively.
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in 4.22. The first order conditions (FOCs) defines the household’s labour-leisure
choice, consumption-domestic saving (borrowing) decision and consumption-foreign








































Equation 4.23 is the labour supply equation; which indicates that the optimal
labor-leisure decision must be such that the marginal rate of substitution between
consumption and hours of work or leisure equates the real wage. The inter-temporal
optimality conditions with respect to domestic and foreign bonds, otherwise known
as the Euler equations are represented by equations 4.24 and 4.25, respectively. The
log-linear versions of equations 4.23 and 4.24 are as follows8:
ηc̃t + %l̃t = w̃t − p̃t (4.26)







4.2.3 Domestic Goods Firms
The representative firm produces non-oil final goods for domestic and foreign con-
sumption.
4.2.3.1 Production
The firm combines labour hours Lht and imported refined oil ROht to produce dif-
ferentiated goods for both domestic and foreign consumption. It seeks to achieve
profit maximization by selecting the price of its variety subject to demand functions































8Equations 4.24 and 4.25 are treated further under incomplete risk-sharing
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Where Zht represent productivity variable in the domestically produced goods
sector, assumed to evolve as an auto-regressive process, and common to all firms.
The imported refined oil ROht and labour employed Lht are used to produce the
variety jh. The weights of refined oil and labour in production are given by ϑh
and 1 − ϑh, respectively; while the degree of factor substitution between refined
oil and labour is defined by ωh. This parameter is crucial in the determination of
the significance of the impact of shocks to refined oil on domestic firms’ marginal
cost, output and core inflation. The production function for the domestic goods





t + (1− ϑh)l̃ht (4.29)
4.2.3.2 Inputs, Marginal cost and Demand Functions
The optimal inputs mix of firms can be determined by minimizing the firm’s total

































The first order conditions from maximizing 4.30 with respect to labour Lht (jh)
and refined oil ROht (jh), respectively yields the following:


































In log-linear form 4.31 becomes:
r̃oht − l̃ht = ωh(w̃t − p̃rot )
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Substituting Lht and ROht into Y ht , and re-arranging the resultant expression










1−ωh + (1− ϑh)W 1−ωht
] 1
1−ωh (4.34)












t − p̃ht ) + (1− ϑh)w̃t − (p̃ht − p̃t) (4.36)
Where the domestic price of imported refined oil assuming government subsidy
is given as:
P rot = StP
ro∗
t −Θt (4.37)
Domestic goods sector productivity z̃ht evolves exogenously as follows:






t ∼ N(0, σ2zh)









, respectively; while the corresponding demand
























Where P ht (jh) is the price of domestically produced good variety jh sold at home
and P h∗t (jh) is the foreign currency price of domestic good variety sold abroad. The
parameter εh represents the demand elasticity for domestic good variety jh while P ht
and P h∗t are the aggregate price indices for the goods variety sold domestically and
abroad, respectively.
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4.2.3.3 Domestic Goods Price Setting
Domestic firms are assumed to face monopolistic competition in the home market
such that domestic pricing is staggered a la Calvo (1983b); whereas pricing of the
export component of the domestically produced variety is perfectly competitive9.
Domestically, a fraction of the firms with the probability of 1 − θh receives a price
adjustment signal at time t and thus re-optimizes at t + 1 while another fraction
with the probability θh are stuck with the previous period price because they do not
receive the signal for price reset10. Thus θh ∈ (0, 1) represents a measure of price
stickiness or nominal rigidity associated with the pricing for home produced goods.
The fraction 1
1−θh represents the period of time domestic goods prices are expected
to remain inflexible.
In addition, we assume that firms that can re-optimize11 every period are in two
categories, namely: “forward-looking and backward-looking firms”. The forward-
looking firms adjust prices optimally using all the information at their disposal at
the time of decision making. Backward-looking firms on the other hand, depend
on a rule of thumb for setting prices. They assume information available to them
is sticky, consequently they extract and process such information with delay and
utilize their knowledge about the historical evolution of price levels to set prices. To
reset their prices P ht (jh), backward-looking firms index current prices to previous
period inflation. The index of domestic prices is given as:
P ht (j







The aggregate domestic price index can be expressed as:
P ht =













h) is the new price set by an optimizing domestic firm producing
good jh variety to maximize the present discounted value of expected future profits
(or dividend) stream. The following expression can be obtained by log-linearizing
equation 4.39 and taking first difference:
π̃ht = (1− θh)(
reset
p̃ht − p̃ht−1) + (θh)2π̃ht−1 (4.40)
Firms maximize profit after a new price is set at time t subject to the relevant
9All goods for exports are competitively priced
10Price stickiness exists in the short-run due to staggered prices, menu cost, coordination failure,
etc (Snowdon & Vane, 2005 and Junior, 2016)
11Reset their prices
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 resetP ht (jh)
P ht+k
−εh (Cht+k +Ght+k + Ch∗t+k) (4.41)
Equation 4.41 captures the optimizing firm’s discounted expected stream of prof-
its constrained by the total demand for good jh variety from domestic households
Cht+k, government Ght+k and foreign households Ch∗t+k. Real marginal cost is RMCht+k
while the stochastic discount factor is Qt+k = 1Rt+1 . Taking the first order condition

















Where the expression εh
εh−1
is the mark up and has been regarded as the flexible
price marginal cost as in Galí (2008) and RMCht+k =
NMCht+k
Pht+k
is real marginal cost.

















. Substituting Qt+k in 4.42 and log-linearizing the resulting
























The New Keynesian Philips Curve is obtained by solving equation 4.43 recur-
sively and re-arranging the resulting equation as follows:
reset









Finally, we substitute equation 4.40 into 4.44 to obtain the domestic goods Hy-

















is the coefficient of marginal cost as derived from the
substitution process above. The Hybrid New Keynesian Philips Curve equation in
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4.45 indicates that domestic inflation dynamics in the small open economy is largely




, the backward-looking π̃ht−1 inflation
elements and firm’s real marginal cost.
4.2.4 Imports Price Setting and Incomplete pass-through
A representative retailer imports final core good from the rest of the world and
applies a mark up on the foreign price of imported good. This gives rise to a wedge
between the foreign price of import P f∗t and the domestic price of import P
f
t . Thus,
preventing the the law of one price from holding and resulting to law of one price
gap ψt (Monacelli, 2005). In addition, Burstein & Gopinath (2014) document, based
on empirical evidence, that the pass-through from import prices to domestic prices
is somewhat subdued; thus generating a deviation from the law of one price. The







Analogous to the pricing for domestic goods, the import retailer faces a downward







Import good pricing is subject to Calvo (1983b)’s staggered pricing mechanism. A
ratio 1−θf can re-optimize while the ratio θf cannot change their price. Among im-
porters that can re-optimize, a group is “backward-looking” and the other “forward-
looking”. Following the procedure leading to the derivation of equation 4.43 for






















The recursive solution to equation 4.47, when re-arranged produces the typical
Hybrid New Keynesian Phillip’s curve which expresses the average imported inflation
as a function of the expected import inflation, lagged import inflation and the law









+ θf π̃ft−1 + κ
f
t ψ̃t (4.48)
Where ψ̃t being the law of one price gap, is equivalent to the real marginal cost
RMCt of imports. In log-linear form, ψ̃t = s̃t + pf∗t − p
f
t ≡ qt− rp
f
t . θf is the import
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price stickiness parameter and κft =
(1−βθf)(1−θf)
θf
is the coefficient of the law of one
price gap. If ψ̃t ≡ 1, then law of one price holds, implying that the foreign price of




Equations 4.3 and 4.4, when differenced and log-linearized produces the following
core and aggregate inflation equations:
π̃ct = (1− Ψf ) π̃ht + Ψf π̃
f
t (4.49)
π̃t = (1− Ψro) π̃ct + Ψroπ̃rot (4.50)
Substituting 4.50 in 4.49, we obtain:





From 4.49, 4.50 and 4.51, we obtain the core inflation in 4.52, an expression that
incorporates aggregate inflation and the difference of the refined oil price. Equation
4.51 can be re-written as 4.53 following:









t + (1− Ψro) (1− Ψf ) r̃pht + (1− Ψro)Ψf r̃p
f
t (4.53)
4.2.6 Real Exchange Rate, Terms of Trade and Foreign De-
mand







The log-linear version of the real exchange rate is: q̃t = s̃t + p̃f∗t − p̃t. It is the
ratio of the aggregate foreign price index to the aggregate domestic price index. An
increase in the ratio implies depreciation and appreciation, otherwise.











It expresses the price of imports relative to the price of domestically produced
goods. The log-linear equivalent of 4.55 is: Υ̃t = p̃ft − p̃ht , whose first-difference
yields: ∆Υ̃ = π̃ft − π̃ht .







Where P rot = StP ro∗t is the domestic nominal price of refined oil, P
f∗
t ≡ P ∗t is
the foreign price index and P ro∗t is the foreign price of refined oil. In log-linear form,
4.56 yields: r̃prot = q̃t+ r̃p
ro∗





and the foreign real price of refined oil r̃pro∗t = pro∗t − p
f∗
t . The foreign real price









t ∼ N(0, σ2r̃pro∗). However, this is not the case, as
the evolution of foreign refined oil price has been linked to that of the foreign price
of crude oil, such that crude oil price shock gets transmitted to the foreign price of
refined oil as shown in 4.93 later. Also, the pass-through from foreign refined oil
price to domestic refined oil price will be incomplete whenever government subsidy
applies.
The small open economy exports domestically produced goods and crude oil to
the rest of the world. The foreign demand for domestically produced goods in the









Where the foreign price elasticity of demand for domestically produced goods
is given by ε∗h, the share of domestically produced core goods in foreign households
consumption basket is given by Ψ ∗h . The export sector is modeled based on the
assumption of the law of one price, implying a complete pass-through from domestic





































This expresses foreign demand for SOE’s goods as a function of the real exchange
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rate. Given the small open economy assumption, the share of domestically produced
goods Ψ ∗h in foreign consumption basket C∗t is negligible and preferences between
domestic and foreign consumers are symmetric. Equation 4.58 can be expressed
log-linearly as follows:
c̃h∗t = −ε∗h(p̃ht − p̃t − q̃t) + c̃∗t (4.59)
From equation 4.46, ψ̃t = s̃t + pf∗t − p
f
t . This can be expressed as:
ψ̃t + p
f
t = s̃t + p
f∗
t (4.60)
Given equation 4.60, we follow Monacelli (2005) to combine the log-linear ver-
sions of equations 4.10, 4.46, 4.54 and 4.55 to obtain an important relationship
between the real exchange rate, the law of one price gap and the terms of trade as
follows:
q̃t = ψ̃t + Υ̃t (1− Ψf ) (4.61)
Equation 4.61 expresses the real exchange rate as a positive function of the law of
one price gap ψ̃t and product of the terms of trade Υ̃t and the share of domestically
produced goods in the core consumption basket 1 − Ψf . From 4.60, we can derive
an expression for the nominal exchange rate as follows:
s̃t = s̃t−1 + π̃
f
t − π̃∗t + ψ̃t − ψ̃t−1 (4.62)
4.2.7 Imperfect International Risk Sharing and the Uncov-
ered Interest Rate Parity
Foreign households are required to solve inter-temporal consumption, savings and
labour supply problem analogous to that of domestic household, except that do-







participate in the international financial market. Under this condition, consump-
tion risk is not perfectly shared between domestic and foreign households. Hence,
the need to augment the equality between domestic and foreign consumption Euler































Equation 4.63 can be solved iteratively in line with Gali & Monacelli (2005), to
derive the following expression:
Ct = Ω (Qtzt)
1
η C∗t (4.64)
where Ω is a constant which represents the initial assets position, Ct is domestic
consumption and C∗t is foreign consumption. From 4.64, the ratio of marginal utility
of consumption to price between domestic and foreign consumers is not equal, re-
sulting to a relative demand gap12 shown by zt 6= 1. This underlies the risk sharing
incompleteness between domestic and foreign households in the model .













ψ̃t + Υ̃t (1− Ψf ) + z̃t
]
+ c̃∗t (4.66)
Given equations 4.24 and 4.25, the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condi-
tion which shows the no-arbitrage condition in an incomplete international financial












In equation 4.67, the presence of zt alters the conventional interest rate parity







= Et (q̃t+1 − q̃t) + z̃t. The domestic real interest rate r̃t = ĩt −Etπ̃t+1
and the foreign real interest rate r̃∗t = ĩ∗t − Etπ̃∗t+1. Therefore, the log-linearized
modified uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) condition can be written as:
r̃t − r̃∗t = Et (q̃t+1 − q̃t) + z̃t (4.68)
The expression in 4.68 suggests that the real interest rate differential between
the SOE and the foreign economy is accounted for by the expected exchange rate
depreciation and the risk premium.
4.2.8 External Debt and the Risk Premium
We assume that both households and the government participate in the domestic
bonds market, while only households can access the foreign bonds market. Domestic
12As discussed in Motyovszki (2016) and Jalali Naini & Naderian (2017)
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bonds holding dynamics results to a zero net supply13, such that Bt = 0. For
simplicity, we assume that households do not hold foreign bonds, but issue bonds
to foreigners for consumption smoothing. Consequently, the small open economy is
a net borrower, such that foreign bonds holding B∗t is positive and the household
pays a premium on top of a foreign risk-free interest rate. In the circumstance, if
the SOE were to be a net lender, it would earn less returns on bonds purchased from
foreign issuers, as the country risk premium is priced in.
Following Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe (2003), Cavoli (2009), Garcia & Gonzalez
(2013), Motyovszki (2016) and Kreptsev & Seleznev (2018), the risk premium zt is
influenced by the foreign debt to GDP ratio dt (where dt =
StB∗t
PtYt
= s̃t + b̃
∗
t − p̃t− ỹt)
deviation from it’s steady value d in log-linear form and a stochastic risk premium
shock εzt . We model the risk premium to act as a second indicator of external
vulnerability, beside crude oil price, for the small open economy. The rationale for
this assumption is established in Smets & Wouters (2003) and Smets et al. (2010)
who reported that the domestic risk premium shock acted like a negative demand
shock, leading to extended decline in domestic spending. In addition, a positive risk
premium shock increases the cost of foreign bonds issuance; thereby constraining
domestic households ability to acquire foreign debt to smooth consumption in the
event of an adverse shock. The risk premium equation can be formalized in log-linear
form as follows:
z̃t = Φdd̃t + εzt (4.69)
Where Φd is the elasticity parameter with respect to foreign debt to GDP ra-
tio while εz is the stochastic risk premium shock, assumed to approximate other
influences on the risk premium. The risk premium is an increasing function of the
economy’s foreign debt to GDP ratio.
4.2.9 The Domestic Oil Sector
The small open economy is endowed with oil mineral reserves over which government
exercises control. The representative oil firm obtains a government license and pays
taxes to government. Crude oil output of the representative oil firm is exported
wholly to the rest of the world. The world oil market is characterized by perfect
competition; with the price of crude oil given as P cot = StP co∗t . P co∗t evolves as an
exogenous process as follows:






t ∼ N(0, σ2pco∗) (4.70)
13The domestic bonds market is always in equilibrium. Every amount borrowed by one agent
(say households) is saved by the other (say the government) and vice versa.
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Crude oil production Y cot requires a mix of labour and oil capital captured by
a Cobb-Douglas type production function: Y cot = Zcot (Kcot )
γco (Lcot )
1−γco . Y cot is the
crude oil output, Zcot is oil sector productivity, Kcot is the previous period oil capital,
Lcot is labour supply in the oil sector and γco represents the share of oil capital in oil
production.






t −WtLcot −Rcot Kcot ]
s.t








Where NRcot is net crude oil revenue, the revenue accruing to the representative
oil firm after capital and labour costs have been deducted from gross crude oil
revenue, GRcot (which is P cot Y cot ). Net crude oil revenue NRcot is subject to tax15 τ co
from the government and the balance 1 − τ co is paid as returns to foreigners who
provide oil sector capital in form of foreign direct investment (FDI).
Accordingly, the first order conditions (FOCs) with respect to labour and an oil
capital are:












The law of motion for oil sector capital is as follows:
Kcot+1 = (1− δco)Kcot + FDIt (4.74)
Where FDIt is foreign direct investment. It evolves log-linearly as follows:
˜fdit = ρfdi ˜fdit−1 + (1− ρfdi)p̃co∗t + ε
fdi
t (4.75)
The log-linear expressions for oil sector production function, labour, interest on





t + (1− γco)l̃cot
14The representative oil producing firm is, in effect, trying to maximize government revenues
since it does not make profit











































Where z̃cot evolves exogenously as follows:






t ∼ N(0, σ2zco) (4.76)
Given that oil output Y cot is completely exported to the rest of the world, such





















Where the foreign price elasticity of demand for domestically produced crude
oil is given by ε∗co and the share of domestically produced crude oil in total foreign
crude oil consumption is given by Ψ∗co. Given our small open economy assumption,
the share of domestically produced crude oil in total foreign oil consumption basket
Cco∗t is negligible. Both foreign crude oil price P co∗t and foreign oil consumption Cco∗t
are assumed to evolve exogenously. The log-linear form of 4.78 is:
c̃hco∗t = −ε∗co(p̃cot − p̃t − q̃t) + c̃co∗t (4.79)
4.2.10 The Labour Market
The labour market is assumed to be competitive and this ensures wage equality











in the domestic goods and oil producing









































(1− ϑh)ỹht − l̃ht
]
4.2.11 Government
Government is assumed to consume both domestically produced and imported goods.
It undertakes the importation of refined oil and sells it to households and domestic
firms. Thus, refined oil subsidy constitutes parts of government expenditure. The
quantum of subsidy depends on foreign oil market dynamics and the degree of its
intervention in the sector.
4.2.11.1 Government Demand
The government consumption basket includes domestically produced goods and im-
ports as follows:











Where Ψg and 1−Ψg are weights of imported and domestic goods, respectively, in
government consumption basket. υg is the elasticity of substitution between the two
goods variety in government consumption bundle. Applying the CES consumption
aggregator and minimizing expenditure, government demand functions for the two
goods categories becomes:












The corresponding log-linear equilibrium government demand functions for core
domestic and import goods are as follows:
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g̃ht = υgΨgΥ̃t + g̃t
g̃ft = −υg(1− Ψg)Υ̃t + g̃t
The price index for government consumption expenditure is expressed by:






Consequently, the small open economy’s government minimum total consump-










Fiscal behaviour is assumed to follow an exogenous process as follows:




t ∼ N(0, σ2g) (4.86)
4.2.11.2 Refined Oil Price
We assume government intervenes to smooth the domestic price of refined oil, as
is the case in many net oil exporting developing and emerging economies. Conse-
quently, the domestic refined oil price is modeled as a rule following Bouakez et al.
(2008) and Allegret & Benkhodja (2015), as a convex combination of the immediate
past period’s domestic price and the prevailing foreign price of refined oil expressed
in domestic currency as follows:
P rot = ςP
ro
t−1 + (1− ς)StP ro∗t (4.87)
Where ς ∈ (0, 1) is the oil subsidy indicator and can vary based on the extent
to which government is intervening in the downstream sector of the oil industry.
The foreign price of refined oil is StP ro∗t while the domestic pump price of refined
oil is P rot . If the subsidy indicator parameter ς = 1, the degree of intervention is
total and there is no pass-through from foreign price of refined oil to the domestic
price; ensuring that the domestic price is fixed at the old level and the differential
is completely picked up by government subsidy, Θt. If, however, ς = 0, then there
is no subsidy, domestic refined oil price will reflect fully foreign dynamics of refined
oil price and as such there will be a complete pass-through. We will consider three
(3) subsidy experiments, namely: (a) full subsidy, (b) zero subsidy and (c) partial
subsidy at a fraction of 0.5.
The refined oil pricing rule, though arbitrary since it is not derived from an
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explicit optimization of government behaviour; it is, however, used to reflect the
practice in many emerging small open economies, where domestic price of refined oil
prices are based on ad-hoc pricing templates intended to smooth oil price volatility.
The pricing rule is also useful for showing that fiscal intervention through oil subsidy
may not permit complete oil price pass-through. Also, the fiscal commitment to an
oil pricing rule may be a good anchor for agents expectations about refined oil price
Bouakez et al. (2008). The oil pricing rule can potentially generate an increase or a
decrease in oil subsidy depending on the nature of the oil price shock and the size
of the subsidy parameter. The equation for subsidy is as follows:
Θt = StP
ro∗
t − P rot (4.88)










4.2.11.3 Government Budget Constraint
Government revenue is sourced through receipts from lump-sum tax τt levied on
households and tax on oil firm’s net crude oil proceeds τ coNRcot and government





spectively; and refined oil subsidy16 payments Θt applied on total refined oil imports
M rot .













Where M rot = Crot + ROht with Crot and ROht being refined oil consumed by
households and domestic firms, respectively. The log-linearized overall government
budget constraint is obtained as follows:

































Where τt evolves log-linearly according to the following fiscal rule:
τ̃t = ρτ τ̃t−1 + (1− ρτ )
(
χ1d̃− χ2(p̃cot + ỹcot − p̃t)
)
+ ετt (4.92)
The expression for lump-sum tax include a smoothing component (ρτ ) and its
sensitivity to the economy’s debt to GDP ratio (χ1) and crude oil revenues (χ2).
Many emerging and developing oil producing economies tend to intensify tax efforts
whenever the threat of a debt overhang looms, and when external borrowing condi-
tions become tighter. They tend to relax their non-oil tax revenue efforts whenever
the oil sector is booming (Tijerina-Guajardo & Pagán, 2003).
4.2.12 Interaction between Crude and Refined Oil Prices
We propose a relationship to account for the relationship between foreign crude oil
price and foreign refined oil price based on empirical evidence17. This relationship
evolves log-linearly as follows:
p̃ro∗t = ζpco∗ p̃
co∗
t−1 + (1− ζpro∗)ṽaro∗t + εro∗t (4.93)
Equation 4.93 show that foreign price of refined oil depends on last period’s for-
eign price of crude oil p̃co∗t−1 and the current period’s value added costs ṽa
ro∗
t , which
may include refining cost, foreign tax on refined oil and distribution or marketing
costs. The relationship between previous period foreign price of crude oil and the
current period foreign price of refined oil is governed by ζpco∗ while εro∗t is an ex-
ogenous shock. This pricing rule allows us to establish a nexus between the foreign
prices of the crude oil and the refined version (petroleum). The characterization
can assist a net oil exporting developing economy to gauge the net real value deriv-
able from its oil endowments and underscore the need to maximize the benefits of
oil domestically. Such a country too, can gain insight on the extent to which it is
vulnerable to oil-related adverse shocks. Foreign refined oil value added cost ṽaro∗t
is treated as an auto-regressive process as follows:
17Data obtained from the US Energy Information Administration
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4.2.13 Aggregation and Market Clearing
4.2.13.1 Goods Market
In order to satisfy the aggregate market clearing condition, gross domestic product
(GDP) must equal consumption of domestic goods by households, government and
foreigners; consumption of SOE crude oil by foreigners; consumption of core imports




t +Xt −Mt (4.95)
Core domestic goods are consumed by domestic households, foreign households
and the government, giving rise to the following:







All crude oil produced domestically is consumed in the rest of the world, such
that:
Y hcot = C
hco∗
t (4.97)
Total import comprises imported core goods M ft and imported refined oil M rot .
Imported core goods are consumed by households Cft and government G
f
t while
imported refined oil is consumed by households Crot and used by domestic firms as
























Equations 4.100 - 4.105 below represent the log-linearized open economy aggre-


















































Aggregate bonds is the sum of domestic and foreign bonds (Baggt = Bt + B∗t ).
However, domestic bonds are assumed to be in net zero supply such that Bt = 0; and
foreign bonds B∗t are issued by domestic households while for simplicity, domestic
households do not subscribe to foreign issued bonds.18 Our earlier bonds assumption
results to a bonds clearing condition which equate aggregate bonds holding to total





The labour market clearing condition results from the equality of the sum of em-
ployment in the non-oil and oil sectors to the total labour supply in the economy.






We derive the equilibrium dynamics in the labour market by linearizing 4.107,
and substituting out the log-linear versions of 4.32 and 4.72 in same; together with
18Were agents in SOE allowed to buy foreign-issued bonds, this will count as part of foreign
assets, the bit of the model we have abstracted from
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are the steady state ratios associated with labour in the oil
and non-oil sectors to total labour.
4.2.14 External Debt and Current Account Dynamics
The current account equates foreign debt service adjusted by the country risk pre-


















t Xt − Pmt Mt (4.109)
Where P xt Xt and Pmt Mt are the nominal exports and imports, respectively. These
identities are further defined as follows:






























b̃∗t−1 + ñxt − fdirt +
NX/PY
β − 1
(r̃∗t−1 + z̃t−1 +4q̃t − π̃t) (4.112)
Where ñxt is the log-linearized net export expressed as follows:
ñxt = x̃t − m̃t (4.113)
fdirt is the returns received by oil sector foreign direct investors and it evolves
according to the following rule:
fdirt = 1− τ co(nrcot ) (4.114)
19Although we assume foreign bonds issuance is limited to domestic households, government
liability is implied as these bonds are often backed by the full faith of government.
20In line with Bergholt (2014)
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4.2.15 Monetary Policy
The model is closed with a Taylor (1993)-type interest rate rule augmented with
the exchange rate. The exchange is under some degree of monetary policy watch in
many emerging SOEs. The central bank is assumed to react to deviation of output,
inflation and the exchange rate from their steady state values. It is common in
the literature to include the exchange rate in the monetary policy rules for small
open economy models21. The generalized Taylor rule, in addition to output and
the exchange rate, features three important inflation variants, namely: aggregate

















The log-linear expression for the above generalized monetary policy rule is as
follows:









Where $1, $2, $3, $4 and $5 are weights associated with output, aggregate
inflation, domestic inflation, core inflation and the exchange rate, respectively in
the generalized Taylor rule. The size of each weight reflects the relative importance
of the corresponding variables in the monetary policy reaction function. ρi is the
smoothing parameter and it captures policy inertia or policy history dependence
(Woodford, 2003) while εit is the monetary policy shock. From the generalized Taylor
rule in 4.116, the following alternative policy rules are assumed:
ĩt = ρiĩt−1 + (1− ρi) ($1ỹt +$2π̃t) + εit (4.117)







ĩt = ρiĩt−1 + (1− ρi) ($1ỹt +$4π̃ct ) + εit (4.119)
ĩt = ρiĩt−1 + (1− ρi) ($1ỹt +$5∆s̃t) + εit (4.120)
Equations (4.117 - 4.120) represents an aggregate inflation targeting rule, a do-
21See Gali & Monacelli (2005), De Paoli (2009), Senbeta (2011), Hove et al. (2015), Allegret &
Benkhodja (2015), etc
151
mestic inflation targeting rule, a core inflation targeting rule and a real exchange
rate targeting rule, respectively. Under all the four policy regimes, the policy maker
exhibit permanent interest in interest rate smoothing and aggregate output stabi-
lization; and combines these with one of aggregate inflation (headline), domestic
inflation and core inflation.
4.2.16 The Foreign Economy
Foreign variables evolve exogenously as follows:































4.3 Parameters, Solution and Simulation
The general equilibrium solution of the model is characterized by the sequences
of equilibrium conditions satisfying economic agents first order conditions, market
clearing conditions, the monetary policy rule, the refined oil pricing rule, the lump-
sum tax rule, the government budget constraint, the external debt equation, the risk
premium equation, and shocks. The model solution is up to a second-order approx-
imation around a deterministic steady state level where all variables are constant.
Parameter values are calibrated in line with standard small open economy DSGE
literature while steady state ratios matches stylized features of a net oil exporting
emerging economy. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 below contain parameters and steady state
ratios characterizing the model, respectively:
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Parameter Description Value
Ψro Share of refined oil in HHs consumption 0.25
ν Elasticity of subst. btw. core and oil consumption 0.2
β Discount Factor 0.96
$ Elasticity of subst. within group in core consumption 8
Ψf Share of imported core goods in HHs consumption 0.35
η Relative risk aversion coefficient 1
% Elasticity of the marginal dis-utility of labour 6
ωh Domestic firm’s factor subst. btw. refined oil and labour 0.5
ϑh Refined oil weight in domestic firm’s production function 0.3
εh Elasticity of demand for domestic good variety 1
θh Stickiness parameter for domestic good 0.75
θf Stickiness parameter for imports 0.60
ε∗h Foreign elasticity of demand for domestic goods 1
ρpco∗ Foreign crude oil price persistence 0.88
γco Capital share in crude oil production 0.65
δco Oil capital depreciation rate 0.025
ε∗co Foreign elasticity of demand for SOE’s crude oil 1
υg Elasticity of subst. for govt. consumption variety 10
Ψg Core imports weight in government consumption 0.35
ρzco Crude oil productivity shock persistence 0.85
ρzh Domestic good productivity shock persistence 0.80
ς
Full subsidy indicator 1
Partial subsidy indicator 0.5
Zero subsidy indicator 0
ρτ Lump sum tax shock persistence 0.85
χ1 Tax sensitivity to foreign debt GDP ratio 0.60
χ2 Tax sensitivity to crude oil revenue 0.95
ρvaro∗ Foreign refined oil value added cost shock persist. 0.75
Φd Risk premium elasticity wrt. debt/GDP ratio 0.0001
ρpf∗ Foreign core goods price shock persistence 0.85
ρi Taylor Rule smoothing parameter 0.75
$1 Output weight in the Taylor rule 0.5
$2 CPI Inflation weight in Taylor rule 1.5
$3 Core Inflation weight in the Taylor rule 1.5
$4 Oil Inflation weight in the Taylor rule 1.5
$5 Exchange rate weight in the Taylor rule 0.25
ρi∗ Foreign Interest rate shock persistence 0.85
ρc∗ Foreign core consumption shock persistence 0.90
ρcco∗ Foreign oil consumption shock persistence 0.85
ρπ∗ Foreign inflation shock persistence 0.85
ζpco∗ Refined oil price dependence on past crude oil price 0.90
τ co Tax on net crude oil revenue 0.75
ρfdi FDI persistence parameter 0.55
Table 4.1: Model Parameters
The discount factor β is set at 0.96 implying that steady state real interest is
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in the neighbourhood of 3% annually. The relative risk aversion parameter η is
calibrated as 1, in line with Steinbach et al. (2009)’s estimate for South Africa, a
commodity exporting SOE. The elasticity of the marginal dis-utility of labour % is
set at 6 based on Alpanda et al. (2010). The shares of refined oil Ψro, core imports
Ψf and domestic goods 1 − Ψf in households consumption basket, are 0.25, 0.35
and 0.65; respectively. These estimates are based on refined oil and core goods
imports data for Nigeria. The shares of core imports Ψg and domestic goods 1− Ψg
in government consumption corresponds to those of the households at 0.35 and 0.65,
respectively. The elasticity of substitution between core and oil consumption ν, the
elasticity of substitution between imported core and domestic goods $, and the
elasticity of substitution for government consumption variety υg are 0.2, 8 and 10,
respectively (Hove et al., 2015). The domestic firm’s factor substitution parameter
ωh is 0.5 while refined oil weight in domestic production ϑh is 0.3 (Romero, 2008).
The demand elasticity for domestic goods variety εh is 1, stickiness parameters for
domestic goods θh and imports θf are set at 0.75 and 0.60, respectively based on
Christiano et al. (2005) and Gali & Monacelli (2005); while both foreign elasticity
of demand for domestic core goods ε∗h and crude oil ε∗co are calibrated to 1.
The capital share in crude oil production γco and oil capital depreciation rate δco
are set at 0.65 and 0.025, respectively. The foreign crude oil price shock persistence
ρpco∗ , the foreign refined oil value added cost shock persistence ρvaro∗ and the foreign
core goods price persistence ρpf∗ are calibrated to 0.88, 0.75 and 0.85; respectively
(Hove et al., 2015). We set values for the foreign oil consumption shock persistence
ρcco∗ , foreign core consumption shock persistence ρc∗, foreign interest rate shock per-
sistence ρi∗ and foreign inflation shock persistence ρπ∗ and the refined oil dependence
on previous period crude oil price at 0.85, 0.90, 0.85, 0.85 and 0.90; respectively.
The tax rate τ co on net crude oil revenue is 0.75, the oil sector foreign direct invest-
ment shock persistence parameter ρfdi is 0.55, and the risk premium elasticity with
respect to external debt to GDP ratio is 0.0001 in line with Schmitt-Grohe & Uribe,
2003. The domestic oil ρzh and non-oil ρzco sectors productivity shock persistence
are 0.85 and 0.80, respectively; while values for lump-sum tax shock persistence ρτ ,
and tax sensitivities to foreign debt to GDP ratio χ1 and oil revenue χ2 are 0.85,
0.60 and 0.95; respectively (Santacreu, 2005 and Alpanda et al., 2010).
The smoothing parameter ρi in the Taylor rule, following Ortiz & Sturzenegger
(2007), is set at 0.75. Following Steinbach et al. (2009) and Zeufack et al. (2016),
our monetary policy parameters in the generalized Taylor rule $1, $2, $3, $4 and
$5 are set at 0.5, 1.5, 1.5, 1.5 and 0.25; respectively for output, headline inflation,
core inflation, oil inflation and the real exchange rate. The Taylor rule type that
incorporate exchange rate element is usually envisaged for small open, emerging
markets and developing economies (Mishkin, 2007 and Taylor, 2001). The inclusion
155
of an inflation measure that reflect oil price movement in the Taylor rule captures
the keen attention usually given to oil price developments in central banks of oil-
dependent emerging economies. The Taylor principle requires that weights assigned
to any measure of inflation should be greater than 1, to capture monetary policy’s





Ratio of domestic consumption to total output 0.85
Gh
Y h
Ratio of government consumption of domestic goods to total 0.05
X
Y
Ratio of total exports to total output 0.15
M
Y
Ratio of total imports to total output 0.10
Ch∗
X
Ratio of core export to total exports 0.10
Chco∗
X
Ratio of crude oil exports to total exports 0.90
Mf
M
Ratio of core imports to total imports 0.85
Mro
M
Ratio of refined oil imports to total imports 0.15
Cf
Mf
Household share of core imports consumption 0.85
Gf
Mf
Government share of core imports consumption 0.15
Cro
Mro
Household share of imported refined oil to total 0.75
ROh
Mro
Firms share of imported refined oil to total 0.25
ΘMro
G
SS ratio of oil subsidy to total government expenditure 0.45
τcoNRco
G
SS ratio of govt. net crude oil revenue to govt. expenditure 0.90
τ
G
SS ratio of lump-sum tax to government expenditure 0.10
Gh
G
SS ratio of gov. spending on home goods to total govt. exp. 0.30
Gf
G
SS ratio of gov. spending on imports to total govt. exp. 0.25
Lh
L
SS ratio of non-oil sector employment to total employment 0.85
Lco
L
SS ratio of oil sector employment to total employment 0.15
NX
Y
SS ratio of net exports to total output 0.05
NRco
GRco
SS ratio of net crude oil revenue to gross crude oil revenue 0.80
WLco
GRco
SS ratio of oil sector labour cost to gross crude oil revenue 0.05
RcoKco
GRco
SS ratio of oil sector capital cost to gross crude oil revenue 0.15
FDI
Kco




SS ratio of external debt to GDP 0
ΘMro
G
SS ratio of refined oil subsidy to total gov. expenditure 0.45
QP ro∗
Θ
SS ratio of unregulated real refined oil price to subsidy 3.33
RP ro
Θ
SS ratio of subsidized refined oil price to subsidy 2.33
Table 4.2: Model Steady State Ratios
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Using Nigerian data22 sourced from the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
and the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN),
we obtain twenty five steady state ratios as shown in Table 4.2. The model is solved
in Dynare, utilizing the Blanchard & Khan (1980) procedure and we simulate a 10
percent negative oil price shock before performing an optimization exercise on the
the coefficients of each alternative Taylor rule specifications under three subsidy or
pass-through assumptions subject to the model’s Philips Curve equations.
22The country is a good example of a net oil exporting country described in our model setup
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4.4 Results
A negative crude oil price shock is simulated under three alternative fiscal regimes
and four possible monetary policy frameworks popular in policy circles. The first
fiscal regime implements full oil subsidy which does not allow any pass-through from
foreign oil price to the domestic price. The second fiscal regime implements partial oil
subsidy, allowing for incomplete pass-through to domestic price of refined oil; while
the third regime does not allow for any oil subsidy, thus permitting a complete pass-
through from foreign price of refined oil. Each fiscal intervention is tested under the
four alternative monetary policy settings, namely: (i) headline inflation targeting
(HIT), (ii) core inflation targeting (CIT), (iii) oil inflation targeting (OIT); and
(iv) exchange rate targeting (ERT). The shock is expected to set off responses from
twenty macroeconomic variables, including: headline inflation, core inflation, oil
inflation, risk premium, aggregate consumption, aggregate output, crude oil output,
non-oil output, interest rate, real exchange rate, government consumption, refined oil
consumption, refined oil in domestic production, external debt-to-GDP ratio, non-
oil employment, oil employment, oil capital, foreign direct investment, real wage and
oil subsidy over a forty period horizon. The impulse responses of the variables are
presented and analyzed following the negative oil price shock. The macroeconomic
responses depicted by the various impulse-response functions will reflect the dynamic
sensitivity of the economy to the shock, under different monetary and fiscal policy
considerations.
4.4.1 Oil Price shock under alternative monetary policy strate-
gies and a full subsidy regime (zero pass-through)
In figures 4.2 and 4.3 below, we present the impulse responses generated following the
impact of a ten percent negative shock to oil price on selected macroeconomic vari-
ables under four alternative monetary policy rules, assuming a full subsidy regime or
a zero percent foreign oil price pass-through. A full subsidy regime assumes a fiscal
environment where government insulates the domestic economy from fluctuations
in the price of imported refined oil. If this policy is effective, households and firms
will not be impacted by the shock. As a result, agents will be indifferent to both
positive and negative movements in oil prices.
Our result indicates that both headline and core inflation would rise marginally,
while oil inflation falls by a significant percentage points around period 2. The oil
shock impacts inflation via income and exchange rate channels. The income effect
sets in as oil output (export) shrinks and aggregate income falls. Inflationary pres-
sure mounts as aggregate output declines. This reflects the inflation component of
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the oil price-induced stagflation, given that aggregate output declined on impact
while headline and core inflation rises after a period lag. In addition, the significant
negative effect of the shock on government revenue 23 leads to a fall in govern-
ment consumption. Exchange rate channel on the other hand, operates as foreign
exchange earnings from oil receipts plummet and imports financing becomes more
challenging as exchange rate volatility kicks in. Consequently, aggregate consump-
tion declines, affecting both imported and domestic goods consumed by government
and households; as inflationary pressures mount in the economy.
The shock exposes households to additional tax burden from a government deter-
mined to augment declining oil tax revenue by raising lump-sum tax and borrowing
more domestically. Higher lump-sum tax reduces households disposable income and
thus, constrains their capacity to maintain the pre-shock consumption level. At this
point, households willing to smooth consumption through foreign debt will experi-
ence higher borrowing costs as the economy’s risk premium goes up. The higher
risk premium is caused by higher external debt to GDP ratio and investor concerns
about debt sustainability, in addition to the other prevailing macroeconomic risks.
Increased risk premium acts like an aggregate demand shock, thus amplifying the
effects of the economic slump.
The negative crude oil price shock precipitates a marked contraction in oil out-
put. The crude oil output contraction can be linked directly to the movement of
productive resources away from the oil sector given that both marginal products
of labour and imported capital in the sector have fallen as a result of the shock.
The development causes movement of oil workers from oil sector to non-oil sector
in search of new employment opportunities, job security and better pay, as wage
volatility ensues in the economy. Oil capital exhibit high sensitivity to oil price
movement. The shock resulted to decline in foreign direct investments and capital
accumulation in the oil sector.
Notwithstanding, the non-oil sector appear to benefit from the labour market
slack, resulting from the oil sector slump. The non-oil sector’s output expands as
it attracts more labour resources from the troubled oil sector. Furthermore, non-oil
output may have received additional impetus from higher demand for core exports
resulting from higher export competitiveness occasioned by the real exchange rate
depreciation. The firm does not benefit directly from the oil price decline as its
refined oil cost remain unchanged; since refined oil price changes are absorbed24
wholly by the government. However, the non-oil firm expands its demand for refined
23Ninety percent comes from tax on oil firm’s net revenue while only ten percent is attributable
to lump-sum tax on households
24Government receives the differentials (revenue) when oil price falls and pays the differential
(cost) when oil price rises.
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oil input utilizing savings from the loose 25 labour market. The increased demand
for more imported refined oil by domestic firms may exacerbate foreign exchange
and inflationary pressures in the economy.
Figure 4.2: Responses to a negative oil price shock given a zero pass-through under
alternative monetary policy rules
Figure 4.3: Responses to a negative oil price shock given a zero pass-through under
alternative monetary policy rules
Under the full subsidy fiscal regime, the negative oil price shock resulted to drop
in oil subsidy expenditure by the government after a period lag. This effect is shown
25Workers are less expensive to hire.
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by the temporary reduction in the size of the fall in government consumption from
ten percent on impact to steady state in period two; before plunging further to 14
percent in period fourteen and remained persistent thereafter. This raises a funda-
mental question on the welfare benefits of oil subsidy on the economy, considering
that household oil consumption, household general consumption and government
consumption are all negatively impacted by the shock. The reduction in oil sub-
sidy payments does not seem to have any remarkable impact on agents, as both
household and government consumption still fell in the aftermath of the oil price
shock. The real wage fell on impact before rising in the second period, owing to the
increased labour demand from the non-oil sector and exchange rate depreciation.
By raising interest rate, the central bank responds mainly to exchange rate and
inflationary pressures. This is not unexpected in a situation where the economy is
being simultaneously buffeted by decline in oil and aggregate output and a rise in
key inflation measures, resulting from an adverse oil price shock. In such situation,
the central bank would be expected to accord priority the price stability, being
the primary object of monetary policy. As seen in both figures 4.2 and 4.3, the
choice of one monetary policy rule26 over another does not seem to matter in a fiscal
space that inhibits foreign oil price pass-through to the domestic economy. This is
because macroeconomic responses to the oil price shock follow similar patterns under
all the alternative monetary policy specifications. Our finding underscores how
undermining the full price subsidy regime can be for monetary policy transmission
mechanism. The absence of foreign oil price pass-through neutralizes almost totally
the endogenous differences between alternative monetary policy strategies in our
model. Given that refined oil feature in both household consumption basket and
domestic firm’s production function, it is no surprise that the full subsidy-induced
distortion to domestic oil price weighs heavily on monetary policy.
4.4.2 Oil Price shock under alternative monetary policy strate-
gies and partial subsidy regime (partial pass-through)
Under a partial subsidy regime, the government allows only half of the foreign oil
price changes to impact the domestic price of imported refined oil. As shown in
figures 4.4 and 4.5, the positive response of headline and core inflation to the shock
happened on impact and gets bigger in period 2 before decelerating to steady state
levels in period 6. The responses are faster and larger under the partial subsidy
regime compared to the full subsidy regime, owing to the movement from the zero
pass-through under full subsidy to a partial pass-through fiscal intervention. This
26These refer to headline inflation targeting, core inflation targeting, oil inflation targeting and
exchange rate targeting
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shows that the degree of oil price pass-through has affect on inflation’s sensitivity to
an oil price shock. However, it did not matter which monetary policy framework was
operational as both headline and core inflation measures exhibit similar patterns
under all monetary policy rules. Notably, oil inflation response was negative on
impact and dipped much further by period 2 before turning positive after period
5. Whereas, oil inflation response was mild and negative before returning to steady
state under the full subsidy experiment; it showed stronger negative response on
impact and in period 2 before turning positive after period 5 under the partial
subsidy regime.
The shock elicited instant decline in all consumption variables, arising from the
income effect of oil and aggregate output downturn. The variables received stronger
impact from a negative oil price shock under the partial subsidy regime, compared
to the full subsidy regime. The monetary policy rule with oil inflation target is
associated with less sharp oil consumption, aggregate consumption and aggregate
output response on impact. The headline, core and exchange rate targeting mone-
tary policy rules are linked to stronger oil consumption, aggregate consumption and
aggregate output negative response to the oil shock. Crude oil output decline under
a partial subsidy regime is the same with all monetary policy rules.
In response to the shock, non-oil output rose from five percent on impact to nearly
twenty percent in the second period. The response derives from the combined effects
of the non-oil labour employment increase and the second period real exchange rate
depreciation. The two factors improved the non-oil firm’s domestic and foreign
competitiveness, respectively. It is observed also, that the spike in its demand
for more workers in period two may not be unconnected with the rise in foreign
demand, buoyed by the second period exchange rate depreciation. Furthermore, the
non-oil firm is shown to demand more refined oil input for production under a partial
subsidy regime because it enjoys at least half of the benefit the fall in oil factor cost.
Similarly, its labour cost too declines given that the oil sector sheds more workers
under the partial subsidy regime than under the full subsidy regime. The fall in
the real wage, on impact, is far more pronounced under the partial subsidy regime
than the full subsidy regime; and so was the period two increase. With less subsidy
intervention, the firm’s adjustment to labour market dynamics, foreign demand and
exchange rate developments appear sharper, as reflected by its demand for more
workers, more refined oil and expansion in its output.
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Figure 4.4: Responses to a negative oil price shock given a partial pass-through
under alternative monetary policy rules
Figure 4.5: Responses to a negative oil price shock given a partial pass-through
under alternative monetary policy rules
Given the shock, crude oil output declines, reflecting the loss of oil sector workers
and the reversal of oil capital accumulation, owing to a massive decline in foreign
direct investments into the oil sector. Whereas, oil capital and foreign direct in-
vestment are shown to be indifferent to the degree of pass-through as they maintain
similar pattern of responses as under the zero pass-through scenario, oil output and
oil employment exhibits stronger negative and volatile responses under the partial
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pass-through policy. For most variables, the shock elicit similar macroeconomic re-
sponses under all monetary policy rules except the oil inflation targeting rule under
which many variables exhibit increased volatility. Tracking oil inflation is bound
to be problematic given that the underlining variable (i.e. oil price) is volatile and
exogenous.
The real exchange rate experiences bigger and longer volatility under a partial
subsidy regime, as it appreciates by 1 percent on impact before depreciating by
about 2.5 percent in the second period. Exchange rate volatility persists until its
final return to steady state in period 8; unlike under the full subsidy regime where
exchange rate volatility was contained in size and duration. Households external
borrowing condition tightened as risk premium rose in response to the increasing
external debt to GDP ratio and dwindling oil revenue. The most profound difference
in the impulse responses under the different monetary policy rules is from interest
rate response to the shock. Monetary policy response is most aggressive under the
core inflation targeting rule and followed by its response under the headline and
exchange rate targeting rules. Interest rate response is least aggressive on impact
under oil inflation targeting rule but it turns aggressive over time. The initial slow
response to the shock under an oil inflation targeting rule may suggest a temporary
modest success in anchoring inflation expectations. The result imply that the central
bank will switch to a more aggressive monetary policy under the oil inflation rule
whenever oil inflation threat become elevated. Such a policy environment will be a
very busy one given the volatile nature of oil price.
4.4.3 Oil Price shock under alternative monetary policy strate-
gies and a zero subsidy regime (complete pass-through)
In our zero-subsidy simulation results in figures 4.6 and 4.7, the transmission mecha-
nism of an exogenous oil price shock should be more visible in the domestic economy
in the absence of oil price distortions, associated with subsidy. Accordingly, infla-
tion’s response to the shock is strongest in the absence of oil subsidy. For headline
and core inflation, the impact of the negative oil price shock was immediate, positive
and significant up to period 2 before decelerating sharply and returning to steady
state in period 15. Similarly, the negative oil inflation response was most significant
on impact compared with responses under other subsidy regimes. It moved from
about 2 percent fall on impact to about 6 percent in period 2, before recording a
minimal positive change in period 5 and finally returned to steady state in period
8. Curiously, however, there are not clear differences between all inflation and ex-
change rate responses to the shock under alternative monetary policy rules. The
situation renders the type of inflation measure or variables targeted in the monetary
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policy reaction function largely inconsequential for price movement and the real ex-
change rate. Perhaps, an optimal policy exercise based on optimized simple rules
will make the underlining differences between the alternative monetary policy rules
less obscure.
Aggregate consumption, oil consumption and aggregate output declined in much
the same fashion as under partial subsidy regime; with the response under oil infla-
tion policy rule trailing the rest in terms of response size; and beating the rest in
terms of volatility. Government consumption fall was more remarkable under the
zero subsidy regime. It fell by 10 percent on impact, dipped further by an additional
25 percent in period 2 and the effect lingered for much longer. The huge decline,
though a primary consequence oil tax revenue loss, is compounded by the lack of
fiscal opportunity to accrue savings from negative oil subsidy because there is no
subsidy under the fiscal regime.
Non-oil firm produce more under the zero subsidy regime than under the full
and partial subsidy regimes, although its output is more volatile especially under
the oil inflation rule. Core output growth reflects the effects of increased labour
employment and higher refined oil utilization in the sector, as well as the increased
competitiveness brought about by exchange rate depreciation. The firm benefits
from fall in the unregulated price of refined oil, workers lay-offs or movement from
the depressed oil sector and the greater demand from abroad. Conversely, output
fell on impact by the same margin as under previous fiscal regimes, but it comes
with higher volatility under the oil inflation rule and the partial and the zero subsidy
regimes. The oil output dip is a direct consequence of negative oil price shock which
decreased oil sector’s productivity leading to fall in oil sector employment, economy-
wide wage volatility, fall in foreign direct investment and oil capital deccumulation.
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Figure 4.6: Responses to negative oil price shock given a complete pass-through
under alternative monetary policy rules
Figure 4.7: Responses to negative oil price shock given a complete pass-through
under alternative monetary policy rules
The real exchange rate is most volatile under the zero subsidy market condition,
while both risk premium and external debt-to-GDP ratio increased as well. The
tightening of external borrowing condition reflects macroeconomic vulnerability due
to negative oil price shock, decline in oil earnings, output slump and constrained
consumption, among others. The interest rate response to inflationary pressures
caused by oil shock is most aggressive under core inflation targeting and least ag-
gressive but most volatile under the oil inflation targeting rule. Given complete
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foreign oil price pass-through to the domestic economy, the oil inflation targeting
rule can not elicit an aggressive interest rate response on impact as the economy
experiences decrease in oil inflation. However, the income effect and exchange rate
effects of the negative oil price shock, manifesting through output decline and ex-
change rate depreciation; causes core inflation to rise significantly; prompting an
aggressive interest rate response under the core inflation targeting policy rule.
In summary, our results show that the magnitude of macroeconomic responses to
the negative oil price shock are comparably smaller under a zero pass-through fiscal
policy scenario 27 than under both the partial and full pass-through policies. This
result corresponds to Bouakez et al. (2008) who reported that under a full subsidy
policy, the transmission of a positive oil price shock to the domestic economy is
subdued, since subsidy act as a smoother of macroeconomic responses to the shock.
27The full subsidy regime
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4.5 Optimal Monetary Policy
We implement the optimized simple rules for the four (4) alternative monetary
policy rules given the model’s equilibrium conditions and a negative crude oil price
shock. The experiment is subject to three (3) possible oil subsidy regimes; viz: (i)
full subsidy; (ii) partial subsidy; and (iii) zero subsidy. Under each of the fiscal
regimes, the coefficients of each of the Taylor-type policy rules are optimized28 to
produce minimum variances associated with an ad-hoc expected loss function. The
expression for the variance of the loss function is as follows:
E(Lt) = λπV ar(πt) + λyV ar(yt) + λrV ar(it) + λsV ar(qt) (4.127)
This represents the weighted average of the unconditional variances of inflation,
output, exchange and interest rates. The weights (λπ, λy, λq and λi) are chosen
optimally to achieve the loss function minimization. Policy preferences or weights
combination(s) that delivers the minimum loss value post optimization under the
alternative monetary policy specifications is deemed to be most welfare superior.
In addition, the target instrument under which the minimum loss value is derived
will be considered most appropriate for adoption given the state of things in the
economy. We follow Alpanda et al. (2010), Hove et al. (2015) and Ferrero & Seneca
(2015) to formulate the relative loss function weights that reveals the policy maker’s
preferences of 0.5 to 2; resulting in ten (10) alternative plausible weight combina-
tions. Inflation variance weight is normalized to one (1) as it is done in the literature.
Each weighted loss function is minimized under each of the alternative simple policy
rules to compute the values of central bank losses. Results of the policy exercise are
presented in tables 4.3 - 4.6 in the sections that follow.
4.5.1 Optimized Simple Rules with full oil subsidy (zero pass-
through)
Allowing for full subsidy or a zero oil price pass-through, optimized simple rules
(OSRs) welfare exercise conducted following a negative oil price shock suggests that,
either core inflation targeting (CIT) or oil inflation targeting (OIT) will pass for the
optimal policy under the policy maker’s preference that normalizes inflation to unity
and attaches a uniform weight of 0.5 to other variables29 and the one that maintains
the same weight allocations for other variables while assigning 1 to the exchange
rate30. In terms of the appropriate weighting for each variables in the loss function,
28Using Dynare’s toolbox for optimized simple rules (OSRs)
29This refers to the central bank’s preference No. 1.
30This refers to the central bank’s preference No. 8
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optimal policy favours low weights on output and interest rate, while exchange rate
weight can be slightly higher or same with inflation weight. However, any exchange
rate weight above 1 comes at a significant welfare cost.
CB’s Preferences Loss values under alternative rules
S/N λπ λy λi λq HIT CIT OIT ERT
1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.2135 1.2134 1.2134 1.2843
2 1 1 0.5 0.5 2.291 2.2612 2.2612 2.4652
3 1 1.5 0.5 0.5 3.2973 3.4097 3.2971 3.6349
4 1 2 0.5 0.5 4.3358 4.3283 4.3283 4.8002
5 1 0.5 1 0.5 1.3421 1.3421 1.3421 1.3615
6 1 0.5 1.5 0.5 1.4102 1.4102 1.4102 1.4212
7 1 0.5 2 0.5 1.4632 1.4631 1.4631 1.4712
8 1 0.5 0.5 1 1.2138 1.2134 1.2134 1.2844
9 1 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.2149 1.2135 1.2135 1.2844
10 1 0.5 0.5 2 1.2136 1.2135 1.2135 1.2845
Table 4.3: Loss values under alternative policy rules and zero pass-through
The policy maker’s preference that delivers the biggest welfare losses across all
monetary policy specifications is the one that assigns maximum weight to output.
Any output weight value above the minimum of 0.5 will have adverse welfare conse-
quences. This imply that, given a negative oil price shock realization in a full subsidy
environment, it is not optimal for the central bank to be aggressive about minimiz-
ing output volatility. Under the circumstance, the worst possible policy choice is
to target the real exchange rate in the Taylor rule while trying to minimize output
variance in the central bank’s loss function in an aggressive fashion31. The outcome
will be most unfavourable for welfare. Under the zero pass-through scenario, the
policy maker may be indifferent in choosing the optimal inflation anchor between
core and oil inflation since both yields the same loss value.
4.5.2 Optimized Simple Rules with partial subsidy (partial
pass-through)
Assuming a partial subsidy regime in the wake of a negative oil price shock, central
bank’s preference 1 which assigns the weight of 1 to inflation and 0.5 to other
variables is associated with the lowest welfare loss value under oil inflation targeting
(OIT) rule. The results, as shown in table 4.4 indicates headline inflation targeting
(HIT) trails OIT in terms of welfare performance. Both values are obtained under
the same preference combination 1.
31Assigning weight of 2 to output variance in the loss function
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CB’s Preferences Loss values under alternative rules
S/N λπ λy λi λq HIT CIT OIT ERT
1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.8711 2.1547 1.861 2.4465
2 1 1 0.5 0.5 3.537 3.4865 3.4788 4.7545
3 1 1.5 0.5 0.5 5.1678 5.1021 5.0959 7.0548
4 1 2 0.5 0.5 6.7957 6.7158 8.8841 9.3524
5 1 0.5 1 0.5 2.0574 2.5274 2.5066 2.5209
6 1 0.5 1.5 0.5 2.2377 2.5274 2.2344 2.5808
7 1 0.5 2 0.5 2.6694 2.6694 2.6694 2.6321
8 1 0.5 0.5 1 1.9323 1.9057 1.9031 2.4974
9 1 0.5 0.5 1.5 1.9478 1.9465 1.9452 2.5307
10 1 0.5 0.5 2 2.0019 1.994 1.9879 2.5728
Table 4.4: Loss values under alternative policy rules and partial pass-through
The preferences with greater emphasis on output stabilization also turn out to
be the worst performing in terms of welfare, under all the Taylor rule specifications.
Under the partial pass-through scenario, caring too much about output variance32
under an exchange rate targeting framework will be most welfare-unfriendly. The
partial subsidy fiscal policy scenario may be more aligned to reality in most oil rich
emerging and frontier small open economies. The common approach is a staggered
implementation of subsidy removal, as total oil subsidy removal is often associated
with charged social and political tensions in these economies.
4.5.3 Optimized Simple Rules with zero subsidy
In a world with complete oil price pass-through, monetary policy response to a
negative oil price shock will be most welfare attractive if the policy maker chooses
preference 1, which normalizes the weight on inflation to 1 and assigns 0.5 to the
other variables in the loss function and uses oil inflation as the policy anchor33. The
second best option results from the same policy maker’s preference (preference 1)
under a core inflation targeting Taylor rule. The worst welfare outcome is attributed
to the central bank’s preference that places strong weight on output stabilization in
the loss function while targeting the real exchange rate in the Taylor rule.
32By attaching a high weight (2) to output in the loss function
33See table 4.5
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CB’s Preferences Loss values under alternative rules
S/N λπ λy λi λq HIT CIT OIT ERT
1 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 2.3164 2.2954 2.2927 2.8532
2 1 1 0.5 0.5 5.6185 5.5772 5.6387 5.5547
3 1 1.5 0.5 0.5 6.3844 6.2994 6.2788 8.1971
4 1 2 0.5 0.5 11.0186 8.2868 10.8438 10.8397
5 1 0.5 1 0.5 2.4994 2.4973 2.4947 2.9259
6 1 0.5 1.5 0.5 3.0629 3.0629 3.0629 2.9828
7 1 0.5 2 0.5 3.114 3.114 3.114 3.0353
8 1 0.5 0.5 1 2.418 2.384 2.3792 2.9406
9 1 0.5 0.5 1.5 2.4855 3.0595 2.4667 3.028
10 1 0.5 0.5 2 3.1808 2.5597 2.5831 3.1154




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In table 4.6, we present the comparison between the loss values obtained under
each Taylor rule specifications and the three subsidy regimes for each specification.
The result is shown under ten alternative central bank’s loss function weights com-
binations No. 1 - 10. Evidently, preference 1 returns the least loss values across all
monetary policy setup and subsidy regimes. Under this preference, both core and oil
inflation targeting maximizes welfare the most in a full subsidy scenario. Although,
the model is indifferent between targeting core inflation and oil inflation when oil
price pass-through is muted and the first weights combination is selected, the less
volatile of the two inflation measures may be preferred.
While a full oil subsidy regime may be popular with the public in oil exporting
developing economies, it is the less likely route for fiscal authorities to follow because
of fiscal pressures, subsidy administration inefficiencies and the need for oil industry
liberalization in order to achieve competitiveness and provide conducive environment
for the private sector to flourish. As we demonstrated earlier with impulse responses
in 4.2 and 4.3, a full subsidy regime suppresses the intrinsic individual flavour of each
alternative monetary policy rules, as they all exhibit the same pattern of response
to an oil price shock.
However, assuming a partial or zero subsidy fiscal intervention, targeting oil
inflation is shown to be welfare superior to all other monetary policy frameworks in
the model. A volatile oil price is very consequential for the household in our model.
He consumes oil directly, suffers the burden of higher lump-sum tax resulting from
the negative oil price shock and has a limited capacity to smooth consumption due
to the borrowing constraint imposed by the risk premium term.
Targeting oil inflation presents a daunting challenge for rule-based interest rate
setting strategies, given that oil inflation is hard to track because oil price shock
is mainly exogenous and oil price is one of the most volatile commodity prices.
Furthermore, a monetary policy framework that actively track oil price developments
and responds to oil inflation dynamics may subject the policy maker to the dynamic
inconsistency problem which can jeopardize credibility; a commodity it requires
to succeed in achieving price stability. In an oil inflation targeting central bank,
monetary policy inertia as in Woodford (1999) will become extremely difficult to
adhere to. The policy environment will become volatile if interest rate adjustments
were to happen in reaction to oil shock-induced inflation dynamics. As shown in
figures 4.3 and 4.5, a clear evidence of significant volatility in interest rate response
to the negative oil price shock under partial and zero subsidy fiscal conditions is
found in our model.
Preference 4 in central bank’s loss function weights combinations yield the worst
possible welfare results across all Taylor rule specifications and subsidy regimes. This
suggest that a net oil exporting small open economy may not achieve optimal policy
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if it focuses heavily on smoothing output volatility. Output stabilization objective
can be more feasible if pursued indirectly through inflation stabilization.
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4.6 Conclusion
We build a New Keynesian small open economy DSGE model which capture some
structural features of net oil exporting developing and emerging economies. The
model highlights crucial structural conditions which make less-developed net oil
exporters more susceptible to adverse external events. Using standard small open
economy DSGE model parameter values and steady state ratios obtained based
on the Nigerian data, we demonstrate through simulation how a negative oil price
shock will impact the business cycle under alternative monetary and fiscal policy
assumptions.
A negative oil price shock sets off a chain of macroeconomic reactions that saw oil
output, aggregate income, government revenue and consumption fall while a reverse
Dutch disease situation led to improvement in the non-oil sector output performance.
Given a full oil subsidy fiscal regime, monetary policy is shown to be indifferent
to alternative target variables as macroeconomic responses to a negative oil price
shock are similar under all alternative monetary policy specifications. As subsidy
intervention tends toward zero, and pass-through approaches unity, macroeconomic
volatility in response to the shock increases. Oil inflation targeting is associated
with the least aggressive monetary policy reaction to the shock, but exhibit higher
volatility at longer term horizons. Optimal monetary policy exercise reveal that oil
inflation targeting has the most welfare gain. This results may have been influenced
by our model characterization which captures important stylized facts of a net oil
exporter in which refined oil feature as both a consumption good and a production
factor. Notably, the argument by Natal (2012) that oil price changes operate as a
distortionary tax on disposable income and a source of monetary policy trade-off
amplification seems to hold in our model. Given the income effect of a negative oil
price shock and the impact of low elasticity of substitution between oil and core
goods, stabilizing oil inflation is revealed to be welfare-enhancing.
A monetary policy strategy that targets oil inflation is bound to be fraught with
daunting policy challenges. Oil price, the underlining variable for oil inflation, is
exogenous and highly volatile and to conduct monetary policy based on its evolution
may undermine monetary policy inertia, give rise to dynamic inconsistency problem
and erode central bank’s credibility, a commodity it requires for monetary policy
success. Perhaps, this explains why existing models34 that feature oil generally
abstract from anchoring oil inflation directly when setting up alternative Taylor rules
to be optimized. The common practice in the literature is to consider core inflation
as the approximate inflation measure to respond to in the event of a persistent oil
shock. In our model, the core inflation anchor delivers results nearly equivalent to
34See Medina & Soto (2005), Bouakez et al. (2008) and Allegret & Benkhodja (2015)
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oil inflation anchor, and since the costs of targeting a largely exogenous oil inflation
directly cannot be reasonably conceived, the recommended optimal path for practical
policy purposes will be to target core inflation. Our proposition aligns with Aissa
& Rebei (2012) who recommends that core inflation should be targeted by central
banks of economies with regulated prices given that it excludes distortions arising
from administered prices.
Monetary policy alone cannot address supply side problems and the structural
deficiencies which predispose net oil exporters to external shocks. To that end, net oil
exporting emerging and developing countries must improve domestic productivity,
ensure proper forward and backward linkages between domestic oil sector and the
rest of their economies in order to maximize the benefits of oil endowment, commit
to fiscal rules that de-links government fiscal operations from direct oil revenue
performance, ensure strong monetary-fiscal policy coordination and re-calibrate their
economies to achieve diversification and self-sufficiency in critical sectors.
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